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The general concept of 'investment' has many facets. It can inter 
alia refer to placing money into debentures, treasury bills, or-
dinary shares, oil ventures, cattle or paintings by investors, 
pensioners, speculators or government agencles. It is indeed 
diversity which characterizes 'investment' (Cohen, Zinberg and 
Zeikel1977:3). 
Since this study confines itself in particular to business or 
economic investment, the 'investment' concept in this context 
needs a more precise definition. Business or economic investment 
refers to the purchase and operation of business assets by firms 
with a view to generating net income. The envisaged income ought 
to be commensurate with the risks 1 involved in the venture. The 
profit motive provides the incentive for the operation: any 
businessman who leases a building and invests in fixed and cur-
rent assets believes that these assets will produce profits when 
combined with good management and adequate labour. In the opinion 
of the businessman it should be possible to eventually earn a 
profit on the investment (Amling 1974:5). 
1. Risk can be divided into two components viz. business risk 
and financial risk. Business rlsk is inherent in the firms 
operations and is influenced by management policies, 
economic conditions and consumer demands. Such factors 
create the po~sibility that actual earnings before interest 
a~d taxes wlll devlate from expected earnings. Financial 
rlsk on the other hand describes a firms ability to meet its 
financial obligations such as interest or repayment of bor-
rowed funds (Gup 1983:70). 
1 
The concept of business or economlC investment is synonomous with 
the concept of capital budgeting in financial literature and is 
also given a time dimension by Weston and Copeland (1986:99). 
They describe it as a process that involves the entire operation 
of planning expenditures whose returns are expected to extend 
beyond one year. They regard as obvious examples of capital out-
lays, expenditures for land, building and equipment, and for per-
manent additions to working capital associated with plant ,expan-
sion. An advertising or promotion campaign or a research and 
development program having an impact beyond one year should con-
sequently also be classified as a capital budgeting expenditure. 
Weston and Copeland (1986:99) further observe that individual 
proposals dealing with asset acquisitions, are frequently grouped 
under the headings, 'replacements' and 'expansion' (additional 
capacity for existing or new product lines). 
Amling (1974:5) regard a business investment as an investment in 
real assets which facilitates the production of goods and serv-
ices. Such investment he suggests, should be made only after a 
thorough economic and financial analysis has been undertaken to 
determine the likely pattern of the income to be generated and 
the risks involved. Business investment accordingly calls for the 
careful and rational selection of business assets. Random or emo-
tional responses to circumstances should be avoided. 
Economic investment is thus rendered" distinctive by the following 
features: 
2 
a) it involves the planning by business organizations of expen-
ditures, the returns on which are expected to extend beyond 
one year; 
b) economic and financial analysis precedes action in order to 
determine the net income which can be expected and' the risks 
involved and 
c) the results of the economic and financial analysis are com-
pared against some norm so that a rational decision may -be 
taken as a prelude to action. 
1.2 PURPOSE OF STUDY 
In this study, investment 1S examined from the perspective of 
small business units : the applicability of traditional theory 1S 
probed from a theoretical point of view and a derived conceptual 
model is tested empirically in the Durban-Pinetown-
Pietermaritzburg area. 
The importance of the small business unit is highlighted by Con-
radie (1982:2) who observes that the small business sector sup-
plies 80 per cent of job opportunities in Japan. Equivalent per-
centages for West Germany, the United states of America (USA), 
Korea and Canada, he notes, are respectively 66 per cent, 58 per 
cent, 46 per cent and 30 per cent. In Korea 96 per cent of all 
business firms are regarded as small. 
3 
Nearly 75 per cent of all business enterprises 1n the USA are 
sole traders and 80 per cent of the total number of business en-
terprises (excluding the agricultural sector) have an employment 
of less than 10. 
In West Germany the small trader sector is responsible for 61 per 
cent of total retail turnover, 59 per cent of total wholesale 
turnover and 47 per cent of total turnover of the manufacturing 
sectors. In the USA the small business sector contributes nearly 
43 per cent of the Gross National Product. The small business 
sector in Japan is responsible for 57 per cent of the gross added 
value of the total manufacturing sector. 
Smith (1980:58-68) 1S of the opinion that the magnitude of com-
petition generated by small businesses is so great that they form 
an important cornerstone of any free market economy. 
Around the world, the small business unit clearly plays an impor-
tant role in employment creation, the supply of goods and serv-
ices at competitive prices and economic well being in general. In 
order to optimally realize its economic potential, the small 
business unit therefore needs to manage the resources at its dis-
posal in the most efficient way possible. The capital goods it 
chooses to use in this process are undoubtedly of central impor-
tance. It might accordingly disturb the reader to note that 
studies of small manufacturing enterprises, in the USA and else-
where have revealed that they are generally unsophisticated in 
financial management and employ practices which are 1n many cases 
regarded as inappropriate by researchers. It will, however, be 
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suggested in this study, that the practices traditionally con-
sidered 'appropriate' are in fact, not appropriate at all for 
small businesses and that a different approach toward investment 
decision making is called for. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
Because decision making is the central issue ln this thesis, 
decision making ln general is first placed under the microscope 
in chapter two. Decision making is then placed within the context 
of the firm where, it is found, that objectives fulfil the criti-
cal function of providing decision criteria. The normative 
rationality of the 'economic man' forms the basis of the 
theoretically sound objectives for the purpose of investment 
decision making. However, cognizance is also given to the be-
havioural adaptations which human decision makers bring to bear 
in the situation. 
It is noted in chapter three that at the top of the organiza-
tional objective hierachy there needs to be one central long-
range objective which can integrate the structure into a consis-
teht set of logically interrelated decision criteria. The nature 
of this objective is of importance, particularly for investment 
decision making, as a firm's strategic stance is determined by 
those decisions. Several theories concerning the nature of this 
central long range objective are reviewed. 
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Part of the investment decision process consists of projecting 
expected cash flows from investments which might be undertaken. 
It is argued that these flows have a time value and that they ac-
cordingly need to be discounted to a present value for objective 
decision making. The fact that they are also uncertain needs also 
to be accounted for. 
In chapter four, the attitude of the decision maker tow~rds risk 
is found to be relevant and attention is given to an approach 
toward the measurement of the riskiness of expected cash flows 
and adjustment thereof. 
The relationship between 'cost of capital' and the normative ob-
jective of the firm, which will have crystalized as 'shareholder 
wealth maximization,' will be explored in chapter five. A discus-
sion will follow, concerning the cost of different sources of 
long term funds as well as different methods utilized for the 
calculation of the cost of equity capital. 
Although short term debt is not considered to be an ingredient of 
permanent financing of a firm and should consequently not nor-
mally be used as a financing source for long term investment 
decision making, literature suggest that small businessmen in 
South Africa in fact make extensive use of this source to finance 
investment. A review will consequently also be coriducted of the 
cost of short term sources of funds as a point of reference for 
later discussions. 
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The 'cost of capital' to be used as criterion for investment 
decision making is finally identified as the weighted average of 
the different component costs of capital. 
A survey is undertaken in chapter six of studies concerning the 
cost of capital in the Unites States of America, the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa. These studies focus at-
tention on large stock exchange listed firms as well as their 
smaller unlisted counterparts. 
Approaches toward capital budgeting are examined in chapter seven 
with the particular attention given to the contrast between time 
related and non time related methods. It 1S noted that investment 
must usually be 
availability of 
undertaken against a background of limited 
funds and evaluation methods to cope with this 
phenomenon are discussed. Inflation in the capital bugeting equa-
tion is also considered. 
The results of surveys of the capital budgeting practices of 
listed and unlisted firms in the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa are then reviewed 
in ' chapter eight. 
In chapter nine, two primary problems in the utilization of the 
classic profit maximization objective for the unlisted small firm 
emerge. From a practical point of view they are found to be in-
surmountable and objectives which might directly or indirectly 
contribute to the normative ideal are re-examined. In chapter ten 
efforts to overcome the problems involved are examined but are 
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ultimately found to be wanting. In particular, it is concluded 
that the existence of certain 'behavioural satisfactions' which 
can be secured in the small business unit profoundingly affect 
the discount rate which might truly optimize owners' returns on 
investment. 
In chapter eleven, a normative model for investment decision 
making in the unlisted small firm is constructed. The elements 
for such a model are derived from material considered in previous 
chapters. Against this normative model will be compared certain 
aspects of the investment decision making of small businesses in 
the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg area. 
Chapter twelve 1S devoted to the research methodology to be used 
in the study. The congruency between the unlisted and small firm 
1n South Africa is noted and a 'small firm' is in fact operation-
ally defined as one which will not qualify for a listing even on 
the Development Capital Market of the Johannesburg stock Ex-
change. 
The administration 'and structure of the questionnaire to be 
employed 1S discussed against the background of a number of 
hypotheses which will need to be tested empirically. 
In chapter thirteen the research results will be recorded. An 
analysis and interpretation of the results follows and where ap-
propriate, a statistical test will be applied in order to verify 
or reject hypotheses. 
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In chapter fourteen . conclusions are drawn from the study and 
recommendations are made. These conclusions and recommendations 
are focus sed toward the normative investment decision making 
model previously enunciated. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
It is clear that the findings of the study will not address the 
investment practices of small business units generally. However, 
the overall results might be used as a indicator for small busi-
ness units in other areas and even in other countries as to 
issues of importance in investment decision making. 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
The small business unit is of vital importance in the health of 
any economy. The resources they use therefore need to be op-
timally allocated in terms of objective criteria. Some of the 
satisfactions they generate for owners are, however, non-
financial and can not be expressed easily in terms of traditional 
approaches. 
Resources are allocated in terms of decisions and the process of 
those decisions must of necessity conform to the requirements of 
decision making in general. Attention thus needs to be focus sed 
initially on the decision making process. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
stated simply, a decision is the choice of a particular course of 
action from a set of alternative possibilities. The process of 
decision making, however, involves, in addition, all the steps 
which lead to such choice (Certo 1983:109). A proper understand-
ing of the process of decision making thus requires a careful 
consideration of these steps, which sequentially, are diagnoses, 
specification of alternative courses of action, analyzing the 
consequences of each, comparing such consequences against desired 
ends and finally, making the choice. 
2.2 STEPS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
2.2.1 DIAGNOSIS 
Diagnosing means identifying and clarifying the problem, supply-
lng the requirements for a satisfactory solution and indicating 
the limits within which a solution must function (Webber 
1981:111). 
Ansoff (1965:25) describes a problem as a 'gap' or difference 
which exists between the current position of a decision maker and 
objectives. Should circumstances change, the potential for at-
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taining objectives might be enhanced or diminished. Should the 
former be the case, objectives might be revised upward and the 
resultant gap described as an opportunity. 
Sound diagnosis should thus address three basic elements, namely: 
a) the nature of the existing 'gap' between the results 
we desire and the current state of affairs; 
b) the cause of the gap and 
c) whether the situation imposes limits within which we must 
find a satisfactory solution (Newman, Summer and Warren 
1967:319). 
2.2.1.1 FINDING THE ROOT CAUSE 
Once the problem or opportunity is identified in terms of a 'gap' 
that exists many decision makers move immediately to seeking al-
ternative means of closing the gap. However an effective solution 
can usually be found if an analysis is first undertaken of the 
cause of the gap. 
This point 1S often critical since what at first sight may seem 
to be the cause of the 'gap' can actually be merely a symptom of 
the real root or underlying cause. If however, the root cause is 
elusive temporary symptomatic relief may be sought by dealing 
directly with the symptoms. In a case like this the question of 
what is causing the symptom should continued to be asked until 
eventually the root cause is exposed (Newman et al. 1967 : 322). 
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2.2.1.2 LIMITING FACTORS 
It is imperative that the 'gap' be defined not only ln terms of 
the relevant and proximate objectives but also placed within the 
context of possible higher level objectives or constraints. This 
perspective will reveal whether a particular course of action 
will in some way be inhibited. Koontz, O'Donnel and Weirich 
(1982:114-115) emphasize that before the decision making process 
can proceed, limiting factors need to be identified. In a busi-
ness enterprise, for example, the availability of funds might in-
hibit a promotional campaign designed to lmprove market share. 
They furthermore note that the limiting factor can change from 
one problem solving situation to another. Constraints imposed by 
higher level goals should therefore be stated specifically. 
Without this a satisfactory solution is impossible (Newman, et 
al. 1967:330-331). 
Only when all the aspects of diagnoses have been fully considered 
should the decision making process proceed to the next step : the 
search for alternative solutions. 
2.2.2 GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE COURSES OF 
ACTION 
Rarely does a decision maker immediately find the one perfect way 
to solve a problem. There are usually several different and valid 
approaches to the solution of a problem, each with its own par-
ticular advantages and disadvantages. The two most common sources 
of alternatives are the past experiences of decision makers them-
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selves and the practices followed by others in similar cir-
cumstances (Newman, et al. 1967:335). They warn however that im-
itation should be considered on a selective basis only as a 
source of possible alternatives. Indeed the generation of alter-
natives relies a great extent on the creativeness of the decision 
maker. 
Newman, et al. (1967:336) point out that any alternative that 
adds some new and useful element 1S creative. These authors iden-
tify the following stages in the 'creative' process: 
a) saturation - becoming thoroughly familiar with a problem, 
with its setting, and also with ideas and activities which 
are integral to the problem; 
b) deliberation analyzing ideas, viewing them from dif-
ferent viewpoints and challenging them; 
c) incubation letting the subconcious take over by retiring 
and attempting not to concentrate on purposeful search; 
d) illumination - getting 'bright' ideas: sometimes unconven-
tional and even fanciful ideai but promising and with the 
potential of providing an answer; 
e) ' accommodation classification of ideas, evaluating 
its relevance to the problem, reframing and adapting it, 
putting it on paper and getting other peoples opinion on it. 
Seen thus, it is understandable that creativity 1S seldom as 
spontaneous as one would take it to be. An individual can however 
try to be alert for obstacles that can hamper creative thought. 
Cultural blocks, for example, impose social conformity: most 
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people, consciously or unconciously try to fit ln with the modes 
of living and attitudes of their associates. until decision-
makers break with ' current fashions of thought, really creative 
ideas will be scarce. On the other hand perceptual blocks may oc-
cur because of barriers arising from past experience: the mere 
transfer of past ways of thinking to new situations may block out 
any fresh perception of possible alternative courses of action. A 
popular puzzle which illustrates this concept is the demand that 
an individual construct four triangles uSlng six match sticks. 
Most people will think only of arranging the sticks on a flat 
surface. If the problem is conceived in three dimensional terms, 
a pyramid solves the problem. 
Serendipity is a further aid to individual decision making. This 
concept is defined as the art of finding things we are not look-
ing for. The search for a bright idea to solve one problem could 
turn up some interesting perspective on quite a different issue. 
The art is to recognize how these by products can be put to good 
use (Newman, et al. 1967:345-350). 
Groups are invariably better able to generate creative ideas than 
individuals for the simple reason that 'two heads are better than 
one.' Various techniques have been developed for stimulating the 
creative potential of groups. One of these, brainstorming, In-
volves the following procedures (Newman, et al. 1967 : 352): 
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* the listing of all the solutions group members can possibly 
think of, however wild or impossible they might seem. An 
hour of brainstorming is likely to produce anything from 
sixty to one hundred and fifty ideas; 
* only when the combined reservoir of ideas has been exhausted 
will any critical examination of the list commence; 
* proposed solutions which are not feasible will systemati-
cally be eliminated during this by the group; 
* better solutions might emerge as a result of critical ex-
amination, refinements or adaptations of original ideas by 
the other members of the group. Some ideas which are imprac-
tical when considered in isolation might become feasible 
when combined; 
* a final 'short-list' of feasible solutions is prepared. 
Newman, et al. (1967: 352) note that brainstorming has proved it-
self to be useful in a variety of problem situations including 
the treatment of glass for new motor vehicle designs, development 
of new tyremaking machines, improvement of highway signs and im-
provement of newspaper production processes. 
Another approach to group involvement in generating alternatives 
is known as synectics. 
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This word means ' the fitting together of diverse 
group interaction (Newman, et al. 1967: 353). 
brainstorming in that the leader of a group will 
elements' by 
It differs from 
select a key 
aspect of the problem and pose it as a general issue for discus-
sion. A technical expert within the group also assists in ap-
praising the feasibility of each idea as it crystalizes. Conse-
quently, instead of producing a number of random ideas as in 
brainstorming, ideas are screened or elaborated as soon as they 
are generated. 
Once a decision maker is satisfied that he has generated and 
short listed all feasible alternatives, his next step is to 
analyze each alternative in terms of the projected consequences 
of implementation. 
2.2.3 ANALYZING ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION 
The consequences of each alternative are likely to be both 
desirable and undesirable, both immediate and long range, tan-
gible and intangible. In short, all possibilities should be taken 
into account (Newman, et al. 1967:363). Koontz, O'Donnel and 
Weihrich (1982:115-116) warn that when projecting consequences of 
alternative plans decision makers should think not only of quan-
titative factors but also of qualitative ones. 
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Quantitative factors are those which can be measured numerically. 
A military strategist might quantify projected consequences in 
terms of casualties suffered or inflicted. A businessman might 
project the consequences of his alternatives in terms of positive 
or negative cash flows. 
Qualitative factors are those which are intangible and cannot be 
measured numerically. One example could be the militancy of trade 
unions, a factor which in recent times has become important in 
the Republic of South Africa (RSA). A militant climate might well 
manifest itself in a costly unexpected labour dispute 
precipitated by a decision in an apparently unrelated matter. 
Qualitative factors can thus impact on the projected quantitative 
consequences. 
The projection of consequences necessarily deals with the future 
and the future is uncertain. Certo (1983:111) understates the 
case when he observes that environments and organizations are 
forever changing and accordingly the future consequences of deci-
sion alternatives are not perfectly predictable. 
On reflection, Certo was able to conceptualize the predictability 
of conditions facing the decision maker in terms of a continuum. 
This continuum, which is presented in table 2.1, ranges from the 
completely certain condition to the completely uncertain across a 
range of risk. 
17 
FIGURE 2.1 
CONTINUUM OF DECISION MAKING CONDITIONS 
Complete 
Certainty Risk Conditions 
Condition 
Low Risk Intermediate Risk 





The complete certainty condition is deemed to exist when decision 
makers know precisely what the consequences of a prospective al-
ternative will be: A precise forecast can be made, assigning a 
probability of occurence of 1. 
The complete uncertainty condition exists when decision makers 
have no idea of what the consequences of an implemented decision 
will be. Predicted consequences would consequently be merely a 
matter of conjecture (Certo, 1983:112). 
In between these extremes lies a range of risk. The primary 
characteristic of the risk condition is that decision makers have 
only enough information about the outcome of each alternative to 
estimate how probable the consequences will be if the specific 
alternative is implemented. Obviously degrees of risk consist in 
that the poorer the quality of information related to the outcome 
of an alternative, the closer the situation is to uncertainty and 
the higher the risk associated with choosing the alternative. 
In many practical decision situations where the consequences un-
der consideration are of considerable importance, decision makers 
will attempt to assign probabilities of occurance to each set of 
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consequences projected. Once the consequences of each alternative 
have been noted, quantified where applicable, and placed some-
where on Certo's continuum, it is possible to proceed to the next 
stage of decision making: the evaluation of alternatives. 
2.2.4 EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION 
The need for decision making was discovered in the diagnosis 
~tage by comparing current or expected experience against a 
desired end or objective. Only if a 'gap' existed was there a 
need for a decision. Alternative courses of action were generated 
with a view of closing that gap. The probable consequences were 
projected and quantified where applicable, hopefully on the same 
basis of measurement used for the expression of the original ob-
jective because a comparison now needs to be undertaken. The 
projected consequences must be compared against the desired end 
or objective and each alternative is evaluated in terms of its 
capacity to 'close the gap.' 
In many decision situations the alternatives can be ranked on the 
basis of the extent to which they will potentially contribute to 
the attainment of the relevant objectives. Sometimes none will 
satisfy the principal objective. In other cases more than one al-
ternative will satisfy requirements and additional decision 
criteria might then be brought to bear. 
In the evaluation of alternatives, the attainment of the original 
relevant objectives is of prime importance. They are the decision 




Making a choice can be a very simple step for an individual. If 
only one alternative satisfies his decision criteria, that alter-
native is chosen for implementation. If all fall short, the al-
ternative which comes closest to the ideal might be cho~en and 
the gap closed by lowering the objectives. He might, of course, 
delay his choice and attempt to generate more effective alterna-
tives. Should more than one alternative meet the decision 
criteria and they are mutually exclusive, the alternative which 
offers the prospect of exceeding the objectives by the greatest 
margin might be chosen. Alternatively if more than one objective 
is involved, the objectives themselves might be weighted or addi-
tional objectives might be brought to bear as a further screening 
device. If the alternatives are not mutually exclusive, all of 
the alternatives which satisfy the criteria can be chosen for im-
plementation. 
Choice becomes more complex when an organizational decision 
situation pertains. In theory, the decision maker should subor-
dinate his personal goals to those of the organisation. In prac-
tise this does not always happen. The decision maker might not 
deliberately misuse the organization : he might simply confuse 
personal desires with sound company values when 'choosing' 
(Newman, et al. 1967 : 338). 
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To illustrate the impact of personal goals on choice, a survey 
was conducted amongst 469 business managers in the United states 
and Europe by Megginson, Mosley and Pietri (1983 : 190). The sur-
vey revealed the following: 
a) Managerial decision making at the senior executive level 
tends to be dominated bi individual preferences when the 
decision maker concerned has a strong personal preference. 
One executive for example decided to locate company head-
quarters near his home in spi te of the fact that extensive 
research indicated that it should be located elsewhere. 
b) Managers tend to make personal decisions in terms of per-
sonal goals and then try to convince others that they are 
appropriate for the organization. 
Newman, et al. (1967:381) notes that in order to decide on a 
specific alternative, the decision criteria be applied in a busi-
ness organization ought to be found among the firm's official ob-
jectives. They give the example of a conservatively owned company 
with limited capital, seeking an objective of a stable operation 
with assured profits. As result of this the company placed high 
value in its marketing on the low risk of using a respectable 
outside sales agency. Had the shareholders been less conservative 
the dominant objective of the company might have been growth. 
Clearly a different set of values would have prevailed and a more 
risky but potentially more profitable sales branch might have 
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been the choice. In either case, the prerogative for establishing 
the official objectives would vest with the shareholders and in 
economics shareholders are deemed to be rational beings. 
2.2.5.2 THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY 
March and Simon (1959:137) indicate that the 'rational man' of 
economics and statistical theory makes 'optimal' choices in a 
specified and clearly defined environment. The economic 'choice' 
theory professes the following: 
a) to each alternative course of action is attached a set of 
consequences that will ensue if a particular alternative is 
chosen; 
b) The decision maker has a 'utility'1 function or "preference 
ordering' that ranks all sets of consequences from the most 
preferred to the least preferred; 
c) the decision maker is now going to select the alternative 
that leads to the preferred set of consequences and 
1. utility is a function of personal satisfaction. Something 
that provides more feeling of pleasure than something else, 
is said to have greater utility (Herbst 1985:238). 
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d) the decision maker must choose along a continuum consisting 
of conditions of complete uncertainty, risk and complete 
certainty. 
i) In the case of complete certainty his choice will be 
unambiguous. 
ii) In the case of risk he will be rational if he chooses 
that alternative for which the expected utility is 
greatest. Expected utility being defined here as the 
average, weighted by the probabilities 2 of occurence 
attached to all possible consequences. 
iii) In the case of uncertainty the definition of 
"rationality" becomes problematic. The economic theory 
leans toward the rule of 'mini max' (minimize the maxi-
mum loss). This means 1n effect that the decision maker 
should consider the 'worst set of consequences' that 
may follow from each alternative. He would then select 
that alternative which will minimize the worst effects. 
The rationality of the 'economic man' 1S contrasted by Simon 
(1982) with 'administrative man'. The administrative man he 
claims cannot be aware of all possible alternatives and cannot 
project all the consequences of choosing one alternative 
2. Probability theory is a decision making tool used in risk 
situations or wherein decision makers -are not sure of the 
actual outcome of an implemented alternative. Probability 
refers to the percentage chance of a given outcome. This al-
lows decision makers to calculate expected values for alter-
natives. The expected value (EV) for an alternative is the 
income (I) it would produce multiplied by its probability of 
making that income (P) : EV = I X P (Certo 1983:114). 
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over another. "Administrative man' therefore reduces his problem 
complexity to the point where within his knowledge and limita-
tions he can make a choice. The typical decision maker is there-
fore subject to 'bounded rationality'. Additionally the decision 
maker will make a choice on the basis of his perception of the 
situation and this mayor may not be what the situation really 
is. 
In support of the concept of bounded rationality the 'economic' 
theory of utility of the rational man 1S also placed within 
limits by McGuigan and Moyer (1975 : 36-37). They agree that it 
is extremely difficult to measure individual utility functions. 
They furthermore question the identity of the individuals whose 
utility functions are made relevant to decision making in large 
organizations. While economic theory points to those of 
shareholders, de facto experience points to those of management. 
But which managers? It is suggested that in fact official objec-
tives are often a set of highly ambiguous statements which permit 
individual decision makers to apply 'convenient' interpretations 
at the moment of choice. 
Despite its shortcomings 1n practice, the rationality of the 
'economic man' does provide a sound normative model and it will 
be used as a point of departure in this study. The issue will be 
considered further in chapter 3. However another matter raised by 
March and Simon (1959:139) needs to be reviewed briefly 1n rela-
tion to the question of organizational choice. 
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They distinguish between satisficing decisions and optimizing 
decisions. 
2.2.5.3 OPTIMIZING CHOICE 
According to March and Simon (1959:139) choice is optimal if a 
set of criteria is available that permits all alternatives to be 
compared and the chosen alternative is preferred in terms of such 
criteria to all other alternatives. 
In economic terms, firms will seek to maXlmlze their profits at a 
given level of risk. 
2.2.5.4 SATISFICING CHOICE 
An alternative is satisficing if a set of criteria exists that 
i 
describe minimally satisfactory alternatives and the chosen al-
ternative meets or exceeds all these criteria. 
Business firms, March and Simon (1959:141) allege, in fact pursue 
satisficing such alternatives. In other words they seek satisfic-
ing profits. They hardly ever aspire to optimize or maximize as 
required by rational eGonomists. 
In this respect Carlisle (1982 : 101) points out that a common 
goal in the long range plans of business organizations is to earn 
a relative 'moderate' return on invested capital. If this goal is 
reached performance is deemed satisfactory and shareholders are 
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assumed to be content. Once again this is contrary to the norma-
tive model and the implications will be considered further in due 
course. 
2.3 TYPES OF DECISIONS 
It is necessary to distinguish between two polar types of deci-
sions as indicated by Simon (1977 : 44-62). He differentiates be-
tween programmed and non-programmed decisions as being on dif-
ferent poles of a continuum. 
2.3.1 PROGRAMMED DECISIONS 
Decisions are programmable to the extent that they are repetitive 
and routine. These decisions therefore need not be treated 'anew' 
each time they occur since a repetitive decision routine can 
worked out for them in advance. 
ideal alternative pre-selected 
The problem is repetitive, 




time the problem occurs. Once the decision routine becomes 
operational, the programmable decisions become programmed deci-
slons. 
Figure 2.2 contrasts programmed decision making situations 
against those which are non-programmed. Also reflected are the 
traditional and modern ways of de~ling with the two categories. 
In the case of programmed decisions, the traditional modes of 
habit and clerical standards have given way to, computer assisted 
applications. The principles however are identical. 
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FIGURE 2.2 
TRADITIONAL AND MODERN TECHNIQUES OF DECISION MAKING 
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Adapted from Simon (1977:48) 




















Simon (1977:46) states that these decisions are usually 
novel, unstructured and consequential and that there are no 
cut and dried methods for handling them. The reasons for 
this being that: 
a) these problems haven't arisen before; 
b) the precise nature and structure are elusive and com-
plex or 
c) because of the magnitude of the consequences concerned, 
they deserve custom tailored treatment. 
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According to simon (1977: 46) the problem solving activities 
characterizing these activities, can also be identified by 
the extent to which they involve search aimed at discovering 
alternatives of action or consequences of action. Discover-
, 
ing alternatives may involve inventing and elaborating en-
tire performance programs where these are not available in 
the problem solvers repertory (March and Simon 1959:140). 
Examples of these types of decisions could be the decision 
to add a new product line to an existing product mix, to ac-
quire a new business or to solve a materials handling 
problem. 
Simon (1977:46) very effectively integrates problem solving, 
programmed decisions and non-programmed decisions when he 
states: 
"Problem-solving proceeds by erecting goals, detecting 
differences between present situation and goal, finding 
in memory or by search some tools or processes that are 
relevant to reducing differences of these particular 
kinds, and by applying these tools or processes. Each 
problem generates sub-problems until we find a sub-
problem we can solve, for which we already have a 
program stored 1n memory. We proceed untill by succes-
sive solution of such sub problems we eventually 
achieve our overall goal, or give up. Problem solving 
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may be viewed as a way of reaching non programmed deci-
sions by reducing them to a series of programmed 
decisions!" 
i.4 SUMMARY 
The decision making process comprises a series of steps 
starting with the identification and clear definition of a 
problem or opportunity. In solving the problem or dealing 
with the opportunity various alte r native courses of action 
need to be generated. 
Each of the generated courses must then be rigorously 
analyzed, particularly with regard to the consequences of 
each. This analysis is especially difficult in that future 
consequences have to be placed within a continuum of dif-
ferent degrees of uncertainty. The next step in the decision 
making process comprises a comparison of projected conse-
quences against the original objectives concerned. This has 
l , 
to be subject where applicable to higher order organiza-
tional objectives and constraints. 
In the final step, namely choice, the theory on the 
'economic man' was explored against that of the 
'administrative man'. The former will optimize because of 
complete knowledge of alternatives and outcomes, whereas the 
latter, will satisfice because of 'bounded rationality.' It 
was noted that in a business organizational context, the 
normative model, which follows the pattern of the economic 
29 
man, places the interests and objectives of shareholders at 
the apex of the decision structure. It is their prerogotive 
to determine the objectives of the organization and in deci-
sion making objectives are of overriding importance. Objec-
tives are the alpha and the omega of decision making and 




OBJECTIVES AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of objectives cannot be overstated and yet 
managers in business organizations often make decisions and 
initiate action without taking the time to establish a 
framework of objectives with wnich to guide the decisions 
made by those in the organization (Megginson, et al. 
1983:150-155).The result is a lack of decision harmony and a 
somewhat disjointed, sporadic and apparantly aimless wander-
ing of the organization through time and space. The pursuit 
of individual rather than organizat ional goals would be the 
norm. 
An organization is only successful if it survives and meets 
its objectives (Glueck 1977:44). Accordingly a spastic firm 
can hardly be regarded as successful it does not meet 
whatever objectives might legitimately prevail and if it 






3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizational objectives are the targets towards which 
human groups strive in their quest for survival in an en-
vironment which is sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile. 
The inputs of the organization, its processes and its out-
puts are structured so as to reach organizational objec-
tives. If properly enunciated these objectives should 
reflect the purpose of the organization. 
A hospital may for example have the primary purpose of 
providing medical services to the community. On the other 
hand, the primary objective of a business organization in a 
capitalistic society is deemed to be the making of a profit 
(Certo 1983:53). However, these s t atements of primary pur-
pose as they stand are very broad and imprecise. They need 
elaboration if they are to serve practically as organiza-
tional goals and effective decision criteria. 
3.2.2 SETS OF OBJECTIVES 
Hodgetts (1985:93) reports that an inter industry investiga-
tion in the USA of organization objectives conducted by G.K. 
Shetty showed that the dominant goals of enterprises are 
steadfastly orientated toward profitability, growth and 
market share. Drucker (1981 :82-83) however, asserts that 
the survival of an organizational system may in fact be en-
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dangered if management emphasizes only a profit objective. 
I 
Such emphasis he claims tends to encourage managers to focus 
on the short term and to lose perspective of the long term. 
He suggests that managers should rather attempt to develop a 
variety of objectives in all management system areas where 
activity is critical to the operation and success of the 
system. 
Drucker (1981 : 82-108) identifies eight key areas where 
management should set objectives: 
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1. Market standing: Managers should set objectives that 
will indicate where they would like to be, relative to 
their competitors. 
2. Innovation: Managers should set objectives outlining 
their commitment to the develop~ent of new methods of 
operation. 
3. Productivity: Managers should set objectives outlining 
target levels of production relative to given 
resources. 
4. Physical and Financial Resources: Managers should set 
objectives with regard to use, acquisition and main-
tenance of capital and monetary resources. 
5. Profitability: Manage~s should set objectives regarding 
the profitability the company would realistically like 
to generate within a specified period. 
6. Managers performance and development: Managers should 
set objectives specifying rates and levels of 
managerial productivity and growth. 
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7. Worker performance and attitude: Managers should set 
objectives regaiding worker productivity and attitudes. 
8. Public Responsibility: Managers should set objectives 
outlining their responsibilities to customers and 





of Drucker may well be valid they do 
an integrated approach to the 
specification of sets of objectives. Another approach which 
may well provide a suitable framework involves the structur-
ing of a hierarchy of objectives. 
3.2.3 DEVELOPING A HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES 
Hampton (1981:157-158) relates the goals of a business firm 
-to those of an individual. Just as a person's basic goals 
incorporate more detailed subgoals that contribute to the 
basic goals, so do an organizations: goals break down into a 
network, or hierarchy of objectives. 
From a time perspective, long range objectives can be trans-
lated into short range objectives which serve as a basis for 
day to day operational plans (Hodgetts 1985:95). If 
Drucker's organizational objectives are taken as an example, 
each one will need to be broken down into sub objectives, 
eventually forming a hierarchy of objectives. Figure 3.1, an 
adapted model from Hampton (1985:143), depicts a possible 
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objective for market standing of the light delivery vehicle 
(LDV) division of a South African vehicle manufacturer. 
Should the company desire to capture 70 per 
cent of the LDV market of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
for the said vehicle, the relative objectives could form the 
following hierarchy: 
FIGURE 3.1 
OBJECTIVE FOR MARKET STANDING 
ComEany Objectives 
Capture 70 percent of 
R.S.A. market for LDV's 
LJ LDV Division Objective Produce and sell· 5000 vehicles per annum , 
I 1 Personnel DeEt. Objective 
Provide adequate staffing 




J I I I 
Personnel Specialist Ob;ective 
Arrange for adverts for 
extra labour force required 
" 
. 
Adapted from Hampton (1985:143) 
Apart from the network formed above this company objective 
will also form sub-objectives in other functional areas such 
as finance, marketing and productioni Hampton (1985:42) also 
points out that the concept of a hierarchy of objectives im-
plies that objectives should be established for every 
department and every individual and that such subsidiary ob-
jectives should contribute to meeting the basic objectives 
of the total organization. Such a hierarchy adapted from 






HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES 
TOP MANAGEMENT 
Obtain a return on total investment of 22 per cent p.a. or 
more. 
Increase sales by 25 per cent annually. 
Maintain the 12 per cent current share of the market of the 
RSA. 
continue to develop a favourable public image 
PRODUCTION 
Increase labour productivity 
by 2 per cent p.a. 
Maintain cost of , goods sold 
as a percentage of sales of 
65 per cent or lower. 
Keep scrap level to 1 per 
cent of inventory expenses. 
Purchase and effectively 
use the most up to date 
machinery and equipment. 
SUPERVISORS 
Meet assigned production 
quotas. 
Resolve human relations 
conflict between workers. 
Source: Hodgetts (1985:96) 
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MARKETING 
Increase sales by 25 
per cent p.a. 
Introduce new products 












5 years, 75 per cent in 
value will be new. 
Keep advertising costs 
to within 10 per cent 
of total sales. 
Have at least two 
sales people in each a rate of 
of 125 national sale 
regions. 













Meet monthly sales 
quotas 
Provide advice and 















It is interesting to note that one of the objectives of top 
management is to ma{ntain a market share in the R.S.A. of 12 
percent. This kind of objective has been shown in figure 3.1 
to have its own network of sub-objectives. Likewise each ob-
jective will create its own cascade of sub-objectives. 
3.2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OBJECTIVE 
The necessity of predetermining appropriate organizational 
objectives has led, to what is called 'the principle of the 
objective.' This means that before managers initiate any ac-
tion, organizational objectives should be clearly deter-
mined, understood and stated (Certo 1983:60). 
The practical responsibility for developing strategic goals 
lies with top executive management in conjunction with the 
board of directors who represent shareholders. Once these 
_objectives are developed, functional goals in respect of 
production, marketing, finance and personnel should be 
stated. Once they have been developed, they should be com-
municated to the next lower management levels. This might 
happen by means of a series of cascading meetings between 
superiors and their subgroups continuing from top management 
down to the lowest point of supervision. The nature of or-
ganizations 1S generally such that lowest level managers 
operate within tighter constraints than managers at higher 
levels; the latter formulate the goals of the organization 
and the former translate them into work (Tosi and Carrol 
1982: 241-242). 
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Fulmer (1974:159) even suggests that if an objective is not 
on the tip of a man'~ tongue it is not controlling many of 
his actions. 
3.2.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that while organizational objectives might well 
be focused on profitability, growth and market share, they 
require hierarchical specification and effective downward 
communication, if cohesive organizational activity is to 
materialize. 
A major aspect of an organization's activity and position 
relative to its environment, is revealed in the capital 
goods it acquires. It 1S accordingly essential that here 
too, the 'principle of the objective', be applied. Organiza-
tional objectives should be made explicitly relevant to in-
vestment decisions and they need to be communicated from top 
management to the point of acquisition. 
3.3 OBJECTIVES RELEVANT TO INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Peter Drucker (1981:95), it has be~n noted, (section 3.2.2) 
suggests that one of the key areas 1n which objectives 
should be set regards physical and financial resources and 
in particular the use, acquisition and maintenance of capi-
tal and monetary resources. Drucker further observes 
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(1981:95) that objectives in this area do not usually con-
cern managers throughout the enterprise as do objectives of 
most other areas. Planning for an adequate supply of physi-
cal and financial resources is primarily the task of top 
management and execution of the plans is most often 
hands of functional specialists. 
ln the 
Dean (1954:20) supports this view, inter alia, by quoting 
the president of a large oil company who stated that the 
very last thing he would delegate would be decisions regard-
ing capital expenditure. 
3.3.2 TIME PERSPECTIVE 
Capital expenditure decisions must clearly remaln the 
prerogative of top management particularly as they cumula-
tively express a commitment to the future which is seldom 
easily reversible or changable in the short term. Capital 
expenditure commits an organization to a specific strategic 
stance which will persist for several years into the future. 
Objectives which relate to such decisions must accordingly 
be placed within the framework of the organization's overall 
development plans, its efficiency and competitive position 
(Dean 1954:20). 
A dynamic balance will also need to be maintained between 
technological advance and anticipated developments in labour 
relations. In particular, probable union reaction to the in-
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troduction of more advanced, but labour saving equipment 
will need evaluation with some emphasis on long term conse-
quences. 
The firm's long term capacity to survive requires that in-
come be generated which is at least sufficient to replace 
the resources consumed in the conversion process (Ansoff 
1965 :49). Maintenance and enhancement of real productive 
~apacity must accordingly not be neglected in capital expen-
diture decisions. However, the firm must continually renew 
itself, not only in respect to capital equipment but in 
terms of its capacity to compete effectively. 
New products and markets must be developed and an investment 
must be made in research and development as well as manage-
ment training. Investments of this nature need the perspec-
tive of 
budget. 
a time horizon which lies well beyond next year's 
It is thus · imperative that long term objectives be 
formulated and made relevant to investment decisions. 
3.3.3 RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) 
ROI is a measure which relates profit to the investment of 
funds. It is a measure which might at first sight, seem most 
appropriate for the formulation of bbjectives relating to 
investment. However, as Ansoff (1965 :50) correctly points 
out ROI measures cannot .do justice to the long term perspec-
tive required. 
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ROI is frequently 'loosely' referred to in financial and 
management literature. Whenever it is used, it needs to be 
properly defined. It could mean profit after interest and 
taxes divided by total assets or profit after taxes before 
interest divided by total assets. It could also mean profit 
after interest and taxes divided by owners equity. 
Typically, assets and owners equity are measured as figures 
on a company's balance sheet. These may however not be rep-
resentative of market values of total investment and owners 
investment in the firm. Also, accounting profit may not 
coincide with true return to the owners. 
These return on investment measures, also suffer from the 
defect, that as fractions, the results may be increased by 
reducing their denominators as well as by increasing their 
numerators. It is moreover possible to increase profit after 
taxes and reduce return on investment if the denominator 
grows more rapidly than the numerator. (Porterfield 
1965:15-16). 
Another serious drawback of the ROI objective 1S the fact 
that it does not take cognizance of the time value of money. 
The process of translating future Rands to todays equivalent 
1S necessary because of the opportunity to earn interest on 
money. In return for his current sacrifice a shareholder ex-
pects some future benefit, either as dividends or an 1n-
creased . share price or both. This benefit lies in the future 
while the sacrifice is current. This leads to a study of the 
rate of return of waiting: the time value of money (Joy 
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1980:47). This principle consequently necessitates a time 
related long term objective relevant to investment deci-
sions. 
ROI as company objective, comes under heavy fire from 
Drucker (1981 :103), who states that return on invested 
capital makes sense but it represents the worst of all 
yardsticks. He describes it as pure rubber of almost in-
finite elasticy. He also questions the concept of 'invested 
capital' and puts forward the question as to whether a Rand 
invested thirty years ago is the same thing as a Rand in-
vested now? He furthermore asks the question as to whether 
invested capital is to be defined as an accounting dif-
ference between the original cash value and subsequent 
depreciation written off. In the logically extreme case, 
furthermore, returns can be maximized in percentage terms by 
reducing investment 1n the firm until all that remained 1S 
the single highest ~ielding project. This is clearly an ab-
surd outcome which would inhibit any form of multidimen-
tional strategic stance in product markets. 
Ansoff (1965 :50) suggests that in order to overcome these 
obstacles, efforts to measure long term profitability should 
be abandoned. Instead, the characteristics , of the firm which 
contribute to long term profitability should be identified 
and deliberately pursued. 
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3.3.4 CONTRIBUTING CHARACTERISTICS 
Ansoff (1965 :50) suggests several characteristics which 
/ 
contribute significantly to long term profitability. He ex-
presses these characteristics in the form of generalized sub 
objectives under the ROI banner as follows: 
i) continuing growth of sales at l east at the pace 9f the 
industry to enable the firm to maintain its share of 
the market; 
ii) increase the relative market share in order to increase 
relative efficiency; 
iii) growth in earnings to provide resources for reinvest-
ment; 
iv) growth in earnlngs per share to enable attraction of 
new capital; 
v) continuing addition of new products and new product 
lines; 
vi) continuing expansion of the firm's customer population 
and 
vii) absence of exceSSlve seasonal or cyclical fluctuations 
in sales and earnings and of consequent loss of com-
petitive position through externally forced inef-
ficiency in the use of the firm's resources. 
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3.3.5 INTERNAL EFFICIENCY 
Ansoff (1965 :51) is also of the opinion that in order to 
maintain long-term profitability, internal efficiency is of 
considerable importance. Pointers to internal efficiency in-
clude the following: 
i) Turnover ratios to be compared with those of com-
petitors. A key ratio in this regard is considered to 
be inventory turnover. It is, however, essential that 
valuation methods for the firms inventory be consistent 
with those used by the firms whose records are used in 
the compilation of industry averages. other important 
ratios are also regarded to be turnover of working 
capital, net worth and debt to equity. 
Net worth, however, is a number which taken by itself 
f~ils to disclose the unique composition of a firms as-
sets and liabilities. To compare returns on depreciated 
and technically obsolete plant against an industry 
return based on the installation of new generation 
plant, for example, can yield an entirely misleading 
picture. 
ii) Ansoff (1965 :51) also regards depth of critical skills 
as a key indicator of futur~ profitability. Thjs is 
measured by depth of management, skilled personnel and 
research and development talent. 
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iii) Human and organizational assets must be complemented by 
physical assets and the age of plant and machinery and 
inventory are particularly important here. 
3.3.6 HIERARCHY OF PROXY OBJECTI VES 
Ansoff (1965 :53) evolves a hierachy of proxy yardsticks for 
investment objectives which relate to the overall objective 
in the manner shown in figure 3.3 on page 47. 
The master list in figure 3.3 consist of constraints and ob-
jectives (Ansoff 1965 :67). Of these, the economic objec-
tives exert the primary influence on the firm's behaviour 
and form the main body of explicit goals used by management 
for guidance and control of the firm. Social objectives on 
the other hand, exert a secondary, modifying and constrain-
1ng influence on management behaviou r. 
Constraints are decision rules which exclude certain options 
from the firm's freedom of actions. (Ansoff 1965 :38). 
Ansoff (1965 :58) adds the flexibility objective to his 
master list. This objective can be measured by two proxy ob- · 
jectives namely external flexibility and internal 
flexibility. External flexibility 1S achieved through a 
product\market posture which is sufficiently diversified to 
minimize the effect of a catastrophe. Internal flexibility 
on the other hand denotes liquidity of the firm's resources. 
A firm with high internal liquidity should have a low debt 
ratio to provide it with reserve borrowing power. By con-
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trast to a small debt to equity ratio, a large one is a 
measure of management's use of leverage1 to increase ef-
ficiency of the firm and hence maximize the return to 
shareholders. These conflicting objectives must be resolved 
by management. 
Ansoff (1965 :53) defines his overall objective as a long-
term measure of efficiency of the resource conversion 
process. This objective contains these elements viz. an at-
tribute that measures efficiency; a yardstick by which the 
attribute is measured; and the goal, the particular value on 
the scale which the firm seeks to attain. As attribute he 
selects return on the firm's equity over a specified time 
horizon. 
1. Financial leverage occurs when a firm uses debt to 
finance a portion of its assets. If the firm earns more 
on the borrowed funds than it pays ln interest, the 
return to the ordinary shareholders are magnified. 
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FIGURE 3.3 
HIERACHY OF PROXY YARDSTICKS FOR INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES 
RELATING TO OVERALL OBJECTIVE 
To matter list 
Long ter! objective 
ROI ovei long term 
competitive 
- external 
streng~ E~ienCY - internal 
r 
Growth 
\ I T \ 
Stability Turnover Depth of Age of 
Skills Assets 
Rate of Sales Fluctuation Return on R & D Plant 
growth of sales Sales Manage-
ment 
Rate of earn- Fluctuation Turnover Machinery 
ings growth of earn1ngs of: 
Net Skilled Inventory 
Increase 1n Utilization worth labour 
market share of capacity Working force 
capital 
Expansion of 
product line Inventory 
Expansion of Debt! 
market scope Equity 
Source: Ansoff (1965 :53) 
Ansoff (1965 :40) mentions that business literature has 
reflected a lively controversy over whether the owner's 
equity or total assets or working capital plus fixed assets 
is the appropriate denominator for ROI computations. His 
v1ew, however, 1S that equity p rovides an all inclusive 
measure of top management's performance, including skill in 
the use of outside funding. He regards denominators other 
than owners equity, appropriate for appraisal of performance 
on management levels charged primarily with operating 
responsibilities. 
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As yardstick Ansoff (1965 :41-42) selects the average rate 
of return on equity over an infinite time horizon. The goal 
is to optimize this return. 
Ansoff observes that proxy measurements below ROI level are 
particularly helpful for diagnostic analysis of the firms 
performance. Using them the cause of a sub-standard ROI can 
more easily be identified. A system for such diagnosis has 
ln fact been developed in the so-called 'Du Pont' system of 
financial control.2 It should be noted however that the Du 
Pont method can not be used without reservations as it util-
izes accounting statements which are based on book values. 
3.3.7 Conclusion 
It is apparent that the principal objections to ROI as the 
key long term objective of the firm can substantially be 
overcome by focusing on proxy objectives which reflect on 
those characteristics which contribute significantly to 
long-term ROI of the firm. However more fundamental 
criticism of ROI itself has emerged from numerous quarters. 
Much of this criticism relates to the requirement that ROI 
be optimized. 
2. See Weston and Brigham (1978 40-43). 
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Just as traditional economists who raised 
profit' as the objective of the firm, 
respond definitively to questions such 
maximum'?; 'over what period?'; 'how 
'maximization of 
were hard put to 
as, 'what is 
1S profit to be 
measured?'; modern defenders of the ROI banner are unable to 
quantify their objectives in such a way that formal decision 
theory can be applied in the investment arena. Such absolute 
objectives are too abstract and elusive for practical deci-
sion making. 
Additional and telling criticism of the ROI approach, ob-
serves that the true value of money is not adequately recog-
nized: a Rand available for spending today is unquestionably 
of greater value to the individual than the promise of a 
Rand to spend one year hence, even in circumstances of zero 
inflation. 
Objectives for use as criteria for investment decisions are 
thus needed which may be explicitly stated and quantified, 
have an extended time horizon and recognize the time value 
of money. Theorists in the field of business finance believe 
that an overall objective has been identified which will 
enable the required decision criteria to crystalize. That 
objective is 'maximization of shareholder wealth.' 
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3.4 MAXIMIZATION OF SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Weston and Brigham are amongst the most prominent theorists 
who have explored 'maximization of shareholders wealth'as 
the objective which ought to be central to any rational~y 
managed business enterprise in a capitalist society. They, 
and others like them3 cast all business decisions into a 
dichotomy: those which contribute to owner's welfare and 
those which do not. They assert that decision criteria ought 
to be oriented toward the former. Indeed, decision-makers 
should seek to maximize that welfare (Weston and Brigham 
1978 : 8-13). 
These theorists needed to demonstrate that this 'maximizing' 
does not impose an elusive absolute on the firm: that it can 
be translated into practical decision criteria which will 
facilitate satisfaction of the optimizing requirements 1n 
the choice phase of investment decision making. There was 
the further need to show that 'owners welfare' can be ex-
pressed in measurable and communicatable terms. 
3. This view is shared inter al i a by Joy (1980 : 10-13); 
Solomon (1967 : 22-23); van Horne (1983 6-8) and 
Schall and Haley (1986 : 1-7). 
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Before examining the results of the efforts of these 
theorists, however,' a brief review will be undertaken of 
some cherished but often mistaken beliefs regarding some ob-
jectives which are expressed by those who think that they 
subscribe to the maximization of shareholder wealth school. 
It is necessary to place the shortcomings of these objec-
tives in immediate perspective lest they be raised as valid 
alternatives to the concept of owners welfare. 
3.4.2 INVALID OR INADEQUATE MEASURES 
3.4.2.1 MAXIMIZATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 
Application of 'maximization of EPS' as the key investment 
objective will not allow for choice between earnings streams 
of different time shapes and degrees of risk. Furthermore 
like profit after tax, earnings per share is an accounting 
figure subject to all the defects and conventions of income 
reporting. (Porterfield 1965:15). 
3.4.2.2 PERPETUATION OF THE ENTERPRISE 
Although this objective might well be advantageous to the 
firm's employees it does not always coincide with the inter-
ests of the owners. 
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Some firms are worth more dead than alive : a favourable op-
portunity for liquidation or unhappy operational prospects 
may be circumstances in which perpetuation of the enterprise 
will not be to the owners economic advantage (Porterfield 
1965: 13). 
And in a capitalistic economic system the shareholders' in-
terests must be of paramount importance if optimum resource 
allocation is to prevail in the macro sense. 
3.4.2.3 PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
Profit maximization is central to traditional econom1C 
theory and at macro level it is an objective which is dif-
ficult to fault. Some business financial writers, however, 
try to apply the concept direct l y to investment decision 
making. 
Superficially, it appears to have the benefit of being a 
simple and straightforward statement of purpose. It is also 
seemingly easy to understand ~s a rational goal for business 
and should focus the firms efforts toward making a . profit. 
This objective is furthermor~ wideli professed in practice. 
Nonetheless several weaknesses materialize under scrutiny 
(Hampton 1976:7). 
The first of these is vagueness. What 1S meant by profit 
maximization? Does it mean net income or profit after taxes? 
Is it referring to operating profits or profits per share or 
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net current profits or perhaps future profits? Does it 
denote profits in the short term or in the long term? This 
brings forward the question of when the short term ends and 
the long term begins. The question can also be posed as to 
whether a steady long term profit is to be preferred to a 
large 'immediate gain'? 
The second weakness relates to the question of risk. Ex-
pected income streams from investment alternatives possess 
differing degrees of certainty and uncertainty. The pos-
sibility exists that owners of a firm would prefer smaller 
but more certain profits to a potentially substantial but 
less secure income stream. The profit maximization approach 
does not distinguish between the two. 
The following example is adapted from a model by Martin, 
Petty, Keown and Scott (1979 :5-6) to further illustrate the 
weakness of this objective regarding risk. 
The first of two mutually exclusive investment projects in-
volves the use of existing plant to produce plastic combs, a 
project with an extremely stable demand. The second project 
uses existing plant to produce electric vibrating combs. 
This latter product may become popular but could also fail. 
Three possible outcomes, are sho~n 1n Table 3.1 : an op-
















No variability is associated with the outcome of the plastic 
comb project. With the electric comb, however, the possible 
profit outcomes range from R20 000 if sales go well, to R10 
000 if the sales go as expected, to zero if they go poorly. 
These expected outcomes clearly reveal that the projected 
returns associated with the electric comb involve a much 
greater degree of uncertainty or risk than the plastic comb 
alternative. The goal of profit maximization, however, ig-
nores uncertainty 4 and would consider these projects equiv-
alent ln terms of desirability on the basis of expected 
returns. This conclusion must be r~jected. 
Mo~t investment decisions involve a 'trade off' between risk 
and expected returns. Characteristically, opportunities 
promising the possibility of higher expected yields are as-
sociated with greater risk. 
4. For the classical distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty see (Porterfield 1965 : 107-108). 
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Another objection to using the goal of profit maximization 
as investment criterion is that it ignores the timing of 
project returns. This shortcoming is illustrated 1n an adap-
tation of an example by Martin, et al. (1979:'6) which calls 
for a re-examination of the plastic comb versus electric 
comb decision. In this instance risk is ignored and it is 
assumed that each of these products will return a profit of 
R10 000 for one year. However, it will be one year before 
the electric comb can go into production, while production 




TIMING OF PROFITS 
Incremental Profits 
Plastic Comb Electric Comb 
R10,000 
R10,000 
The timing of the profits from these projects is illustrated 
1n table 3.2 In this case total profits from each project 
are the same but the timing of the returns differ. However, 
money has a definite time value: money received in the fu-
ture is not as valuable as money received today. A process 
of rendering money 'time equivalent' is necessary because 
of the opportunity to earn interest thereon. The plastic 
comb project 1S therefore the better of the two. After 1 
year the R10 000 profit from the plastic combs could, at 
worst, be invested in a savings account earning say 5 per 
cent interest for the year. At the end of the second year 
55 
the return would have grown to R10 500. Since investment 
opportunities are always available for money in hand, an en-
terprise should not be indifferent to the timing of the 
returns. To ignore the timing of the return, as profit maxi-
mization implies, can result in inappropriate investment 
decisions being taken. 
Putting aside the problems of accounting, timing and risk, 
it is sometimes assumed that maximizing profit means maxi-
mizing absolute profit after taxes, in the sense of net in-
come as reported in the income statement of the firm. 
It is in the opinion of Porterfield (1965:14) that maximiza-
tion of this figure may not serve in the owner's best inter-
ests. He points out that it is possible for a firm to in-
crease absolute profits before and after taxes by simply 
selling additional ordinary shares and investing the 
proceeds in traditionally low yielding assets such as Post 
Office savings certificates. Profits before and after taxes 
would certainly lncrease, but earn i ngs per share would in 
all probability decline. 
For example, assume that a company has 1 million ordinary 
~hares in lssue, profits after taxes of R10 million, and 
earnings per share of R10. If a million additional shares 
were issued at a price that would net the company R100 per 
share and the proceeds were invested at 4 per cent per annum 
after taxes, the absolute profit after taxes would rise to 
R14 million (the initial R10 million plus R4 million in 
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earnings from the incremental investment). However earnings 
per share would fali to R7 (R14 million profit after taxes 
divided by the 2 million shares finally in issue). The 40 
per cent increase in absolute profit after taxes would be 
small comfort to the holder of 100 shares who would have 
watched his share of the profit fall from R1000 to R700. 
3.4.2.4. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
whether firms should operate strictly in the shareholder's 
best interests or whether they should assume a respon-
sibility for the welfare of society at large rema1ns a 
debatable point. Some writers suggest that such an objective 
can actually contribute to owner's wealth. 
On Drucker's list, (section 3.2.2) social responsibility 
features as one of the 8 objectives he considers essential 
for any firm. Drucker (1969 :77) asserts that modern 
society demands that business and businessmen be concerned 
about the quality of social life and that that concern be 
central to the conduct of business itself: the quality of 
life becomes the quality of business. In this respect he 
suggests that in financial terms the only truly successful 
business in the years ahead will be the , one that not only 
offers quality products at competit i ve prices but also suc-
ceeds in matching its resources to society's changing 
demands: that business which 1S able to glve creative 
response to the social aspirations of the people it serves. 
On the other hand, the business that fails in the years 
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ahead will be the one that fails to understand how it is re-
lated to society around it and will, therefore overlook op-
portunities for service, growth and profits. 
Uliana, Correia, Wormald and Flynn (1985:5) assert that in 
South Africa the objectives of social responsibility and 
wealth maximization are indeed very compatable. They provide 
examples of consumer boycotts and strikes in the RSA in the 
case of companies who have neglected their social respon-
sibilities. They observe too that these events had a 
depressing effect 
shareholder wealth. 
on share prices and consequently 
By contrast Brigham (1977:6) focuses attention on firms 
achieving rates of return on investment which are close to 
the average of all firms in the industry. He points out that 
if some such firms are socially responsible, disbursements 
would rlse. If the other similar businesses do not follow 
suit, the socially oriented firm will eventually be forced 
to abandon its efforts. It appears that this author regards 
socially responsible actions as so expensive that it can 
cause a significant erosion of the particular firms' ROI. 
Consequently, any socially responsible acts that raise costs 
will be difficult, if not impossible to implement ln in-
dustries subject to keen competition. 
Brigham further states that firms with above normal profits 
can and do devote resources to social projects, however, 
they are severely constrained in such actions by capital 
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market factors. He uses the example of an investor who con-
siders two alternate firms for investment. One firm devotes 
a considerable part of its resources to social actions while 
the other concentrates on profits and share prices. He con-
cludes that most investors will shun the socially oriented 
firm which will put it at a disadvantage in the capital 
market. The question would be posed, as to why shareholders 
of one company should subsidize society to a greater extent 
than shareholders lof another company. Thus, even highly 
profitable firms are generally constrained against taking 
unilateral cost increasing actions. 
Brigham suggests that most cost increasing social actions 
may have to be put on a mandatory rather than a voluntary 
. basis initially to ensure that such actions fall uniformally 
across all business. He concludes that fair hiring and 
firing practices, minority training programs, product 
safety, pollution abatement and antitrust actions are more 
likely to be affected if realistic rules are established 
initially and enforced by government agencies. The rules of 
the game would then become constraints which would inhibit 
all firms equally in their quest for profits. 
Such an approach would however be politi~ally and economi-
cally contrary to principle of fr~edom of choice which 
characterizes a capitalistic and democratic society. 
Reynders (1975:441-442) does not regard. social respon-
sibility as a goal of the firm at all, but rather as an 
aspect to be observed in formulating policies for achieving 
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satisfactory profits. His argument is that those social 
responsibilities concerned with employees (wages, job 
security and satisfaction) as well as aspects imposed on 
business by state like pollution control and minimum wages 
be regarded as costs of runn1ng the business and should 
therefore be passed on to the consumer. Although Reynders' 
view would at first sight appear to exempt the business from 
the costs of any social responsibility, his approach might 
be criticized on two counts. Firstly, if costs can be passed 
on to the consumer, it would seem that the firm was not pre-
viously charging a full market related price. In the pursuit 
of profit the firm ought to pitch prices at levels which op-
timize profits, given a particular marketing m1X and cost 
structure. Should 'costs be passed on to the consumer', 
therefore, the firm is in fact taking a price it should have 
reaped in the first place. 
The second point on -which issue may be taken with Reynder's 
approach, 1S the adoption of 'satisfactory' goals. Such 
goals would be even more elastic, elusive and inappropriate 
to investment decision making than ROI objectives. Thus in-
stead of finding in Reynders' work, some· support for the 
camp opposed to the social objective, we find a red herring. 
Friedman on the other hand, outspoken disciple of free en-
terprise as the key to a better life for all states une-
quivocally that profit goals cannot be sacrificed for social 
goals. Friedman (1962:133) emphasizes that the only social 
responsibility of business is to use its resources and 
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engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it engages in free competition without deception or 
fraud. He adds that few trends could so thoroughly undermine 
the very foundations of free society as the acceptance by 
company officials for a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money as possible for their shareholders~ He 
argues, that if funds are diverted to social programs 
without shareholder's approval the effect in essence is 
taxation without representation. Also, if business pursues 
too much social activity, its performance may eventually be 
measured by social rather than economic criteria. This 1n 
effect may lead to less economic efficiency and produce con-
sequences to the disadvantage of all society. He concludes 
that business responsibility lies in economic and not social 
programs, the latter being government's responsibility. 
It thus remains a debatable question as to whether the goal 
of social responsibility 1S 1n all cases incompatible with 
the profit goal. A social deed ostensibly aimed at the al-
leviation of stress on the consumer's household budget as in 
the case of the slogan 'we will keep the bread price at the 
old level for the next three months' can very well lead to 
an increased turnover 1n the overall product mix of the 
firm. So much so that the social deed could prove to be a 
worthwhile investment. 
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3.4.3 OWNERS WELFARE 
It is suggested that in order to make a valid formulation of 
the objective of firms, it is helpful to revert to the ob-
jective of the individual. In this regard it is pointed out 
that the objective of the rational individual in making his 
financial decisions should be to maximize the utility of his 
consumption over time. In other words he should strive to 
consume goods and services in the amounts and patterns and 
at the times that will yield him the greatest satisfaction. 
To do so, he will seek to maximize the economic wealth which 
can be derived from any investment (Porterfield 1965:16). 
This, according to the author, forms the touchstone by which 
the objective of the firm may be formulated. The firm's 
response to the investor or owner/si aspirations ought to be 
to aid owners ln reaching their objective. It is the owners 
welfare which is of paramount importance. The question that 
now becomes relevant is the manner in which the firm may aid 
its owners in achieving their objectives. The answer can be 
found through a consideration of risk and profitability ln 
the following example: 
Consider two hypothetical firms A and B. The firms have 
identical expected profits (R1 per ordinary share). If it is 
assumed that firm B expects to earn -its profit by investing 
in a riskier venture than A [viz. financing a textbook on 
investment] the market price of the ordinary shares of firm 
A will, ceteris paribus, tend to be higher than that of firm 
B (both offer investors the same expected earnings but B has 
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a much higher risk). The situation gets more complex if it 
1S assumed that the risky venture undertaken by B, offers 
higher expected earnings. Suppose that firm B can earn RI 
with certainty or, alternatively, R2 with a 90 per cent 
probability, but there is also a 10 percent probability that 
the firm could go bankrupt. The decision situation is com-
plex. Is the possible additional RI of profit sufficient to 
offset the 10 per cent chance of going bankrupt? 
The answer is dependent upon the share market's evaluation 
of the risk/return tradeoff implicit in the venture. If the 
greater expectation of return outweighs the increase in risk 
the share price will be expected to rise if the project is 
undertaken. Conversely if the riskiness outweighs the in-
crease 1n expected returns the share price will be expected 
to drop. 
If the goal of the firm is defined in terms of the market 
value of its ordinary shares, this calls for an effort on 
the part of management to seek an optimum balance between 
risk "and profitability. The general decision problem faced 
by the firm is summarized in figure 3.4. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
DECISION INVOLVING RISK/RETURN TRADE OFF 
Decision 
aXlmum Profit 
Levy and Sarnat (1982:10-11). 
Maximum Value 
~----~ of stock 
The unrealistic alternative A where the results of all deci-
sions are known in advance with certainty should have as ob-
jective the maximization of the firm's long run profit. 
However, when uncertainty prevails, as it does in the real 
world, risks as well as profits must be considered, and the 
choice will hinge around that combination of risk and profit 
which maximizes the value of the firms' ordinary shares 
(Levy and Sarnat 1982:100). Maximization of the firm's value 
to its shareholders is represented by the market price of 
the firm's ordinary shares (van Horne, 1983:6). 
Wealth maximization of the shareholders/owners of the firm 
is thus effectively bound to the maximization of the market 
value of its ordinary shares. 
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Owners can, with their wealth maximized, adjust their fund 
flows in such a way as to optimize their consumption by 
buying and selling or borrowing and lending shares in the 
market. For instance, if a shareholder finds that the cash 
flowing to him from his investment, is greater than that re-
quired for his preferred level of current consumption, he 
would reinvest ' the excess funds by lending them out or 
buying investment assets. On the other hand, if the cash 
flows to him were insufficient for his consumption purposes, 
he would borrow funds or sell assets to redress the balance 
(Porterfield 1965:16). 
Financial theorists have favoured the wealth maximization 
objective because it serves as a focal point for all the 
considerations in operating the firm and it is a measure 
that is often easily observed. Theoretically, if the firm is 
not making the right investment or financial decision, the 
share price will drop, and when making the right decision 
the share price will rise (Bolten 1976:16). The reason for 
this is that marginal shareholders, those tempted to either 
buy or sell at the prevailing price, will have their deci-
sions triggered by their estimation of the future stream of 
cash to be expected from investment in the shares in ques-
tion. The present valuesof that future stream will need to 
be positive to trigger purchase orders or to 
5. The current worth of a future sum considering the time 
value of money 
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avert selling orders, and calculation of the present value 
can be made only by referral to the investor's own required 
rate of return. His expected cash flows from the investment 
depends on his perception of the company's capacity to gen-
erate profits and to pay dividends. Should he consider that 
the company is utilizing shareholders funds in projects 
which should yield returns which are greater than his own 
required rate (given an equal risk rating), his assessment 
of the situation will trigger a buying order. When many mar-
ginal investors reach the same conclusion, their combined 
pressure of demand will cause an increase in the share price 
concerned. 
A share price maximizing framework thus has the advantage of 
looking beyond the short run. It explicitly seeks to incor-
porate into the firm's planning a consciousness of the en-
tire future stream of earnings that it will generate, with 
the time value of money fully appreciated. It also requires 
information about the discount rate that marginal 
shareholders use to convert a firm's expected earnings into 
present value (Lerner 1971:343). 
Reynder's views (1975:428-429) which have already been 
touched on but rejected, acquire new meaning when examined 
from the perspective of wealth maximization. Reynders 
regards the objective of the firm as a 'target rate of 
return'. Instead of regarding Reynder's target rate of 
return as a simple satisficing objective of the firm, it can 
conceptually be adopted for use as a 'cut off rate': an in-
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vestment made at such rate would neither increase nor 
decrease the market value of the equity of the firm. Any In-
vestment by the firm that yields a rate which is higher than 
the 'cut off rate' will tend to increase the market value of 
the equity or net worth 6 and any investment that yields a 
lower rate will lower that value'. Reynders also suggested 
that the 'target rate' should be measured in terms of the 
'lending rate' or opportunity cost of capital.? This sug-
gestion will be further explored ln relation to the inves-
tors required rate of return in a later chapter. 
However it should at the outset be noted that the obser-
vability of a proper market related share price is of prime 
importance for the determination of the marginal investor's 
required rate of return. Shares which are listed on stock 
exchanges around the world generally satisfy this requlre-
ment. But unlisted shares face valuation difficulties. This 
problem will be addressed in a later chapter. It is at this 
stage advisable not to lose sight of the practical problem 
of a possible conflict between the personal goals of 
managers and maximization of shareholder's wealth. 
6. Henderson, Trennepohl and Wert (1984: 609) defines 
'net worth' as the book value of owner's claims on a 
company~ equal to assets minus total liabilities. 
7. Opportunity cost is defined by Weston and Brigham (1978 
1016) as the rate of return on the best alternative 
investment available. 'Lending rate' is generally 
synonomous with opportunity cost and is encountered as 
such in Dutch literature. See Scheffer (1968 : 107). 
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In this regard, Weston and Brigham (1978:10) observe that 
there are some large, well entrenched companies whose 
managers attempt to keep shareholder's returns at a merely 
fair or reasonable level. Thereafter, they devote their at-
tention and company resources to public serV1ce activities, 
to employer benefits, or to higher management salaries. 
Similarly, well entrenched managements sometimes try to 
avoid risky ventures, even when the possible gains to 
shareholders are high enough to warrant the gamble. These 
managers would argue that shareholders are usually well 
diversified; holding portfolios of many different shares, so 
if any company takes a chance and loses, the shareholders 
lose only a small part of their wealth. Managers, however, 
would be affected more seriously because they are not diver-
sified and would lose their jobs. Accordingly it 1S not 
surprising that managers of such firms will prefer to play 
safe, rather than agressively seeking to maximize the prices 
of their firms' shares. Managers behaving in this manner can 
indeed place investment theory in jeopardy through their un-
derstandable but counterproductive attitude. 
Weston and Brigham (1978:10) refer to Lewellen who states 
that top managers of large firms have most of their personal 
wealth tied to their firm's fortunes. Hence they are likely 
to behave more like owners than literature would suggest. 
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In South Africa, enthusiastic support has been given to 
share incentive schemes by both shareholders and management 
in recent years. Properly structured, such schemes should 
substantially reduce the risk of 'deviant' behaviour by top 
management. 
3.5 PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEALTH MAXI-
MIZATION OBJECTIVE 
As a measure of performance the wealth maximization objec-
tive presents a problem in that share pr1ces are also sub-
ject to influences beyond management s' control. A slump in 
the economy can depress share prices, and management has no 
control over the economy in general. Management can also 
feel frustrated and dissillusioned if share prices do not 
respond positively to superior performance. Furthermore, 
share prices are often highly volatile and this can have a 
disruptive effect on the firm's capital budgeting. Bolten 
(1976:16) concludes that wealth maximization may be some-
thing more to strive for than to achieve. 
In spite of what Bolten says the wealth maximization objec-
tive 1S rational and takes cognizance of the risk/return 
tradeoff. Unfortunately the utility functions of the deci-
sion maker will inevitably constrain the wealth maximizing 
objective. When such decisions involve a board of directors, 
a diversity of these utility functions could impact on the 
choice involved. For this reason some people argue that a 
committee decision can never be consistently rational. 
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However, where a 'choice' has to be made in a small business 
where fewer decis{onmakers are involved, the theory has a 
greater chance of being used fully. This situation will be 
explored mor~ fully in later chapters. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
Every firm has a number of different objective areas, 
~hether or not expressly stated. Most of these objectives 
are supported by contributing sub-objectives. 
Organizational objectives therefore cascade down into a net-
work or hierarchy of objectives. Long range objectives are 
translated into short range objectives which serve as bases 
for day to day operation plans. 
At the top of the hierarchy, however, there needs to be one 
central long range objective which integrates the structure 
into a consistent set of logically interrelated decision 
criteria. The exact nature of this objective lS of con-
siderable importance, particularly for investment decision 
making, as a firm's strategic stance is substantially deter-
mined by those decisions. 
Some writers contend that the firm ~hould strive to maximize 
owners wealth. Others claim that this central objective 
should incorporate a broader perspective. Profit maximiza-
tion is frequently cited as an objective which will do jus-
tice to such perspectives. However a review of these 
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writer's claims exposes some severe difficulties and the 
balance of logic indicates that maximization of owners wel-
fare should justifiably be the main objective of the firm. 
This objective 1S attained through maximization of the 
market price of the equity of the firm. 
In this study it is assumed that the market price of the or-
dinary shares will depend directly on expectations of future 
dividends to be paid on the share including the final liqui-
dation dividend and the certainty thereof. The price of a 
share on the market should accordingly reflect the expected 
cumulative results of a series of investment decisions that 
have been taken by the firm. These investment decisions can 
only increase the market price of the shares if marginal 1n-
vestors on balance, expect that the earnings to be generated 
by those investments will exceed their own target rates of 
return. Investment decisions should thus take cognizance qf 
the factors on which the market price depends and operates. 
Part of the valuation process consists of projecting the ex-
pected cash flows from investments undertaken and in recog-
nition of the fact that these flows have a time value, they 
need to be discounted to a present value. The fact that they 
are uncertain must also be accounted for. These concepts 
will now be pursued in detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROJECTED CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTMENT DECISION ALTERNATIVES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Investment decisions involve the long term commitment of 
scarce financial resources. Their commitment to one course 
of action prevents their commitment to another. Accordingly 
a great deal of effort can legitimately be expended on gen-
erating alternative investment opportunities. Once a set of 
such alternatives has been assembled (usually part of the 
preparation for a firm's annual budget discussions), a com-
mon base will need to be specified in terms of which each 
alternative can be considered on an equal footing. Some al-
ternatives may be technically mutually exclusive, as in the 
case of different machines being available for the same 
functional requirement. Others may be independant of one 
another, such as the proposed purchase of a new office 
block, as opposed to the launching of a new Research and 
Development programme. Whatever the case may be, all are 
subject to the financial constraints of the firm and accord-
ingly all alternatives need to have their consequences 
projected on a basis which will permit valid comparisons. 
Each alternative can be expected to yield positive and nega-
tive cash flows and it is the resulting net cash flows which 
will ultimately contribute positively or negatively to com-
pany profits. The common base must thus be grounded in the 
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amounts of each cash flow and the timing thereof. In view of 
the time value of money the timing of the cash flows con-
cerned can be of critical importance in this exercise. 
These issues will be dealt with in this chapter beginning 
with a review of the rationale for projecting cash flows. 
4.2 THE RATIONALE FOR PROJECTING CASH FLOWS 
4.2.1 CASH FLOWS VERSUS ACCOUNTING 'EARNINGS' 
It has been suggested that the consequences of alternative 
investment proposals should be projected in terms of the net 
or incremental cash flows of each project under considera-
tion. Another possibility is that they be projected in terms 
of accounting profits. However only cash can be reinvested! 
Only cash can be used to pay dividends and interest and to 
repay debt. Only cash can be used to pay suppliers, workers, 
management and tax authorities. 
Over the long run, a firm's total net cash flows and total 
accounting profits will be equal. However, in the short run 
the two will generally not be highly correlated. Measured by 
general accounting principles the firm may have a very 
profitable year and yet have no cash available to meet its 
obligations since profits are not yet realized in cash but 
are tied up ln accounts receivable that mayor may not be 
eventually be collected (Herbst 1982:26). 
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Henderson et al. (1984 :122) extend this discussion by ad-
ding that cash flows include every aspect of profit on in-
vestments and return of capital. An accounting approach on 
the other hand is more restrictive where for example a fixed 
capital investment is recovered by making an annual provi-
sion for depreciation. To explain the implication of this 
distinction more comprehensively the authors furnish the 
following example: 
A firm invests in a machine costing RI 000 which has a one 
year economic life and is depreciated accordingly. 
In this case there is initially a cash outflow of RI 000. 
During the year R400 1S spent on materials and R500 on 
labour. The project produces and sells R2000 worth of goods 
for cash. The accounting profit after taxes is depicted 1n 
Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 



















This illustrates the purpose of depreciation accounting, it 
is the process of writing off the cost of the means of ' 
production. This prevents the company from confusing return 
of capital with income. The distinction is important from a 
tax standpoint, in that income is taxable whilst return on 
capital is not. With return of capital investors are only 
getting their own money back. The fact that capital return 
is not taxable (depreciation 1S deductable> preserves the 
definition of cash flow. 
However 1n addition to net income and depreciation there 
could be off-income statement cash flows. These are flows 
that involve the investment or the return of capital in ways 
other than through depreciation. In the cash outflow result-
1ng from the original investment two other cash flow items 
are frequently encountered. Inventory and receivables must 
1ncrease to accommodate the increased turnover. This invest-
ment 1n working capital does not affect accounting income 
but does affect the more fundamental return on investment. 
In order to properly appreciate exactly how this return is 
affected by the fact of such investment and the timing there 
of, it is necessary to consider the time value of money and 
the corresponding need to use discounted cash flow tech-
niques. 
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4.3 DISCOUNTING CASH FLOWS 
The time value of money recognizes that the timing of cash 
flows 1S very important: a Rand received today is superior 
to a Rand to be received in one year and the latter is supe-
rior to a Rand to be received four years later. The sooner 
money is received the sooner it can be reinvested. 
Time value of money 1S fundamentally related to the prin-
ciple of compound interest. When compounding, the earlier 
cash flows will grow relatively more in value than later 
cash flows because they benefit from compounding (Hartl 1986 
: 75) • 
Due to the time value of money, projected future cash flows 
are not directly comparable as they stand. Later cash 
receipts are overvalued relative to the initial investment. 
To correct the time factor, it is necessary to adjust all of 
the projected net cash flows by some discount rate that 
gives recognition to the time value of money. 
The preferred method is to translate all projected cash 
flows to the present value of money (the time the decision 
is being made) by 'discounting' them. Discounting 1S the 
reciprocal of compounding. In so doing cash receipts are 
reduced by some discount rate, the later receipts reduced 
more than the earlier ones. By converting all of the net 
cash receipts into present values the element of time is no 
longer an obstacle and the decision maker can now proceed to 
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compare the adjusted projected cash flows to the initial in-
vestment (which is naturally a present value) (Hartl 1986 
:228). 
What the discount rate should be is of considerable impor-
tance in investment decision making. It is a matter which 
will enjoy considerable attention in due course. 
4.4 RISK ADJUSTMENT 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In capital budgeting the decision maker acts under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Nothing 1S completely certain and 
projected future outcomes can at best only be educated es-
timates. The projected cash flows used in capital budgeting 
are estimated cash flows and they are subject to error. Con-
sequently the risk 6f a project is represented by the pos-
sibility ~hat actual cash flows will deviate from forecasted 
cash flows (Moyer, McGuigan and Kretlow 1981:19-25). 
Moreover, the assessment of a projects' risk is directly re-
lated to the decision makers perception of the degree to 
which the cash flows might deviate from the projected amount 
in any future time period. The analysis of projects is fur-
thermore dependant upon the decision makers preference for 
risk. Preference for risk deals with an aspect of utility 
whereas characteristics of cash flows include probable 
returns and the standard deviation characteristics of the 
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relative probability distributions. These concepts will be 
explored in order t~ provide a basis for the discussion of 
risky projects (Mathur 1979:209). 
4.4.2 UTILITY 
Bierman and Smidt (1986:276-277) indicat e that different in-
vestors have different risk preferences. A description of an 
investors risk preferences 1S called a utility function. 
Just as subjective probabilities can be used to describe a 
persons attitude about the likelyhood that some outcome will 
occur, so a utility function may describe risk preferences. 
Hence, a utility function of a person can be used to 
evaluate his decision problems involving uncertain outcomes. 
In order to facilitate this discussion consider the follow-
ing three choice situations put forward by Mathur 
(1979:210). 
In each case an alternative 1S offered to an individual: 
1. Rx or a toss of a C01n: heads the individual gets noth-
ing, tails he gets R1. 
2. Rx or a toss of a coin: heads the individual gets noth-
ing, tails he gets R5 000. 
3. Rx or a toss of a coin: heads t he individual gets noth-
ing, tails he gets R1 000 000. 
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In the example cited the COln toss will result in two pos-
sible outcomes, heads or tails, each with a probability of 
0,5. 
According to Solomon and Pringle (1980:381) the expected 
value of the second alternative in each of the above three 
choice situations can be used to identify the utility 
preferences of individuals. The expected value of the toss 
of the coin is obtained by multiplying each outcome by the 
associated probability and summing all the resulting values. 
For each coin toss: 
expected value = probability of heads and payoff for heads 
and probability of tails and payoff for tails 
In case 1 the expected value proves to be 50 Ci in case two 
R2500 and in case three R500 000. 
It . is consequently clear that case three has the highest ex-
pected value followed by case two and case one respectively. 
4.4.2.1 CERTAINTY EQUIVALENT 
The choice which the individual in the above example is 
going to exercise depends on the value of Rx in each of the 
three cases and is termed his certainty equivalent. 
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Under the subjective certainty equivalent approach the 
decision-maker must specify how much money 1S required with 
certainty to make him or her indifferent between this cer-
tain sum and the expected value of the risky alternative. In 
other words he must derive the same utility from the certain 
amount as from the expected value of the risky sum. This 
choice will indicate the individuals risk/return trade off 
at each of the three levels (Weston and Brigham 1978:438). 
The certainty equivalent could also be considered as the 
minimum amount one would be willing to accept for selling a 
desirable risk (Bierman, Bonini and Hausman 1973:327); or 
the minimum amount one would be willing to pay for buying 
, 
into a risky situation. 
4.4.2.2 RISK AVERSITY 
An unwillingness to pay an amount as great as the expected 
value of an uncertain investment opportunity indicates risk 
averse behaviour. Weston and Copeland (1987:388) describe 
the risk averter as an investor who has a decreasing mar-
ginal utility for wealth. This type of investor is also 
described as one who would experience more dismay from a 
Rand lost than joy from a Rand gained. 
In the above example the risk averter would prefer an amount 
less than the expected value in each case, rather than the 
toss of the coin because the marginal return for the toss 
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carries with it the risk of not getting anything and there-
fore possess lower utility for this decision maker (Mathur 
1979 :210). 
Weston and Copeland (1986:388) allege that most business and 
shareholders are risk averters. They add that risk aversion 
is reflected in the capitalization rate investors apply when 
determining the value of the firm. This statement is of 
paramount importance for the study at hand and it will be 
imperative to revisit these aspects when the position of the 
small businessman is placed under the microscope at a later 
stage. 
Solomon and Pringle (1980:381) shed more light on the 
utility question by indicating that it is quite possible for 
a person to exibit risk aversity in business financial deci-
sions but risk preference in entertainment situations, viz. 
gambling. 
4.4.2.3 RISK INDIFFERENCE 
The risk indifferent individual is one who is willing to pay 
exactly the expected value of a risky investment. For the 
three choices in our example the risk indifferent individual 
will be willing to pay 50 c, R5 OGO and R1 000 000 respec-
tively. 
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4.4.2.4 RISK SEEKING 
A risk seeker according to Solomon and Pringle (1980:381) 
will be willing to pay more for a risky investment than its 
expected value. In the example cited the risk seeker will 
gladly select the gamble in the place of the expected value. 
Such a person has an increasing marginal utility for money 
(Weston and Copeland 1987:388). 
4.4.2.5 UTILITY CURVES 
Figure 4.1 depicts the utility curves of the risk averter, 
the risk indifferent person and the risk seeker. 
FIGURE 4.1 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND RETURN PREFERENCES 





Source: Mathur (1979:211) 
The utility curve of the risk averter shows that as the risk 
of an investment project increases the risk averse manager 
imposes a proportionately higher required rate of return for 
the project to be deemed desirable. This shows that marginal 
increases in risk requires proportionally larger increases 
in return. The curves intercept the horizontal axis, 1n-
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dicating that some minimum returns are preferred by all in 
the absence of risk. Mathur (1979:211) presumes that this 
indicates that financial managers know that they can invest 
in risk free government securities. 
4.4.3 EXPECTED VALUE 
The concept of expected value or expected return may be ap-
plied to evaluate capital expenditures (Mathur 1979:212). 
Table 4.2 depicts a hypothetical firm that is considering 
three risky projects for which expected net cash flows for 
the coming year are dependent on the state of the economy. 
The economy could move into a recession, continue its 
present moderate growth rate or expand more rapidly. In 
terms of the perceptions of the decision makers the follow-
lng probabilities can be ascribed to the different states of 
the economy: a receSSlon 0,1; moderate growt~ 0,7 and expan-
sion 0,2. 
TABLE 4.2 
EXPECTED VALUES OF THREE INVESTMENT PROJECTS (RANDS IN 
'OOOS) 
PROJECT STATE OF PROBABILITY OUTCOME PROBABILITY OF 
ECONOMY OF OCCURRENCE NET CASH OCCURRENCE X 
FLOWS OUTCOME OF NET 
CASH FLOWS 
Novelty Recession 0,1 400 R 40 
item Moderate 0,7 700 R 490 
Expansion 0,2 950 R 190 
EXEected Value R 720 
Auto- Recession 0,1 1000 R 100 
motive Moderate 0,7 800 R 560 
Part Expansion 0,2 300 R 60 
EXEected Value R 720 
Chain Recession 0,1 900 R 90 
Saw Moderate 0,7 1100 R 770 
Expansion 0,2 1400 R 280 
EXEected Value Rl14U 
Source: Mathur <1979:212) 
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The first project considered by the firm is the production 
of a novelty item. Sales are expected to vary depending on 
the state of the economy. Expected net cash flows associated 
with each state of the economy are shown in the fourth 
column in Table 4.2. The second pro j ect involves manufactur-
ing an automotive replacement part. If the economy moves 
toward a recession, this piQject is expected to do well in 
. . " ' . . '.~, 
that more people would be fo;~:~(t ~to repair their own cars. 
The third project involves the pioduction of a petrol driven 
chain saw. Sales would be particularly good in an expansion. 
Expected values are shown in the third column of table 4.2. 
According to calculations, the expected values of the 
novelty item and the automotive part are the same. Mathur 
(1979:213) asks whether, if it is assumed that these two 
projects have identical lives and require equal investments, 
the investor would deem them to be equally desirable? In or-
der to answer this question the riskiness of the projects 
need to be measured. One way of doing this is by means of 
the standard deviation. 
4.4.4 THE STANDARD DEVIATION 
It lS noticed from table 4.2 that the 'range' between the 
minimum and maximum net cash flows for the novelty item is 
R550 000 (R950 000 - R400 000). The difference for the 
automotive part, however, lS R700 000. This 'range' can be 
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interpreted as an indication of risk. The larger the range 
in this instance the' more risky the project (Mathur 1979 
:213). 
Weston and Brigham (1978 :346-347) describes the 'range' as 
a probability distribution and point out that the risk of a 
project is indicated by the 'tightness' of the distribution. 
In other words the more peaked the probability distribution 
the less risky the project and vice versa. According to this 
measure, the project involving the manufacture of the 
automotive part is more risky than that of the novelty item. 
A formal method of measuring this range is through calcula-
tion of the standard deviation: the 'tighter' the probabil-
ity distribution, the less variable the expected returns, 
which means the less risky the project and this is reflected 
in a smaller standard deviation (Weston and Brigham 
1978:346-347). 'The standard deviation is defined as the 
square root of the weighted average squared deviation of in-
dividual observations from the mean' (Moyer et al., 1981 
:248-249). It is calculated using the formula: 
0-. = 1!(Xi ~\:q 
Where: (J\ = standard deviation 
Xl = possible cash flow; 
X = mean value of the cash flow 
Pi = probability associated with return 1. 
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In the above example the standard deviation for the novelty 
item project proves to be R145 260 and that of the automo-
tive part project R218 170. 
The standard deviation is an appropriate measure of risk 
when projects being compared are approximately equal in Slze 
and the cash flows are expected to have symmetrical proba-
bility distributions (Moyer, et al. 1981 :248-249). However, 
it is an absolute measure of variability, and accordingly it 
is not suitable for comparing projects of different sizes. 
The rationale for this statement is that two projects of 
different sizes and the same standard deviation have dif-
ferent amounts of risk per Rand of investment. We conse-
quently need a relative measure for risk in such a case. An 
example will serve to clarify such a case. 
Consider two projects from an example provided by Moyer, et 
al. (1981 :251): project T has an expected value of R500 
000 and project S an expected value of R4 000. Both these 
projects, however, have standard deviations of R2 000. 
~ Project T clearly has a far lower risk profile but some form 
of measurement 1S needed 1n order to quantify the dif-
ference. The co-efficient of variation provides the answer. 
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4.4.5 CO-EFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
The co-efficient of variation is a relative measure of risk 
and it is defined by Moyer, et al. (1981 :251) to be the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the expected value, which 
proves to be 0,004 for project T and 0,5 for project s. This 
shows in clearly defined relative terms, that project S has 
more risk per Rand of expected value than project T even 
though both projects have the same standard deviations. 
standard deviation and co-efficient of variation can be used 
as risk indicators to rank investment proposals. However, 
the firm must still decide as to whether certain projects, 
promising specified expected values and containing a certain 
amount of risk are acceptable at all. The net cash flows 
shown in the example reflected in table 4.2 are in fact In-
tended to represen~ the net present values (NPV's) of the 
relative streams of cash flows extending perhaps some years 
into the future. However as noted in section 4.3 the dis-
count rate used ln determining the NPV's is of critical im-
portance : by using a much higher discount rate in the ex-
ample, the NPV's of all alternatives could be negative and 
accordingly, none of them would be acceptable. 
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4.4.6 ADJUSTMENT OF DISCOUNT RATES 
In section 4.4.2.5 it was noted that a risk averter would 
tend to impose a proportionately higher required rate of 
return. It is this required rate of return which is in fact 
used as the discount rate in the calculation of NPV's.1 
However before one can apply an adjustment to the discount 
rate to accommodate risk aversion or risk seeking , one first 
needs to establish what the appropriate rate would be for a 
'risk indifferent' investor. In this regard Mathur 
(1979:215) provides two points of reference. The first 1S 
the discount rate that would discount the risk free future 
cash flows associated with government securities back to the 
price at which they are currently trading 1n the capital 
market. Any discount rate which is higher than this risk 
free rate would thus contain a 'premium' to take account of 
risk. The risk free rate accordingly establishes a 'floor' 
for discount rates. The second point of reference provided 
by Mathur (1979:215) is the rate which applies to the firms 
'average risky' project. 
1. The following equation is used for calculating the NPV 
of a project: 
~± + ~~ + ~n - I 
NPV = (1+k)1 (1+k)2 (l+k)n 
Here F11 F21 and so forth represent the net cash flows; 
k is the discount rate; I is the initial cost of the 
project and N is the project's expected life. 
(Weston and Brigham 1978 295) 
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The 'average risky' project for any specific firm would be a 
project that is homogeneous in respect of risk to the ag-
gregation of assets in that particular firm (van Horne 
1983:212). 
In the case of evaluating the 'average risky project', k in 
the NPV equation is identified as the firm's marginal cost 
of capital (see section 5.5.1.4). This is the minimum rate 
6f return expected by the firm's suppliers of capital 
(Mathur 1979 :215). 
From the firm's viewpoint the marginal cost of capital can 
be defined as the rate of return on new investments which 
would leave the price of the firm's ordinary shares un-
changed (Martin, et al. 1979:648). This assumes that poten-
tial investors in the shares of the firm would be prepared 
to pay a higher than the prevailing price for the shares if 
the firm embarks on a project which promises the yield of a 
positive expected value. 
From this definition it follows logically, that the marginal 
cost of capital will act as a cut off rate (acceptance or 
rejection) of proposed investments. 
If a proposed investment project is now more risky than the 
firm's average project, the appropriate discount rate to use 
is the marginal cost of capital plus an excess risk premium. 
This 'add on' risk is the function of financial managers' 
perceptions and preferences for risk, the firm's attitude 
toward risk as exemplified by its long term objectives and 
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the capital market's trade off for risk and return. If the 
proposed investment for the novelty item in the example 
cited is viewed as average for the firm a risk premium 
should be added to the discount rate when discounting the 
expected net cash flows of the proposed automotive part in-
vestment (Mathur 1979:215). 
4.4.7 ADJUSTMENT OF NET CASH FLOWS 
This method concerns adjustments to the numerator of the NPV 
equation to accommodate risk. The expected net cash flow of 
the proposed investment is evaluated in terms of its cer-
tainty equivalent. The decision maker identifies the risk 
free net cash flows that he or she considers to be equ1v-
alent to the expected risky net cash flow. These certainty 
equivalent net cash flows are then substituted for the ex-
pected risky cash flows. It is however important to note 
that since risk free cash flows are discounted~ the risk 
free rate of return should be used (Mathur 1979:216). 
It is pointed out by Oysteryoring and McCarty (1980:183) that 
although this 1S a conceptually sound method, its primary 
deficiency lies 1n the fact that the determination of the 
certainty equivalent is an art without any real quantitative 
basis of calculation. It is therefore subjective and related 
to risk attitudes of decision makers. 
Nonetheless, the decision maker's subjective assessment must 
enter the equation as a material factor. 
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4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has dealt with the fourth step in the 
decision-making process, namely the projected consequences 
of decision alternatives and the measurement thereof. 
A rationale for projecting cash flows as opposed to account-
ing profits is provided. This rationale mainly hinges around 
the importance of cash in the sense that it can be rein-
vested, used to pay dividends, taxes and interest whereas 
accounting income can be tied up in various asset accounts. 
Expected cash flows furthermore, not only include profit on 
investments, but also return on capital. In addition it also 
takes cognizance of the time value of money whilst account-
ing profits do not. 
Time differentials of expected cash flows render them non 
comparable as they stand and they consequently must be ad-
justed by a discount rate. By doing this the projected cash 
flows can be converted to present values which make them 
comparable to the initial investment which is also a present 
value. 
Cash flows, however, are uncertain and projections depend on 
the decision makers risk pr~ferences. Since risk preferences 
concern utility functions, the latter can be comprehended as 
representing the attitude of a decision maker toward risk. 
It can consequently be used to evaluate the decision makers' 
decision problems involving uncertain outcomes. 
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Expected values are furthermore used ln order to identify 
the utility preferences of individua l s. 
Attention is finally given to the measurement of the riski-
ness of expected cash flows and adjustment thereof. Risk ad-
justment is necessary whenever a firm contemplates a 
proposed investment project of which the riskiness varles 
from that of the 'average investment project' of the firm. 
Adjustment for risk can be applied to either the cash flows 
or the discount rate in the net present value equation. The 
logical neatness of the adjustment is unfortunately marred 
by the subjective perceptions and preferences of the deci-
sion maker. 




THE SELECTION CRITERION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been noted that the objective of wealth maximizatiori 
has a time perspective involving future streams of cash 
flows. The principle of the time value of money must accord-
ingly be applied to the expected cash flows projected for 
each investment opportunity. These prospective future 
benefits then need to be discounted by an appropriate dis-
count rate in order to translate them to a present value. 
The appropriate rate is the 'cost of capital'. 
5.2 COST OF CAPITAL AND WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
The cost of capital has assumed growing importance because 
of the need to make rational investment decisions in an in-
creasingly complex world. Indeed in current literature, ap-
plication of the cost of capita l as the discount rate is 
corisidered to be of ciitical importance 1n the making of op-
timal investment decisions. The reasoning underlying this 
stance is straightforward: If the return from a proposed in-
vestment promises to exceed the cost of the funds that are 
required to undertake it, the investment would be eligible 
for acceptance (there may be the need to compare it still 
further against the prospects for other mutually exclusive 
opportunities). If the estimated return from the project is 
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however less than the cost of the funds required to under-
take it, it should be rejected. This cost is usually 
referred to as the 'cost of capital.' More correctly, it 
should be referred to as the 'marginal cost of capital.' 
In this way the firm will accept desirable projects which 
enhance its value and reject all that are undesirable. This 
approach is conceptually consistent with Reynders 'cut off' 
rate discussed in section 3.4.3. 
The marginal cost of capital therefore acts as the rejection 
criterion to be applied to proposed investments (Porterfield 
1965:43). Through application of this criterion it will be 
possible to gauge whether a proposed investment is likely to 
increase the value of the firm and thereby the market value 
of the ordinary shares of the firm which is the measure of 
owner's wealth. 
The cost of capital is of course a cost, and just like any 
other cost, it needs to be managed effectively. This 
perspective is underlined by Brigham who states 'maximizing 
the value of the firm requires that the cost of all inputs 
including capital be minimized and to minimize the cost of 




Calculation of the cost of capital is thus a necessary pre-
requisite for the effective management thereof. Accordingly 
attention will now need to be given to the composition and 
calculation of the cost of capital. 
5.3 EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT COSTS OF CAPITAL 
5.3.1 EXPLICIT COSTS OF CAPITAL 
'The explicit cost of any source of capital is the discount 
rate that equates the present value of the cash inflows that 
are incremental to the taking of the financing opportunity 
with the present value of its incremental outflows' 
(Porterfield 1965:45). The cash inflows reflect receipt of 
the capital obtained and the cash outflows involve the ser-
vicing of that capital and perhaps, repayment th~reof. 
The general formula for this explicit cost of capital of any 
financing opportunity is as follows: 







+ •••••••• ~!l 
(l+c)n 
c = explicit cost of capital 
I = initial cash inflow 
F1,F2,F3,Fn = cash flows of times 1,2,3, .•.• n 
(Porterfield 1965:45). 
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5.3.2 IMPLICIT COSTS OF CAPITAL 
Implicit cost of capital can be defined as the rate of 
return of the best company project, shareholder investment 
opportunity or shareholder consumption opportunity that 
would be foregone if the project presently under considera-
tion by the firm was accepted (Porterfield 1965:61). 
Explicit costs arise when funds are raised. Implicit capital 
costs do not arise until the funds concerned have been in-
vested and accordingly not applied to alternative uses. 
The implicit cost of retained earnings~ is perhaps the most 
obvious. Porterfield (1965:61) describes it as the rate of 
return at which a shareholder could have invested these 
funds had they been distributed to him. 
In terms of Porterfield's exposition of capital costs, forms 
of capital with an explicit cost also have an implicit cost. 
Debt capital for example when raised from a bank has an ex-
plicit cost based on the contractual price (interest rate) 
and arrangements for repayment of the principal sum, between 
the bank and the borrower. However the moment that the funds 
received are invested, alternative investment opportunities 
are foregone and an implicit cost arises. 
1. Retained earnings is equivalent to profit after taxes 
less dividends paid (Porterfield 1965 :54). 
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Implicit costs of capital are therefore opportunity costs. 
Martin, et al. (1979:383) provide a very apt description of 
the implication of such opportunity costs. They assert that 
when managers are considering the retention of earnings as a 
means of financing an investment, they are servlng in a 
trustee capacity. That is, the ordinary shareholders have 
entrusted the company assets to management. If the company's 
objective is wealth maximization for its ordinary 
shareholders, management should retain the profits only if 
the company's investments within the firm are at least as 
attractive as the shareholder's next best investment oppor-
tunity. Otherwise, the profits should be paid out ln 
dividends, thereby permitting the investor to invest more 
profitably elsewhere. 
The concept of opportunity costs in the determination of the 
cost of equity of the small business is particularly lmpor-
tant and will be further reviewed in chapter ten. 
It is at this stage necessary to take a closer look at the 
costs of each of a number of different capital components. 
5.4 COMPONENT CAPITAL COSTS 
It is important to note when studying the 'cost of capital' 
that in principle it denotes a long term concept. Joy 
(1980:170) stresses that we are concerned with long term 
capital sources. While the firm might also use short term 
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sources of capital, our concern is here with how the firm 
finances its long term investments. Normally this 1S done 
primarily with long term capital. 2 Basically this means that 
an attempt should be made to secure capital with repayment 
terms that match the duration of the relative asset's 
economic life. 
This clearly excludes short term debt Slnce by convention 
the latter has a time horizon of less than one year. Short 
term debt 1S usually utilized for workin~ capital require-
ments which are self liquidating and revolving in nature. 
The danger of uS1ng short term funds for long term invest-
ments is considerable. The firm could experience financial 
distress if it is unable to renegot i ate or renew a short 
term repayment commitment which has been utilized to fund an 
investment which is both non liquid and essential for the 
ongoing viability of the firm as a business unit. Short term 
funds are notoriously fickle and in macro terms, expand and 
contract as a function of the business cycle and monetary 
policy. Notwithstanding these comments, evidence will in due 
course be presented which shows that a considerable number 
2. The distinction is often drawn between long term, 
medium term and short term finance. Uliana, et al. 
(1987 :398) points out that the exact lines of demarca-
tion are hazy. A guide would be that medium term 
finance would be for periods of not less than 1 to 3 
years and up to between 5 and 10 years while long term 
finance would be for longer periods. 
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of south Arican firms, particularly small firms, deviate 
from this norm and in fact use short term funds, not only to 
finance working capital but also to finance fixed 
investments.In these cj rcumstances, the cost of short term 
capital becomes pertinent to the capital budgeting situation 
and accordingly, some short term sources of funds and their 
costs will be considered under this heading. 
In considering long term debt one can distinguish between 
new debt and existing debt. These will be examined in turn. 
5.4.1 THE COST OF LONG TERM DEBT 
5.4.1.1 COST OF NEW DEBT 
Debt for the purpose of determining the cost of capital of a 
company refers to interest bearing loans. 
made on various terms according to 
Such loans may be 
Uliana, et al. 
(1987:422). These include debentures which may be issued on 
a wide variety of terms, and fixed term loans which may 
specify fixed interest rates or rates fluctuating with some 
base rate such as the prime overdraft rate, or the 90 days 
banker's acceptance rate or the Reserve Bank discount rate. 
(Uliana, et al. 1987:9) 
Uliana, et al. (1987:422) suggest that in both cases the In-
terest will be market related at the date of the lssue. In 
the case of debentures issued at a discount or premium, the 
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effective interest can be established by relating the coupon 
rate (which determines the interest actually payable) to the 
issue price. 
From the standpoint of the firm raising the finance, the 
before tax cost of debt is: 
kd = liP 
where : kd = before tax cost of debt 
I = interest paid 
p = the net principal amount raised 
The real cost however is usually lower than kd as the firm 
does not normally expect to incur losses and an existing as-
sessed loss for tax purposes is the exception rather than 
the rule. Accordingly interest is normally a deductable ex-
pense in the calculation of taxable lncome. In a sense 
therefore the Receiver of Revenue is subsidising the inter-
est payment to the extent of the marginal tax rate of the 
firm. In these circ~m~tances, the relevant component cost of 
debt is calculated as follows: 
ccd = kd (1 - t) 
Where CCd = the component cost of debt 
kd = before tax cost of debt 
t = marginal tax rate 
(Uliana, et al. 1987 :422-424) 
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The authors also mention that the task of raising money from 
a debenture issue may well be placed in the hands of an in-
termediary such as a merchant bank. In such a case there is 
likely to be a raising fee and possible underwriters fees. 
As these costs will reduce the amount received, the debt to 
be issued must therefore be sufficient to cover both the 
funds required and the costs involved. 
5.4.1.2 THE COST OF EXISTING LONG TERM DEBT 
Bierman and Smidt (1986:321-350) state that the effective 
rate of interest for an outstanding issue can be determined 
by comparing the current market price for the security con-
cerned with the remaining payment obligations. The effective 
interest rate for an outstanding debenture will then be the 
rate of interest which equates the current market price to 
the present value of the amount due at maturity, plus the 
present value of the series of interest payments to be made. 
In order to compile the effective cost, the interest pay-
ments must be adjusted to compensate for the fact that in-
terest is normally tax deductable. 
Should the market price of the loan stock or debentures be 
unobtainable because the stock is not listed on a stock ex-
change, or seldom trades, it may be possible to estimate the 
current cost by reference to current yields on listed stock 
with an approximately equivalent te r m and risk profile. 
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5.4.2 THE COST OF SHORT TERM DEBT 
Gup (1983:531) defines short term debt as debt with a 
maturity of up to one year. This is consistent with the ac-
counting concept of short term debt but the dividing line is 
really somewhat arbitrary. The banking sector for example 
regards paper with a maturity of less than three years as 
short term, merely because relevant legislation 1n the RSA 
permits them to do so. Reekie and Lingard (1986:34) distin-
guish between short and medium term debt and define the lat-
ter as funding for any period between short term and long 
term, long term being funds provided for anything up to the 
entire life span of the business. 
It should be noted that the cost of short term debt 1S 
analogous to that of long term debt in that there may be an 
explicit cost. 
5.4.2.1 'FREE' SHORT TERM DEBT 
Uliana, et al. (1987 :336) discuss short term liabilities 
that have no explicit costs. Among these are accrued wages, 
accrued taxes and accrued interest. 
They mention however that under certain circumstances cer-
tain types of apparantly free credit will have a very real 
explicit cost. One such an example is given by Freear 
(1980:300) as follows: 
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"A trade creditor3 specifying maxlmum terms of 30 days 
may offer say 2 percent discount if the amount due is 
paid within 10 days of invoice. Suppose the invoice 
amount is R2 000. By failing to pay within the 10 day 
discount period the customer forfeits 2 percent of R2 
000 which is R40 and his further 20 days of credit will 
effectively cost him: 
R 40 x 365 days = 37,24 per cent p.a. 
R1 960 20 days 
Having lost the discount, he may even decide to delay 
payment beyond the thirty day period. In this case a 
penalty interest rate might be charged by the supplier, 
increasing still further, the costs concerned." 
'Non free' short term debt on the other hand has an ex-
pressly stated cost. It 1S therefore necessary to take a 
closer look at the costs of these forms of financing. 
3. Miller, Roome and staude (1985 :128) point out that 
'trade credit' can take the form of an open account 
i.e. there are no formal evidences of debt, the seller 
having merely a copy of the invoice sent to his cus-
tomer. 
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5.4.2.2 'NON FREE' SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM DEBT 
5.4.2.2.1 BANKING FACILITIES 
The explicit cost of short to medium term bank facilities 
will vary depending on the specific conditions involved. 
Some of the more common conditions employed are reviewed 
below. 
i) 'Regular Interest' on Loans 
Weston and Brigham (1978:228-229) state that if the in-
terest charge is paid in full on the maturity of a 1 
year loan, the stated rate of interest is equal to the 
effective rate of interest e.g . a R10 000 loan for 1 





ii) Discounted Interest on Loans 
= 7 per cent p.a. 
If the bank discounts the interest ln advance 
(discounts the loan), the effective rate is increased. 
In this example the borrower will be committed for a 
R10 000 repayment amount at the end of one year but o~­
tains only R9 300. The effective rate of interest 
therefore amounts to: 
Interest = 700 = 7,5 per cent p.a. 
Borrowed amount-interest 9 300 
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iii) Installment Loan 
In this case the loan is repaid by say 12 equal monthly 
installments inclusive of interest. However, 'flat' in-
terest (7 per cent in the example) is calculated on the 
original balance. This has the consequence that the ef-
fective rate of interest is considerably higher as a 
result of the fact that the borrower has the full 
amount of money only during the first month. By the 
last month he has already repaid eleven twelfths of the 
loan. This means the borrower, at 7 per cent flat, 
would have paid R700 for the use of about half the 
money he received. In the example the amount received 
is R10 000 but the average capital amount outstanding 
during the year is really only R5 000. On the basis of 





= 14 per cent 
Should the instalment loan idea be combined with that 
of discounted interest the effective rate 1S even 
higher : only R9 300 would be received and half of that 
would be used as a denominator. 
700 x 100 = 15,05 per cent 
4650 1 
The authorities in the RSA recognize the difference be-
tween a 'flat rate' and an 'effective' rate and now re-
quire installment credit contracts to specifically dis-
close the effective rate. 
105 
ivl Bank Overdraft 
Reynders (1971: 230-231) considers bank overdrafts to 
be the most popular and widely used form of short term 
credit used amongst business firms in the Republic of 
South Africa. This opinion was verified by Conradie 
(1982:223-227) 1n a survey focussing on the financing 
of small businesses (section 9.1.4.3). 
In granting an overdraft a bank agrees to pay cheques 
issued by the account holder in excess of the funds 
held in the relative current account up to an agreed 
limit. Although the bank might agree to note an over-
draft limit for a specific ~eriod or on a continuing 
basis, such an agreement will always be 'subject to 
normal banking reservations.' This means that over-
drafts can at any time be 'called up' for immediate 
repayment. 
Miller, et al. (1985:129) observe that South African 
commercial banks recogn1ze three general categories of 
borrowers: 
a) Local authorities or parastatal bodies which are 
usually charged the 'prime overdraft rate.'4 
4. Uliana, et al. (1987 :340) describes the 'prime rate' 
as the lowest rate which is the rate commercial banks 
would charge very large and financially strong com-
panies. Interest rates on smaller loans or more risky 
loans are scaled up from the 'prime rate'. 
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b) First class business risks who can usually also 
negotiate ,the 'prime' overdraft rate. 
c) Other who are charged higher rates up to the maX1-
mum permissable,s depending on the risk factor and 
ancillary transactions conducted through the bank. 
The precise rate charged to an individual customer 
is, of course always open to negotiation. 
A significant feature of this form of financing is the 
fact that interest 1S calculated on actual daily 
balances and not on the full sum that can be utilized. 
However, an annual 'facility fee' of perhaps 1 / 4 per 
cent might be charged by a bank for large overdraft 
facilities. This would be calculated on the overdraft 
limit arranged. 
Interest is automatically debited to customer's ac-
counts on a monthly basis. Monthly compounding is thus 
operative. 
5. In terms of the Limitations and Disclosure of Financial 
Charges Act of 1989 the maximum interest rates banks 
can charge on overdrawn accounts are as follows :31 
per cent for amounts up to and including R6 000; 28 per 
cent for amounts above R6 '000 up to and including 
R500 000. After this no maximum applies. 
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v) Commercial Paper 
When there is a 'hard core' usage of an overdraft it 
may be possible to convert that portion to commercial 
paper, usually in the form of a banker's acceptance. 
In such circumstances the customer would draw a bill on 
the bank. Once accepted by the bank, it can be sold on 
the money market with the proceeds used to reduce the 
overdraft. On maturity the bank will pay the holder and 
debit the account of the customer. The rate applicable 
on such acceptances will be determined by the money 
market conditions prevailing at the time of acceptance 
and the bank will charge a negotiable commission over 
and above the bankers acceptance rate. 
The 'all in" cost might at times be lower than the 
prevailing prime overdraft rate or might become lower 
during the currency of the acceptance (usually 30, 60 
or 90 days) should the overdraft rate climb in the 1n-
terim. Under such circumstances it would be 1n the in-
terest of the borrower to convert from overdraft to 
bankers acceptance. 
However, if the banker's acceptance ' rate together with 
commission is higher than the existing or expected 
prime overdraft rate during the currency of the accept-
ance a borrower would rationally prefer to rema1n 1n 
overdraft. 
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Bankers acceptances which can be directly linked to a 
specific purchase of goods rank as 'liquid' for pur-
poses of rediscounting with the south African Reserve 
Bank. 'Non liquid" bankers acceptances fail this test, 
are not eligible for automatic rediscount and accord-
ingly attract a higher rate of interest. 
5.4.2.2.2 HIRE PURCHASE FINANCE 
Hire purchase describes the sale of goods on instalment, 
where the ownership of the goods 1S only transferred to the 
buyer when the final payment has been made. 
An agreement is signed by the customer whereby he undertakes 
to pay a deposit and thereafter make a ser1es of payments 
(including finance charges> in retur n for the use of the as-
set which becomes his upon payment of the last instalment. 
Under the credit agreements act of 1980 the seller is em-
powered, under certain conditions to repossess the goods if 
the instalments are not paid. The sale proceeds of such 
repossessed goods would be applied against the amount then 
outstanding. Hire purchase therefo r e involves the extension 
of credit to customers with the underlying goods themselves 
serving as security. A primary consideration therefore is 
that the goods that are sold under this type of agreement be 
durable. Hire purchase contracts may extend for two years or 
even longer (Miller, et al. 1985:132). 
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The conditions pertaining to hire purchase agreements are 
amended periodically. 
The rates of interes~and the duration of the contracts on 
this type of finance are to a great extent a function of the 
prevailing state of the economy. 
Reynders (1971:230-231) suggests that this form of financ-
ing, although relatively expensive compared to other forms 
of finance, remains an important source of financing for the 
small business. 
Specialist banks will often discount hire purchase paper 
from traders or provide hire puchase finance directly to the 
purchaser. 
5.4.2.2.3 LEASING 
According to Uliana, et al. (1987:449) a lease is a contract 
that provides a right to the use of assets, legally owned by 
the lessor, 1n exchange for a specified rental paid by the 
lessee. The lease payment is normally paid at the beginning 
of each lease period and is included in the gross taxable 
income of the lessor. On the other hand, the lessee would be 
allowed to deduct the lease payment in calculating his gross 
taxable 1ncome. 
Reekie and Lingard (1986:38) categorize leases into operat-
ing leases and financial leases. 
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i) Operating Leases 
An operating lease is an arrangement which provides an al-
ternative means of obtaining the use of an asset that 
management has no intention of purchasing (Uliana, et al. 
1987:450). 
These leases are cancellable, do not fully cover the cost of 
the asset and often include maintenance clauses. They are 
very popular in circumstances where equipment might rapidly 
become obsolete (Reekie and Lingard 1986:38). Office 
machines and computers are often leased on this basis. 
Firms, for example, often acquire the use of photocopier 
machines through the use of an operating lease which 1S 
renegotiated every three years. 
A firm can however renegotiate before the current three 
years have expired, by 'trading' the old photocopier machine 
for a new one. Included in these operating lease payments 
are the costs of all services to be provided by the equip-
ment supplier (Uliana, et al. 1987:450). 
The authors also mention that 1n the RSA there are some 
equipment suppliers who 
the only way the user firm 
do not ever sell their equipment: 
can acquire the use of such 
equipment is by entering into an operating lease. 
111 
ii) Financial Leases 
A financial lease differs from an operating lease in several 
ways. Firstly the lease payments specifically provide the 
lessor with reimbursement for the cost of the leased asset 
plus interest. The agreement often allows the lessee the op-
tion of purchasing the asset at the termination of the 
lease. Maintenance and insurance of the asset are usually 
the responsibility of the lessee. This type of lease is most 
commonly used to finance the acquisition of motor vehicles, 
equipment and plant. 
The major difference between the operating lease and the 
financial lease is that the lessee intends to acquire the 
use of the asset for its useful l i fe. Normally financial 
leases are structured 1n a manner that is similar to in-
stallment loans. 
The lease is made up of the cost of the asset to which 1S 
added flat interest. A financial lease is usually non-
cancellable. Should the lessee however be permitted to can-
cel, he would usually have to forfeit some of the interest 
built into the unexpired portion of the lease. This occurs 
because the lessor will allow the lessee interest at a lower 
rate than that which was included in the original contract 
for the period that the lessor will not be using the funds. 
Hence, to cancel the lease, the lessee will usually have to 
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pay the lessor an account settlement figure which is made up 
of the outstanding capital balance plus the interest dif-
ferential (Uliana, et al. 1987:450-451). 
Reekie and Lingard (1986:38) add that financial leasing in-
volves a liability indistinguishable from that of medium 
term debt, even though its accounting and taxation treatment 
is different. It need not for example be recorded as a 
liability on the balance sheet itself. 
5.4.2.2.4 BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
As indicated by Miller, et al. (1985:130-131) the signing of 
a bill or the acceptance thereof indicates that the acceptor 
undertakes to pay a debt plus interest at some agreed future 
date. A bill may also take the form of what 1S termed an 
'acceptance credit,' being a bill drawn in terms of a letter 
of credit. 
The debtor's bank could, in a letter of credit, indicate 
that it will accept bills on behalf of its client subject to 
certain conditions being fulfilled. Accumulatively the bank 
can add its guarantee to such bills . These bills can be dis~ 
counted at keen rates. These bills are often used in inter-
national trade. 
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Accommodation bills are drawn by one party on another 
without an underlying trading transaction having taken 
place. This kind of bill is used specifically to raise money 
or to evidence existing debt. 
5.4.2.2.5 FACTORING 
Factoring is a relatively recent innovation in the RSA and 
involves the outright sale of the f i rm's debtors accounts to 
a financial institution called a factor (Miller, et al., 
1985:134-136). A factor could provide one or more serVlces 
for his clients. 
with sales ledger factoring, the factor buys all the clients 
debts and becomes wholly responsible for credit control, is-
suing of lnVOlces, debt collection and risk of default or 
bad debts. 
The firm is immediately paid by the factor an amount which 
will usually be expressed as a percentage of invoices and/or 
bills outstanding. The difference between the invoice value 
and the price paid is the factor's reward or commission for 
services provided. This difference , expressed as an annual-
ized percentage of the amount paid constitutes the cost to 
the firm. However, that cost is partly for financial and 
partly for administration. 
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Alternatively, the factor may not take over the accounting 
duties of sales ledger management but will simply pay (at an 
agreed discount) for approved invoices already issued by the 
firm. Furthermore, the factor in such circumstances mayor 
may not assume the risks of bad debts, depending on the 
agreement with the client. If he does not, and a bad debt 
occurs, the factor would then call on the client to repay to 
the factor the full invoice amount. 
The true cost of factoring tends to be very high and is of-
ten regarded as the last resort to raise urgently needed 
cash for maturing commitments. 
Factoring is generally employed by small firms rather than 
larger ones which already have sophisticated internal ac -
counting mechanisms and controls for the collection of debts 
(Reekie and Lingard 1986:38-39). 
What is significant about the forms of finance, discussed 
under 5.4.2.2.1 to 5.4.2.2.5 above lS the fact that they all 
have an explicit cost which can be calculated (Reekie and 
Lingard 1986:39). These authors, on the other hand are also 
able to cite a source of medium term capital which has only 
an implicit cost. This source lS identified as deferred 
taxation an item of growing importance on South African 
balance sheets. 
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5.4.2.2.6 DEFERRED TAXATION 
The item of deferred taxation that 1S often of greatest 
monetary importance relates to taxation on company profits. 
This phenomenon can arise as follows: 
In any given year, when a firm calculates its profits, it is 
technically and legally liable to pay taxes on that 1ncome 
at the ruling rate. There can, however, be reasons why the 
accounting income calculated 1S more than the taxable income 
for the current period. For example if the government, for 
tax purposes, permits fixed assets to be written off against 
profits (eg. wear and tear allowance) at a faster rate than 
the firm deems appropriate from an accounting point of view, 
two profit figures can be calculated. Where the permissable 
wear and tear 'allowance' has been charged against profits 
the 'taxable income' is lower than the accounting income 
where less depreciation has been applied to more accurately 
reflect the true state of affairs of the company. In the 
latter case, the taxation calculated and debitted will be 
more than the amount due to the Receiver of Revenue in 
respect of that tax year. The difference would be creditted 
to a Deferred Taxation account. The difference between the 
taxable 1ncome figure and the accounting income figure 
provides a source of funds to the firm to the extent that 
excess tax has been provided for on the discrepant amount. 
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Since the purchase of assets is generally a continuous 
process and not a one-off event, a positive and large sum 
can continuously exist against this balance sheet item 
(Reekie and Lingard 1986:40-41). 
However, it is pointed out by Uliana, et al. (1987:122) that 
if there should be a deferred taxation balance, the neces-
sity exists to decide whether to classify deferred tax as 
equity or debt. Frequently, deferred tax lS regarded as 
equity. This is based on the premi se that the liability is 
unlikely to arise in fact as there will always be new tax 
allowances to replace those that are expiring. If it were 
known that this is not the case then it lS suggested that 
deferred taxation would more correctly be treated as debt. 
The example shown in figure 5.1 depicts a situation where a 
provision for deferred taxes is created in the first 3 years 
(a temporary source of funds) but reverses when the wear and 
tear allowance falls below the accounting depreciation 







DEPRECIATION ON PLANT AND MACHINERY 
ACCOUNTING INCOME EFFECT 
(Deduction of depreciation 








TAXABLE INCOME EFFECT 
(Deduction of wear and tear 





R 8 000 
R 5 000 
RSa 000 
In the above case the provision for deferred taxes is 
creditted in the first two years as follows: 
1st Year (Wear and Tear Allowance 
2nd Year 
- Depreciation) x tax rate (say 50 per cent) 
(15 000 
(12 000 
10 000) (.5) = R2 500 
10 000) (.5) = R1 000 
In the third year there will be no c hange in this provision. 
However it is clear that the actual liability will material-
ize after the third year when the wear and tear allowance 
falls below the depreciation charge. The provision for 
deferred tax will diminish by (10 000 - 8 000) .5 = R1 000 
ln year 4 and vanish in year 5. In this case, because the 
provision was only a temporary source of funds, deferred tax 
should be classified as debt. 
However, if a case, occurs where replacement of the plant 
and machinery is done every 3 years on a continuing basis a 
permanent source of funds of R3 500 is created with debits 
to the account being offset by credits relating to new 
machinery so that the balance will not fall below R3 500. 
In such an instance to the extent of R3 500, the provision 
can be classified as equity since i t will never materialize 
under prevailing tax legislation. 
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This 'equity' portion of deferred taxation, 
Hopkins (1982:46) say, may legitimately be 
Everingham and 
regarded by a 
shareholder, who believes he is investing in an expanding 
company, as a reserve, since it is unlikely ever to be used 
if the company continues to expand in items of plant and 
machinery. 
They point out however, that a long term creditor certainly 
would not regard deferred tax as a reserve since credit 
balances would be likely to disappear if business activities 
contracted or the firm was liqui~ated. 
Where these funds constitute a temporary source, it clearly 
1S a 'cost free' source. In the second instance, however, 
where the source is classifiable as equity, its implicit 
cost is a function of the opportunity applicable to the 
firm's ordinary shareholders. 
5.4.3 THE COST OF PREFERENCE SHARES 
The component cost of preference shares is an explicit cost 
and is equal to the dividend i nvestors receive on the 
shares. Assuming the preferred issue is a perpetuity that 
currently sells for R100 a share and pays an R8 annual 
dividend, its yield is 8 per cent: 
Preferred yield = preferred dividend = 8 = 8 per cent 
price of preference share 100 
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In calculating the explicit cost of preference shares it is 
necessary to observe that the payment to shareholders is in 
the form of dividends and not interest and is accordingly 
not deductable for tax purposes. 
As 1n the case of debentures and loan stock, if the 
preference shares are not listed or seldom traded, the cur-
rent price can be approximated by reference to other listed 
preference shares with similar terms and risk profiles. 
5.4.4 COST OF EQUITY 
Hampton (1976:31) says that equity capital represents the 
ownership of a business. Equity investors are the suppliers 
of the firms' basic risk capital. This capital 1S exposed to 
all the risks of ownership and provi des a cushion for debt 
that has a preferential claim to income and capital on liq-
uidation. Normally this risk capi tal will only receive 
returns in the form of dividends after the prior claims of 
interest on debt and preferred dividends have been 
satisfied. On liquidation equity investors only have a claim 
to. what remains after the prior claims of creditors and 
preferred shareholders have been met (Uliana, 
1987:105-106). 
et al. 
Equity can formally be defined as the issued ordinary share 
capital of a company which carries an unrestricted right to 
participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution. 
Added to this are undistributable reserves (reserves which 
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are not available for distribution as dividends) e.g. any 
surplus arising as a premium on the issue of shares and 
debentures, as well as distributable reserves (reserves 
which are available for distribution as dividends) 
(Chartered Institute of Cost and Management Accountants 
1981:62-63). 
The cost of equity is an opportunity cost and is defined as 
such by Bierman and Smidt (1986:362) namely as the rate of 
return shareholders require on the firms ordinary shares. 
The 'required rate' must be as good as or better than the 
-
return ordinary shareholders or potential ordinary 
shareholders, contemplating trading at prevailing prices, 
can obtain on the best alternative investment. This required 
return can be measured by comparlng expected future 
dividends against the present market value of the shares. 
The rate of discount that equates the present value of ex-
pected future dividends to the current price of the share is 
the cost of capital for ordinary shares. The expectations 
that are relevant are those of the shareholders or potential 
shareholders who contemplate trading at prevailing prices. 
If this minimum rate is not earned inside the fir~, inves-
tors will be better off by having their funds returned to 
them. 
In order to calculate the cost of equity, certain models 
have been developed. One popular model which is frequently 
used ln financial literature was articulated by professor 
Myron Gordon and was consequently named after him. 
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5.4.4.1. THE GORDON MODEL 6 
5.4.4.1.1 THE COST OF INTERNAL EQUITY 
In terms of the Gordon Model the following formula ap-
proximates the cost of internal equity: 
ki = d1 + g 
po 
where ki = cost of capital for equity 
d1 = expected dividend rate in 1 year 
po = current market price per share 
g = expected long term annual rate of increase in 
future dividends. 
Weston and Brigham (1978:704) comment on the Gordon approach 
as follows: 
"stockholder returns are derived from dividends and 
capital gains and the total of the dividend yield plus 
the average growth rate of earnings over the past five 
to ten years may give an estimate of the total returns 
that stockholders expect in the future, from a par-
ticular share." 
6. To see how the Gordon model was developed see Weston 
and Brigham (1978 :640-641) 
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The point must be made here that dividends are paid out of 
after tax profits , and whether or not a company pays a 
dividend, and how large it will be are at the discretion of 
the board of directors. Consequently a change in management 
could very well impact on future decision making inter alia 
in this respect. 
Weston and Brigham (1978:701-702) place their statement in 
perspective by the following example: 
"Consider a firm that is expected by shareholders and 
prospective shareholders to earn R2 a year and pay a R1 
dividend during the coming year. The company's earn-
1ngs, dividends and share price have all been grow1ng 
at about 5 per cent per year and this growth rate is 
expected to continue indefinately and the dividend 
policy to remain unchanged." 
The share 1S ln equilibrium? and it currently sells for R20 
a share. 
7. The dividend growth model might be used as a valuation 
model: po = d1 
ki-g. 
The present value (po) of the share after discounting 
may be higher or lower than the current market price of 
the share. If it is higher than the market price it 
will yield a rate of return that is lower than that ac-
cording to the market price of the share. It follows 
then that if the market value is the same as the 
present value the rates of return yielded will cor-
respond. When this is the case the share will be n 
equilibrium (Weston and Brigham (1978 :640-641). 
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The rate investors requ1re on the firm's shares and conse-
quently the cost of equity will be: 
ki = dl + g 
po 
= 1 + ,05 
20 
= 0,1 or 10 per cent <effectively) 
The expected annual growth rate for the price of the shares 
1S 5 per cent, which on the initial price of R20, would lead 
to a Rl increase 1n the value of the share to R21 after one 
year. This price increase can only be attained if the Rl of 
retained earn1ngs 1S invested in the firm to yield 10 per 
cent per annum. If it is invested to yield only 5 per cent 
per annum, earnings will grow by only 5 cents during the 
year and new earnings will be R2 05, a growth of only 2 1/2 
per cent per annum. Once investors realize what is happening 
they will revalue the share downwards as follows: 
po = dl 
ki - g 
= 1 
0,10 - 0,25 
R13,33 
The net present value of the share, discounted at 10 per 
Gent, is now lower than the R20 market price which means 
that the share is not in equilibrium any more. This 1S the 
result of the share no longer earning the shareholder's op-
portunity cost or required rate of return. 
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In other words the best opportunity that would have been 
foregone by shareholders if funds were kept in the business, 
should now be accepted. 
Shareholders will now start selling, and with a downward 
shift in the shares' supply curve, the share price will tend 
downward until it is in equilibrium again yielding the re-
quired rate of return. 
5.4.4.1.2 THE COST OF EXTERNAL EQUITY 
According to Mathur (1979 :276) the investor is indifferent 
to the choice between existing and new equity. However 
management must consider this decision, since new externally 
generated equity has certain costs involved whereas inter-
nally generated equity has not. 
When a company ralses finance through the.issue of new 
shares it does not get the full price of the share. Issue 
expenses have to be met. Uliana, et al. (1987 :375) specify 
the following typical share issue expenses: 
* 
* 
listing fee - 1 cent for every 100 shares with a maxi-
mum of R5 OOOi 
professional fees legal and audit fees in drawing up 
the prospectus, and for other related professional 
services; 
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* bankers fee the issue is usually administered by a 
merchant bank, the fee of which is usually 1 per cent 
of the gross proceeds of the issue and 
* underwriting commission - the issue 1S usually under-
written to protect against the issue not being fully 
subscribed. A comm1SS1on of 1,5 per cent is not un-
usual. 
The authors point out that a new listing on the Johannesburg 
stock Exchange would typically cost at least R200 000 while 
a listing on the Development Capital Market would amount to 
approximately R50 000. 
If the figures used in the computation of the cost of inter-
nal equity were made applicable here and share 1ssue ex-
penses of R2(0,10) per share assumed the cost of external 
equity would be: 
ki = d1 + g 
po(r-flotation costs) 
= 1 + ,05 
20(1 - 0,1) 
= 0,105 or 10,5 per cent 
·From the above computation it can be seen that new equity's 
cost 1S higher than that of internal equity. Because of 
flotation costs being 0,10 or R2 per share it means that the 
firm will only receive R18 per share instead of R20, 1n net 
proceeds from issuing new shares. 
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Unfortunately the Gordon model, also known as the dividend 
growth model, makes certain dubious assumptions.: 
a) Investors assume that the past realised growth in the 
rate of return on the shares will persist into the fu-
ture. (Uliana, et al. 1987 :184-185). 
This is obviously an unwarranted assumption. The in-
dustry in which the firm operates could for example be 
adversely affected by an economic downturn. This could 
so adversely affect the earnings of the relative firm 
that the growth rate could decline significantly or 
even go into reverse. 
b) It is assumed that the share is ln equilibrium (present 
value = market price) (Weston and Brigham 1978 :704). 
In this cas~ it is presupposed that all investors take 
cognizance of the time value of money, are able to 
forecast dividends and react accordingly by buying and 
selling in the market. 
There are also two serlOUS anomolies inherent ln the model: 
a) as growth (g) approaches the required rate of return 
(ki) so the value of the share (po) approaches infinity 
and 
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b) if growth exceeds the required rate of return the model 
gives a negative valuation to the shares (Uliana, et 
al. 1987:184-185). 
The last two limitations of the Gordon model clearly 
implies that in order for it to function, ki (cost of 
equity) must be greater than g (growth rate). Uliana, 
et al. (1987 :185) cite that this clearly indicates 
that the model is suspect for a company that has a very 
high growth rate. 
Weston and Brigham (1978:704) furthermore point out 
that the logic underlying the analysis assumes that in-
vestors are indifferent between dividend yield and 
capital gain. 
This is clearly ignoring investors preferences. It is a 
known fact that because of differences in marginal tax 
rates, certain investors do prefer dividend payouts and 
others do not. 
Further deficiencies of the dividend growth model are noted 
by Lo Cascio (1970:72). He regards the use of d + g as 
p 
rather unfortunate because it treats ki as a dependant vari-
able with respect to d, p and g. This tends to confuse the 
true cause and effect relationships involved. For example if 
one solves for d, d = (ki - g) p . By interpretation this 
could mean that a change in p could cause a change 1n d. 
This obviously is absurd. The 'best' statement of the equa-
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tion is p = d because price changes are caused by d, ki 
ki-g 
anq g. If this were the case there may be a further flaw in 
the structure of the dividend growth model : an assumed ki 
will have to be slotted into the equation. What this in ef-
fect means 1S that it is not only assumed that all 
shareholders of a company have a predetermined opportunity 
expectation, but also that they have the same expectation. 
This can surely not be true. 
All these limitations put a question mark on the reliability 
of the Gordon model and necessitates reconsiderationn of the 
cost of equity capital. 
Another model has been developed which does not have the 
limitaions of the Gordon model. This model is known as the 
Capital asset pricing model. 
5.4.4.2 THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM) 
The point of departure in the theory underlying the CAPM is 
that a shareholder's perception of relevant risk will change 
if he holds a collection or portfolio of investments in the 
shares of a number of different companies. In this context 
the individual share will be important 1n terms of the mar-
ginal contribution it makes in the form of additional risk 
and expected return to his overall portfolio. 
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The benefit of diversification lies in the fact that inves-
tors typically spread their risks by investing in a number 
of securities rather than by putting all their money into 
one. 
The benefits of diversification can be measured by the ex-
tent to which the returns on two securities (i.e. shares) 
vary together (statistically measured by the covarianceJ.~ 
The CAPM is based on portfolio theory which distinguishes 
between two types of risk namely systematic and unsystematic 
risk. 
Systematic risk cannot be avoided by security investors 
since it affects financial markets in totality (general 
economic conditions, government policy, changes at a macro 
level, wars, etc.). Unsystematic risk, however, is peculiar 
to the security or firm concerned and will pertain inter 
alia to strikes, innovations, management quality, state of 
the industry and competition. The CAPM assumes, that the un-
systematic risk can be diversified away in any individual's 
portfolio since shares with a high level of risk can be 
off-set against low risk shares. 
8. Weston and Brigham (1978 :1011) define covariance as 
the correlation between two variables multiplied by the 
standard deviation of each variable. See also Weston 
and Brigham (1978 : 955-957). 
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Since anyone security's unsystematic risk or diversifiable 
risk is therefore irrelevant to an investor, only the sys-
tematic risk will influence the security's price. In the 
CAPM securities are consequently priced according to their 
non-diversifiable or systematic risk which is measured by 
the beta co efficient (Reekie and Lingard 1986 :117~119). 
Beta is a measure of the sensitivity of an individual 
security to changes ln the market. It is an elasticity co-
efficient and can be denoted as the percentage change in an 
individual security's return for a 1 percent change ln the 
return of the entire market (Henderson, et al. 1984 :109). 
Since the cost of capital is the required rate of return on 
new investments, the beta used must be the beta of the new 
investment, which may be different from the beta that ap-
plies to the firm as a whole. We are, however concerned with 
estimating the cost of capital for investments at a level of 
risk equal to that of the firm. Therefore the firm's beta 
does apply. (Ben Horim 1987:151) 
Lobking at this from a different viewpoint one can observe 
that the cost of all funds in the firm namely equity, debt 
and preference shares are a function of the risk inherent ln 
the firm. If the cost of equity, therefore is going to be 
calculated according to a risk that is different from that 
of the firm the cost of the other forms of finance will not 
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be compatable. It will be like operating in two firms, one 
financed with equity and the other one with debt, and 
preference shares. This surely doesn't make sense. 
Reekie and Lingard (1986:120) note that calculating betas 
involves expectations about the future responsiveness of the 
share's return against changes in the market return. Since 
the future is unknown, historical data must be used as a . 
substitute (monthly returns as measured by dividend yield 
plus capital appreciation for the share for a period of 
years). Since the market portfolio is also unknown a widely 
accepted share index could be used as a proxy. 
When we are looking at the market as a whole the relevant 
perspective becomes that of all investors who are actively 
involved ln buying and selling securities. A risk return 
line may consequently be identified that reflects their at-
titudes regarding the minimum acceptable rate of return for 
a given level of risk (Martin et al . 1979 :346-347). This 
line, also called· the security market line (SML) and graphi-
cally portrayed in figure 5.1 may be described not only as 
an expression of the relationship between expected return 
and systematic risk but also as the market price for risk. 
132 
FIGURE 5.2 
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Source: Reekie and Lingard, (1986:119) 
The SMLis plo~ted according to the equation known as the 
CAPM viz: 
ki = rf + b (rm - rf) 
where ki = required rate of return on equity 
rf = risk free rate 
rm = return available on the market portfolio 
(rm rf) is the risk premium obtained by investing in 
the market portfolio and not in risk free securities 
(i.e. the premium awarded for accepting systematic 
risk) . 
b = the factor by which (rm - "rf) is mUltiplied to in-
dicate the premium a relative security must earn above 
(or below) the risk premium on the market, thus taking 
into account systematic risk. 
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If the beta equals 1, then a security's returns will vary 
directly in proportion with the market returns (i.e. 10 per 
cent increase in market returns will produce 10 per cent In-
crease in the security's returns). Correspondingly a beta of 
2 implies that a 10 pe"r cent change in the market return 
will produce a 20 per cent change i~ the security's returns. 
Thus when a beta 9 is larger than 1 individual security 
returns are more than proportionally responsive to changes 
in the market, both when returns are increasing and decreas-
ing (Martin, et al. 1979 : 348). 
If hypothetical data lS substituted into the CAPM equation 
the required rate of return on equity is equal to: 
(risk free rate) + (risk premium) 
= rf + b(km - rf) 
= 0,10 + 1,25 (0,14 - 0,10) 
= 0,15 or 15 per cent 
The CAPM lS also not without blemish. Weston and Brigham 
(1978:431-432) list the following unrealistic assumptions 
underlying the CAPM: 
9.. Beta's significance as far as investment on the stock-
market is concerned is clear . High b value shares 
should be bought if the market is expected to rise 
since they will rise faster than the market. Con-
versely, if the market is expected to fall high b value 
shares are unattractive prospects. 
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* all investors are single period expected utility of 
terminal wealth maximizers who choose among alternative 
portfolios on the basis of standard deviation of 
returns; 
* all investors can borrow or lend an unlimited amount at 
an exogeriously given risk free rate of interest, rf, 
and there are no restrictions on any short sales of as-
sets; 
* all investors have identical subjective estimates of 
the means, variances and covariances of return among 





all assets are perfectly divisible, perfectly liquid 
(i.e. marketable at the going price) and there are no 
transaction costs; 
there are no taxes; 
all investors are prlce takers and 
the quantities of all assets are given. 
Van Horne (1983:201) furthermore, cites as a crucial assump-
tion in the CAP M the fact that the cost of bankcruptcy or 
insolvency is zero. This implies that if a firm fails, as-
sets can presumably be sold for their economic values. No 
liquidation or selling costs are incurred. After creditors 
have been paid, the residual proceeds are distributed to 
shareholders. 
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These assumptions speak for themselves as being devoid of 
realism. What some of them imply, however, is that theCAPM 
effectively assumes that investors hold portfolios of 
securities which are simply miniatures of the overall stock-
market. 
However absurd this may sound Weston and Brigham (1978:432) 
point out that the CAPM has been used in several civil court 
cases in the USA where its advocates have stood up quite 
well under intense and expert cross examination. 
Hyndman and Pogue (1984: 52-53) discuss a few problems in-
herent in the use of the CAPM, name l y: 
* the difficulty of obtaining an accurate measure of beta 
for a company or a project; 
* it deals only with the systematic risk but the ihvest-
ment manager may be interested in the total risk of the 
project if his portfolio is not efficient. A portfolio 
1S relatively inefficient if its securities still con-
tains substantial unsystematic risk; 
* changes in the capital structure10 of a company usually 
require alterations in its beta factor and 
10. Capitai structure denotes the prevailing long term 
financing of the firm and is represented by long term 
debt, preference shares and net worth (net worth con-
sists of ordinary share capital, non distributable 
reserves and retained earnings. In order to see how 
beta is affected by changes in the capital structure of 
a firm, see Henderson, et al. (1984 :113-115). See also 
section 10.2.2 
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* Slnce the beta factor 1S calculated using historical 
data and also tends to be relatively unstable over 
time, its accuracy as a measure of risk su)rrounding 
present investment possibilities 1S somewhat under-
mined. 
If one looks at the maze of limitations, assumptions and ob-
jections surrounding the CAPM it is no wonder that one of 
its midwives, Professor William Sharpe referred to 'the 
never-never land of the capital asset pricing model!' 
(Sharpe 1981 :144). 
However this is at least another attempt by financial 
theorists to develop a means by which the cost of equity 
capital can be measured. 
The near impossibility of this task is recognized by Bierman 
and Smidt (1986:372) when they say that 'there are no ways 
to estimate exactly the cost of equity of a publicly owned 
firm. ' 
A choice between the Gordon model and the CAPM is no easy 
task. Some comparative work has been done that justify 
closer scrutiny. 
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5.4.4.3 GORDON MODEL VERSUS CAPM 
In contrast to the dividend yield plus growth model, the 
CAPM 1S a single period model in that the expected rate of 
return for the stock market over a specified time period 
must first be estimated after which the expected return ~n a 
particular ordinary share for the same period must be es-
timated (Johnson and Melicher 1982 :418). 
It is furthermore pointed out that the CAPM's estimated cost 
of capital and the dividend growth models' estimate can, and 
often do differ significantly (Levy and Sarnat, 1982:418). 
The authors suggest that in such an event the dividend 
growth model should be relied on since it represents a more 
pragmatic approach. They also feel that the CAPM's ex-
planatory power leaves much to . be desired. They do not, 
however, substantiate their position in a convincing manner. 
Despite the shortcomings of the CAPM and the preferences of 
Levy and Sarnat, the CAPM is generally accepted as provid-
1ng the best available indication of the cost of equity 
capital. 
The above conclusion differs from that of van Wyk and 
Joubert (1987:42-44) who undertook an empirical study 
(section 6.3.3) using 21 selected shares on the Johannesburg 
stock Exchange and applying the Gordon model and the CAPM 
alternatively to calculate the cost of equity. They con-
cluded that neither of the models can be advocated for use 
in preference to what they term the more 'traditional' 
methods used in the analysis of financial statements. 
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This conclusion of van Wyk and Joubert necessitates a closer 
examination of the merits (if there are any) of traditional 
financial statem~nt measures of cost of equity. 
5.4.4.4 RATE OF RETURN ON SHAREHOLDER'S FUNDS 
The rate of return on shareholder's funds is calculated by 
using the following ratio expressed as a percentage: 
Earnings after interest and taxes 
shareholder's interests 
The numerator is self explanatory. The denominator consists 
of the nominal share capital as it appears in the firms 
balance sheet, plus reserves. Reserves in a company balance 
sheet arise from two main sources: retained profits from 
previous years which could have been but were not dis-
tributed to shareholders and any premium paid by 
shareholders over the nominal price of the shares when they 
initially bought the share, on the date of issue. The ratio 
prima faci appears to approximate the return expected by 
shareholders, but in fact it does not. Future growth or 
growth in current earnings are compl etely ignored. 
Another severe limitation of this ratio is the fact that 
shareholders' interests ln the balance sheet may bear vir-
tually no relation to the stock market prlce of the firms 
shares, and it is this price, not a balance sheet entry 
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which is of interest to existing shareholders (who may wish 
to sell or hold their shares) and to potential investors who 
may wish to buy shares (Reekie and Lingard 1986 :57). 
These arguments against return on investment as a criterion 
for cost of equity serve to reinforce the arguments against 
it as objective of the firm cited in chapter three. 
Another effort to express cost of equity capital hinges 
around the dividend payment. 
5.4.4.5 DIVIDEND RATE 
The dividend rate is the ratio of dividend paid to nominal 
share capital expressed as percentage. It 19nores current 
retentions (in the numerator) and past retentions or 
reserves (in the denominator) and so ignores growth poten-
tial for the future. Furthermore, the denominator is again 
unrelated to the market value of the firm (Reekie and Lin-
gard 1986 :57). 
These arguments clearly exclude this ratio as a realistic 
criterion for cost of equity. 
The dividend yield constitutes a criterion which is really a 
variation of the dividend rate. 
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5.4.4.6 DIVIDEND YIELD 
The dividend yield is the ratio of current dividend paid to 
market value of share capital expressed as a percentage. 
Market value is taken account of in this ratio but no ac-
count is taken of future earnings o r dividends (Reekie and 
Lingard 1986 :57). 
This limitation clearly renders t he dividend yield method 
unsatisfactory. 
The earnings yield constitutes a popular method of calculat-
ing cost of equity. 
5.4.4.7 EARNINGS YIELD 
Mathur (1979:277-278) notes that the earnings yield 
(reciprocal of pr1ce to earnings ratio) is sometimes advo-
cated as being a correct method to measure the cost of 
equity. The same ratio is also arrived at by dividing earn-
ings per share (EPS) by share price. 
This statement, he suggests, 
firm's dividend payout 1S 
can only be true when the 
one hundred per cent and its 
growth rate of earnings is consequentlj zero. 
Reekie and Lingard (1986 :58) observe that the limitation of 
this ratio lies in the fact although that it takes cog-
nizance of market value, it ignores future dividend or earn-
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ings growth. 'Like' in the numerator is therefore not com-
pared with 'like' in the denominator since market value of 
shares does embody future prospects but earnings or 
dividends do not. 
Perhaps the most profound objection against all of the above 
financial ratio measures of cost of equity, propogated by 
van Wyk and Joubert (1987:44), is perhaps that they do not 
take cognizance of the objective of the firm viz. wealth 
maximization of the owners. Wealth maximization, as postu-
lated is achieved through maximization of the market value 
of the ordinary shares. This value, as Porterfield (1965:43) 
indicates, is a function of future dividends and future 
dividends are in turn dependant on future cash flows. In or-
der therefore that the investment decision criterion, which 
is the cost of capital, be consistent with the objective it 
must also be defined in terms of future cash flows. 
In this respect all book value orientated measures fail 
miserably and the CAPM despite its defects, remains the best 
available approach to estimating the cost of equity capital. 
Having identified the component costs of capital and having 
considered some of the measurement problems involved the 
crux of the matter now is to establish how these costs can 
be combined to form a valid selection criterion for invest-
ment decisions. 
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5.5 THE COST OF CAPITAL AS SELECTION CRITERION 
The rationale for using the cost of capital as a selection 
criterion for new investments was pointed out in the begin-
ning of this chapter (section 5.2). 
It is however, postulated bySchall and Haley (1986:181) 
that this cost should be calculated as a weighted average of 
the components. A basic assumption in this study is that in-
vestment decisions by a particular firm should be limited to 
those in its own industry. 
A basic condition therefore for uSlng the cost of capital to 
evaluate new investments is firstly that new investments 
must have the same risk as average investments made in the 
past. This means that new investments must not change the 
business risk of the firm if they are undertaken. Any 
prospective investments that are bound to increase the busi-
ness risk of the firm should, according to Schall and Haley 
(1986:279) be evaluated inter alia by the CAPM in order to 
establish a required rate of return. 
This rate (risk free rate + risk premium) should then be 
used as a risk adjusted rate ln place of the weighted 
average marginal cost of capital (section 5.5.1). 
If follows however that the rate of return on any investment 
having the same beta risk as that of the firm can be deter-
mined by the CAPM as alternative to the Gordon model and 
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that this component cost can be used as a weight in the com-
putation of the marginal cost of cap ital (Schall and Haley 
1986 :182). 
Schall and Haley (1986: 182) secondly state as condition 
for using this marginal cost that the financing of new 1n-
vestments should not change the financial risk of the firm 
meaning the relative amounts of the different types of 
securities used by the firm should not change as a result of 
undertaking any of the new investments being evaluated. 
5.5.1 
5.5.1.1 
THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST OF CAPITAL 
(WACC) 
INTRODUCTION 
The WACC concept stresses that, 1n the long run, the firm 
will use many capital sources, thus the firms' cost of cap1-
taIls a weighted average of the costs of the various 
sources. The rationale for this is supplied by Weston and 
Brigham (1978:694-695). These authors put forward an example 
of a hypothetical firm whose cost of debt and equity is es-
timated to be 8 per cent per annum and 12 per cent per annum 
respectively. The firm has made a decision to finance the 
following year's investment projects by selling debt. It 
could borrow heavily using up its debt capacity 1n the 
process, to finance on a marginal cost basis, projects 
yielding 9 per cent per annum. In the following year it 
might have projects available that yield 11 per cent per 
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annum but they cannot be accepted because they can only be 
financed with additional 12 per cent equity money. To avoid 
such an absurd situation from arising the firm should be 
viewed as an ongoing concern and its cost of capital calcu-
lated as a weighted average of the varlOUS types of funds it 
uses : debt, equity and preference shares. 
In order however to proportion these varlOUS types of capi-
tal a value criterion is needed. 
5.5.1.2 VALUES TO BE USED WHEN CALCULATING THE WACC 
Financial theory suggests that the WACC should be calculated 
according to market values of debt and equity and not book 
values. This will provide a more appropriate 'marginal' 
perspective. 
Levy and Sarnat (1982:416-417) provide an example to il-
lustrate the logic of this suggestion: A firm issued R100 
debent~res bearing 5 per cent per annum interest a number of 
years ago. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that 
ta~es are zero and that the debentures are perpetuities 
having no maturity. After a number of years, inflation lead 
to a sharp rise in the domestic interest rates and the 
market rate of interest on this class of debentures rose to 
10 per cent per annum. The only way these debentures can now 
yield a 10 per cent per annum interest rate is by the market 
price falling to R50. In a free and competitive securities 
market therefore debenture holders will try to sell the 
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securities as long as the price 1S over RSO (and the yield 
below 10 per cent per annum) but no investor will buy them 
until the price drops to RSO (and the yield equals the going 
market rate of 10 per cent). 
Assuming 1n this hypothetical world that all investment is 
financed by debt only, the use of historical accounting 
values would suggest that investments should be accepted if 
they earn a rate of return of more than S per cent per an-
num. The market value approach would stipulate 10 per cent 
per annum as the correct cut off rate. Only the latter is 
correct because the firm can always earn more than S per 
cent by simply repurchasing two of its own debentures 1n the 
market for RSO each i thereby saving R10 in interest payments 
and effectively earning a rate of return of 10 per cent per 
annum. Thus the cost of the debt component cannot be less 
than its opportunity cost to the firm which in this case is 
10 per cent per annum. 
The only conclusion one can possibly come to is that his~ 
torical costs are completely irrelevant and that wACC should 
consequently always be calculated according to market 
values. 
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5.5.1.3 OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Weston and Brigham (1978:714) point out that if it lS as-
sumed that an optimal capital structure exists at a par-
ticular time, any new funds should then be raised with a 
view to attaining the weights reflected in the ideal struc-
ture. Should another subsequently become optimal, due 
perhaps to a change in financial markets, different target 
weights should be used. It is claimed by Weston and Brigham 
that an optimal capital structure for a firm is determined 
by finding the capital structure that minimizes the cost of 
capital. 
In this respect Gup (1983:181) suggests that Slnce a basic 
assumption underlying the theory of cost of capital is that 
it is applicable to new funds being raised by the firm, the 
weights to be used to calculate the cost of capital should 
reflect the proportions of the additional funds being raised 
to reach the target values. 
5.5.1.4 COMPUTATION OF THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST 
OF CAPITAL(WACC) 
The marginal concept is accentuated in current literature on 
cost of capital. What is professed lS that only the cost of 
new or marginal funds have any importance. Since the firm is 
continuously making new or marginal investments this makes 
sense provided it is the weighted average which is referred 
to and not a single source of funds as in section 5.5.1.1. 
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Consequently if new funds are raised the cost of each RI of 
funds will be a hypothetical weighted average of the propor-
tion of funds represented in the new capital structure. Only 
these funds then have any relevance when a cost of capital 
is computed and is termed the weighted average marginal cost 
of capital. Table 5.1 illustrates the calculation of the 
WACC using 'target values' for weight purposes. 
TABLE 5 . 1 
COST OF CAPITAL FOR 'HYPOTHETICAL COMPANY' USING 'TARGET 
VALUE 'WEIGHTS 
Source of financing 























11. 5,14 per cent signifies the af t er tax cost of debt, 
calculated in terms of prevailing market rates of in-
terest on equivalent debt. 
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The logic of using the WACC as criterion for investment 
decision making should now be clear. It represents the mini-
mum rate of return required by a firms' suppliers of capital 
on marginal investments. These investments should therefore, 
in order to be acceptable, yield a rate of return as high or 
higher than this rate in order to be eligible for accept-
ance. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the relationship between the cost of capital 
and the objective of the firm viz. shareholder wealth maxi-
mization has been outlined. The cost of capital acts as a 
'cut off' rate for new proposed investments in that the es-
timated rate of return on these marginal investments should 
be higher than the 'cost' in order to be acceptable. 
Both explicit and implicit costs are involved in the cost of 
capital. Explicit costs prove to be relatively easy to cal-
cUfate because they are mainly contractual in nature. Im-
plicit costs, however, are much more complicated to estab-
lish since they are opportunity costs. 
with regard to the cost of equity 'popular' methods in 
financial theory were investigated : the Gordon model and 
the capital asset pricing model were evaluated. Although 
both methods were found to have merits they were also found 
lacking in many respects. The CAPM, however, seems to be the 
most favoured of the two. 
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Although short term debt is not an ingredient of permanent 
financing as represented in the capital structure of a firm 
and should consequently not be normally used as a financing 
source for long term investment decision making, literature 
suggest that small businessmen in South Africa make exten-
sive use of this source of financing ln their investment 
decision making. It was therefore decided to conduct a 
review of the cost of short term sources of funds as a point 
of reference for later discussions. 
The rationale for regarding the discount rate or cost of 
capital as the weighted average of the different component 
costs of capital in the capital structure is also outlined. 
This cost is then also a marginal cost which can be applied 
as criterion to marginal investment decisions, and can be 
weighted according to target proportions representing the 
optimal capital structure as perceived by management. 
In the next chapter a study will be made of empirical 
studies conducted in the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa which have 
probed the place and calculation of cost of capital ln ac-
tual investment decision making situations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON COST OF CAPITAL IN PRACTICE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The review of the studies embodied in this chapter glve an 
indication of the relative degree of sophistication with 
which business people over a broad spectrum, interpret the 
concept of 'cost of capital' and its component costs. 
One problem encountered in this reVlew is that the Slze of 
businesses studied were not always clearly stated. Bearing 
in mind also that 'size' is a relative concept, it is ln any 
event extremely difficult to equate any business of a 'size' 
like 'small or large' ln another country to its counterpart 
in South Africa. 
The first studies reviewed are those which examine cost of 
capital determinati~n in the United States 6f America (USA). 
6.2 STUDIES ON COST OF CAPITAL IN THE USA 
Several studies in the USA have been undertaken regarding 
cost of capital. 
between listed 
Unfortunately no differentiation was made 
and unlisted firms. The following studies 
pertain inter alia to the so-called 'small firm'. It must be 
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stated, however, that many of these so called 'small firms' 
are listed companies and by South African standards would 
probably be regarded as 'medium' or 'large'. 
6.2.1 THE SOLDOFSKY STUDY 
Robert Soldofsky undertook a study on . capital budgeting 
practices (section 8.2.3.2) among 'small firms' .In this 
study some questions on cost of capital featured prominently 
(Boyer 1974 7-10). The interviews conducted in the 
research probed methods of financing and the managers' Vlews 
on the nature and measurement of the related costs. 
6.2.1.1 COST OF BORROWED FUNDS 
Interest on borrow~d funds was most often viewed in dollar 
terms rather than a rate or percentage. Interviewees seemed 
to be concerned about the amount of dollars they had to pay 
out. 
Quite a substantial number of the respondents viewed the 
cost of debt to be higher than the cost of equity. This 
viewpoint according to Boyer (1974:9) is not consistent with 
financial literature for two reasons. Firstly there is a tax 
adyantage on debt which reduces the cost and secondly the 
cost of owner supplied funds is supposed to be higher be-
cause of the risk factor it reflects. 
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6.2.1.2 COST OF EQUITY 
One fifth of the firms surveyed said that equity funds had 
no ' cost. The basis for this belief was that no cost outlay 
was required since dividend payments were optional. 
Of the respondents 70 per cent considered the cost of equity 
to be a rate. The most commonly accepted definition of the 
'rate' proved to be current earnings as a percentage of the 
book value of equity capital. None of the firms employed the 
earnings\market price ratio. 
Very few respondents attempted a weighting process ln the 
final computation of a cost of capital. Soldofsky expressed 
the feeling that this was beyond the conceptual framework of 
the respondents. 
6.2.1.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Soldofsky's principle conclusions were that 'small 
businesses' are basically cash and profit orientated and are 
na.lve in their use of 'traditional' computation of cost of 
capital when making decisions. 
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6.2.2 THE GRAY, MONROE BIRD AND SCOTT STUDY 
The Gray, Monroe, Bird and Scott s t udy (1972: 1-9) focussed 
specifically on investment decision making (section 8.2.5) 
by 'small firms' which were defined as those having net as-
sets of less than 1 million dollars. 
From a random sample of 500 questionnaires sent to small 
manufacturers, 135 responses were received. 
The Gray, et al. (1972:35) study indicated that 61 per cent 
of the firms used a basic standard of financial performance 
against which proposed uses of funds were appraised. The 
most popular procedure employed was to compare the expected 
rate of return on an investment proposal with the cost of a 
single source of funds. The respondents who used this type 
of procedure totalled 37 per cent; this amounted to 62 per 
cent of the 61 per cent above who said they used a screening 
rate. 
Of the other respondents 13 per cent used some mlX of 
financing costs such as an average overall cost of all 
sources of funds and 9 per cent used an historic 'hurdle 
rate', such as a historic return o n investment. 
This study certainly confirmed a lack of consistent under-
standing of the cost of capital concept among 'small firms' 
in the USA. 
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6.2.3 THE BOYER STUDY 
By far the most significant contribution made to knowledge 
pertaining to the cost of capital of the 'small business' 
was an empirical study done by P Boyer (1974:43-44) in the 
USA. The sample was drawn from manufacturing firms in the 
Tidewater area in the state of Virg i nia. The population was 
limited to manufacturing firms since Boyer felt that capital 
budgeting was a more vital process for this type of business 
than retailing or wholesaling because of the heavier invest-
ment in long term assets. Size was determined on basis of an 
employment criteria of 250. This constituted a suggested 
maximum employment criterion for 'small business' laid down 
by the Small Business Administration of the USA. 
In the area under surveillance 462 firms met this criteria. 
Firms consisted of sole proprietorships, partnerships and 
corporations. A sample of 30 firms was decided on and inter-
views were conducted personally by the author. 
6.2.3.1 COST OF DEBT 
The cost of borrowed funds was commonly regarqed as a rate 
rather than a dollar flow. 
The respondents who felt that the cost of debt was greater 
than the cost of equity totalled 87 per cent. This could be 
understood since most respondents felt that equity had no 
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cost. Of those who viewed a cost of equity other than zero 
the following two reasons were given for debt cost being 
higher than equity: 
a) there is a cost of aggravation associated with borrow-
ing and 
b) interest rates are higher than those of equity. 
The author unfortunately, did not elaborate on the method 
according to which the 'interest rates' were calculated by 
respondents. 
6.2.3.2 COST OF EQUITY 
Slightly more than 73 per cent of the interviewees regarded 
equity funds as cost free. The reasons suggested to back up 
this viewpoint were: 
a) there is no outlay as there 1S with interest; 
b) it cannot be computed; 
c) it is the owners money and need not be repaid. 
Of the respondents considering a cost to exist for equity, 
62,5 per cent viewed it as a rate rather than a dollar cash 
flow. Again the author did not elaborate on methods of cal-
culation. 
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others looked at it as being a cost for all funds (debt and 
equity), even .if only an opportunity cost, while others did 
not compute the cost but did recognize its existence. 
6.2.3.3 CONCLUSION 
This study did confirm that the concept of the cost of capl-
tal is only loosely and naively understood, if at all, by 
many small business firms in the USA. 
It is a pity that the study did not probe the reasons why 
many respondents claimed that capital costs cannot be com-
puted. 
6.3 A STUDY ON COST OF CAPITAL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) 
Carsberg and Hope (1973:23-65) undertook a study in the UK 
with the specific purpose of eva l uating a hypothesis that 
the investment appraisal practice commonly used in British 
firms contribute to a tendency to under-investment, (the 
meaning of 'under-investment' will become clear ln due 
course). 
The study also dealt with the cost of capital as an accept-
ance criterion for investment decisions. 
The questionnaire pertaining to this study was sent to a 
sample of 325 companies chosen from 'The Times' list of 1 
000 leading UK companies for 1971-72. Financial and banking 
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institutions were excluded since most of their investments 
would be undertaken in financial markets and would conse-
quently raise special problems of appraisal. 
A total of 103 usable responses were received, which repre-
sented a response rate of 31,7 per cent. 
6.3.1 RESULTS 
Table 6.1 reflects a list of some basic discount rates 
which were put to interviewees. They were asked to indicate, 
irrespective of whether they used an accounting rate of 
return method, or a 'discounting method', which of the fol-
lowing describes most closely how the basic discount rate 















CHOICE OF BASIC DISCOUNT RATE 
Rate charged on bank overdrafts 
Actual rate of return on equity shares.in your 
company over some past period 
Actual rate of return earned on a diversified 
portfolio of equity shares over some past period 
Current dividend yield on equity shares in your 
company plus an allowance for growth 
Current redemption yield on government securities 
Current redemption yield on ' fixed interest 
securities 
Ratio of accounting profit to book value of equity 
(as per recent accounts) 
Ratio of accounting profit to total assets at book 
value (as per recent accounts) 
Coupon rate on fixed interest securities in your 
company 
Some average of the above 
Rate chosen by management as a matter of policy 
other 















In answering the above question some respondents selected 
more than one option reflecting different rates in different 
situations, with the result that the total number of 
choices, 108 in all, exceeds the total number of replies. 
The authors concluded that, the fact that the most popular 
method of setting a target rate involved policy considera-
tions resulted in a rate that is not directly related to 
market factors. 
Also the rate charged on bank overdrafts is not directly 
relevant to the appraisal of investment projects because it 
relates to a source of short term rather than long term 
capital. They furthermore state that the bank overdraft rate 
will normally also be lower than the cost of equity capital 
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and may tend to produce an underestimate of the weighted 
average cost of capital. According to the authors it is also 
apparent that firms selecting methods (b), (c) and (d) have 
little or no fixed interest capital. Since the cost of 
equity is generally supposed to be higher than the cost of 
fixed interest capital, these firms could reduce their cost 
of capital and hence may be under-investing. In other words 
the wealth of the shareholders could be enhanced by increas-
ing long term liabilities, thereby reducing the acceptance 
criterion enabling more investment to take place. It was 
further concluded that firms which calculated their target 
rate of return as some average of basic rates (j), generally 
used some combination of rates (a), (c) and (f) or rates (b) 
and (i). These firms according to the authors, appears to 
operate closest to the prescriptions of financial theory ln 
that they appear to have used a rate of weighted average of 
debt and equity in order to arrive at a weighted 'cut off' 
rate. 
Finally, firms which used target ra t es of return equal to an 
actual accounting rate of return in a past period would be 
constraining future potential on the basis of past perfor-
mance. These firms will then also suffer from the weaknesses 
of the accounting rate of return, amongst others its depend-




This UK study reveals much ignorance amongst supposedly 
sophisticated firms in the calculation of cost of capital. 
This ignorance seems to extend into the field of financial 
theory since no mention is made by the researchers of models 
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utilized for the purpose of the calculation of the cost of 
capital like the 'dividend growth model' or the CAPM. 
Most respondents seemed to rely on historical data, mostly 
based on accounting fig~res, and managements' intuition. 
6.4 STUDIES ON COST OF CAPITAL IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA (RSA) 
6.4.1 THE LAMBRECHTS STUDY 
6.4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1972 Lambrechts (1976:27-31) conducted a survey on capi-
tal investment appraisal methods in the RSA (section 8.6.1). 
The top 100 quoted companies (in terms of total assets) 
which appeared in the Financial Mail top 100 list in 1971 
were approached in 1972. The assets of these companies 
ranged from R19 million to R290 million. Positive reactions 
were received from 57 of the 100 companies and of this num-
ber 48 were included in the investigation and personally 
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visited by the investigator. Of the 48 companies, 38 were in 
the manufacturing industry. In this study some pertinent 
questions were posed on cost of capital issues. 
6.4.1.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
Lambrechts (1976:30) found that the figure being used as 
'cost of capital' of the co-operating companles varied be-
tween 10 and 20 per cent (after tax) at the time of the In-
terview. 
Common methods for the calculation of the cost of capital 
were 'experience' and subjective evaluation (37 per cent), 
some form of weighted cost of capital (24 per cent) and 
profitability allowed by the price controller (11 per cent). 
The remainder of the interviewees (28 per cent) were not 
certain of their practice! 
In cases where the cost of capital was estimated in terms of 
'experience' and subjective evaluation no definite method, 
approach or policy could be specified. Lambrechts indicates 
that the following justification was common: 
"A profitability of 25 per cent after tax . is too high 
and would lead to new competition, 10 per cent after 
tax is too low because it does not compensate the firm 
for risk. Therefore, the cost of capital should be be-
tween 10 and 25 per cent after tax." < Lambrechts 1976 
:30) 
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Unfortunately, Lambrechts does not specify whether the above 
stated 'profitability' refers to a profitability on total 
assets or on owners equity. 
In applying the weighted cost of capital method, 6 of the 9 
companies concerned used the present capital structure for 
weighting purposes and 3 used the expected structure. Market 
values were used by 5 companies to determine the weight for 
ordinary share capital while 4 .companies used book values. 
For determining the cost of equity capital, earnings per 
share were preferred by 7 of the ~ompanies and dividend per 
share by 2 companies. 
6.4.1.3 CONCLUSION 
Lambrechts' study revealed 
regard to the calculation of 
ticularly that of equity cost. 
a great deal of confusion with 
capital cost and more par-
Ignorance regarding the cal-
of discounted cash flow culation of equity cost in terms 
seemed to exist across the board. This can be viewed as a 
di~turbing situation. 
A subsequent study by Reeves, on investment decisions was 
undertaken seven years later. This study also focussed inter 
alia on cost of capital issues. 
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6.4.2 THE REEVE STUDY 
6.4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reeve (1981:10-14) undertook a survey on business investment 
decisions (section 8.6.2) under conditions of inflation in 
the RSA, in 1978. 
The subjects utilized for this survey were the top 100 South 
African companies in terms of asset size, given in the April 
1977 edition of the 'Financial Mails' Top 100 Companies' 
repo~t. Of the replies· received 50 were deemed usable. 
In order to establish whether inflation was correctly 
treated ln the methods used ln practice, firms were re-
quested to supply, inter alia, details regarding the basic 
discount rate of return used in investment decisions. 
6.4.2.2 RESULTS 
Table 6.2 depicts a range of the act ual discount rates used 
by South African companies in this study, the number of com-
panies using a specific rate, the numbers that have chosen 
this rate as a matter of policy and details about when last 
this rate was altered. 
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TABLE 6.2 
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It is notable that over 50 per cent of responding companies 
indicate that their rate had been chosen as a 'matter of 
policy'. This probably was a way of 'saving face' for many 
respondents who had no formal appraisal methods for capital 
budgeting at all. 
Firms were asked whether the 'normal' discount rate was 
varied for individual projects. Of the respondents inter-
viewed 70 per cent said that this was the case. They stated 
that adjustment was usually based on top management judge-
ment taking into account the nature of the project (8 
firms), the risk of the project (12 firms) and 'strategic' 
factors (14 firms). Finally the firms advised that in about 
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80 per cent of cases the rate was established by managers 
alone, whilst in the remainder of the cases the advice of 
consultants or writers in the field was sought. 
The author, who made the somewhat sweep1ng assumption that 
the typical industrial company in the RSA 1S financed half 
by debt and half by equity qrrived at a weighted average 
cost of capital, suitable for use as an investment decision 
discount rate of about 15 per cent ln nominal terms. 1 
This was derived from available data of average interest 
yields on company debentures, changes in the consumer price 
index and average dividend yields on industrial shares. It 
was decided that 8 per cent was a fair estimate of the after 
tax cost of debt. The cost of equity was computed according 
to the Gordon model viz. 
d1 = 12 per cent and g = 10 per cent. 
po 
The growth rate was obtained as fol l ows: 
The average dividend yield on industrial shares for 1971 was 
6,4 per cent and that of 1977 11,5 per cent. This con-
stitutes a growth rate of 10 per cent. 
1. The 'nominal rate' reflects a premium for inflation, 
contrary to the 'real rate' which does not. 
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How the 12 per cent dividend yield was derived at 1S however 
not at all clear. 
The weighted average cost of capital was therefore computed 
as (1/2 x 8 per cent) + (1/2 x 22 per cent) = 15 per cent. 
This compares against a range of 9 per cent to 30 per cent 
in table 6.2. 
Since the inputs on the authors' capital cost computation 
were derived from capital markets, he regarded 15 per cent 
as a criterion and consequently stated that all companies 
with a higher cost would create a bias toward under invest-
ment. 
It is unfortunate that Reeves made t he assumption that the 
typical South African industrial company is financed half by 





it automatically leads to the implication that all 
firms have the same financial risk; 
it furthermore implies that target capital structures 
do not exist in the South African industrial sector and 
it is sure to present a distorted reflection of the 
weighted average cost of capital. 
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6.4.2.3 CONCLUSION 
A most serious deficiency was once again exposed by the 
Reeve survey: not one company seemed to be aware of the ex-
istence of the Gordon model or even the concept of dividend 
discounting in order to arrive at some kind of cost of capi-
tal. Neither did they seem to be aware of the CAPM. 
It is a pity that Reeve did not ask any questions about the 
objectives of the respondents. This might have substantiated 
the suspicion that some or all of the firms concerned were 
inclined to confuse wealth maximizat ion with book value max-
imization or maximization of earnings per share or profit 
maximization. 
Another disturbing factor is that some firms use the over-
draft rate as the discount rate. It has already been stated 
ln the UK study that this rate cannot be used as cost of 
capital since overdrafts, being for short term financial re-
quirements, ought not to form part of the capital structure. 
In this regard Pike (1983:37) warns specifically that over-
draft rates are not reliable as a measure of a project's 
cost of capital (section 8.4.1.2). 
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6.4.3 THE VAN WYK AND JOUBERT STUDY 
van Wyk and .Joubert (1987:42-44) made an empirical study 
using 21 selected shares on the Johannesburg stock Exchange 
and applying the Gordon model and t he CAPM alternatively to 
calculate the cost of equity of each company. 
The shares selected were all clas sified as industrial and 
represented most of the various industrial sectors. 
6.4.3.1 METHODOLOGY 
van Wyk and Joubert established the risk free rate from 
price movements in the RSA 2005 13 per cent stock. Calculat-
ing the growth rate percentage (g) provided significant 
problems according to the researchers. They point out that 
the Gordon model relies on the product of the percentage 
return on shareholder's funds (r) and the percentage of net 
lncome retained (b) to provide the growth figure i.e. g = 
rb. 
With the present rate of inflation in the RSA, however, the 
return on equity as reported by companies is distorted. Some 
companies revalue their fixed assets which leads to less 
distortion. To complicate matters further, the period 1982 
to 1985 included a severe economic recession. Eventually it 
was decided to accept published resu lts on face value but 
use a five year average, 1981 to 1985, as approximations for 
rand b. The average earnings per share for this period was 
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divided by the average net asset value per share to provide 
r, while b was taken to be the aveiage plough back percent-
age for the same period. 
As far as dividends were concerned do was taken to be the 
last dividend if dividends were decreasing. If it increased, 
d1, was set equal to do (1 + g) as required by the Gordon 
model. If the company suffered a loss, d, was assumed to be 
zero. 
The JSE industrial index was used to indicate the market. 
The monthly change in the index, 
dividend yield, was expressed 
adjusted for the market 
as a total yield of the 
market, and this was compared to the yields of the selected 
shares to calculate betas. 
6.4.3.2 RESULTS 
They were surprised to find that no less than 11 of the 21 
companies had a cost of equity lower than the risk free rate 
when the 'Gordon model' was applied. The companies with 
traditionally good investor ratings viz. Trek, Sasol, Al-
tech, Toyota, Dunlop, Nampak, Pepkor, Pick 'n Pay and Tren-
cor had a cost of equity higher than the risk free rate. 
The Gordon model approach provided a cost of equity of be-
tween 4,57 per cent and 24,33 per cent for the 21 companies 
with an average of 16,01 per cent. 
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According to the Beta approach all companies had a cost of 
equity in excess of the risk free rate. The percentage cost 
was also much more concentrated under this approach and 
varied between 17,11 per cent and 20,73 per cent with an 
average of 19,14 thus exceeding the Gordon model approach by 
3,13 percentage points. 
A real disappointment for the researchers was that for three 
companies only viz. Trek, Nampak and Pick 'n Pay did the two 
methods provide a cost of equity figure within one percent-
age point of each other. 
Their conclusion (for which they provide no rationale) was 
that the CAPM provides truer figures, although the range be-
tween the best and poorest companies appeared to be too 
small. This phenomenon appeared to have occurred due to the 
fact that during the period under review, the risk free rate 
was approximately 16,5 per cent. 
Although the authors do not mention the returns on the 
market (k) when this study was undertaken it appears that 
this situation could arise due to the fact that the dif-
ference between the risk free rate and the market rate of 
return at the time was relatively small. To illustrate, let 
us assume there are two companies A and B. A 1S a business 
cycle sensitive company and displays a beta of 2 (twice as 
risky as the market) whilst B the more stable company dis-
plays a beta of .5 (half as risky as the market). Let us 
further assume that rf (the risk free rate) = 16 per cent 
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and km (the return on the market) = 18 per cent. The re-
quired rate of return for company A would be 20 per cent 
(0,16 + (0,18 - 0,16) (2) and company B 17 per cent (0,16 + 
(0,18 - 0,16) (0,5). 
The range is only 3 per cent. As the difference between rf 
and km becomes bigger so does the range between the required 
rates of return. A possible reason therefore for the small 
range between the required rates of return of the more 
stable companies and the business cycle sensitive companies 
1n the above study seemed to be a market return relatively 
little higher than the risk free rat e of 16,5 per cent which 
prevailed at the time. 
Further conclusions drawn by van Wy k and Joubert were that 
the results obtained by the Gordon model were suspect and 
its use should only be limited to t h e calculations of equity 
costs of very prosperous companies. van Wyk and Joubert do 
not elaborate on the rationale of t h is cryptic statement. If 
one accepts that a 'prosperous' company, is likely to have 
supernormal growth rates, the Gordo n model cannot be used at 
all. A pre-requisite for the use of this formula 1S that ki 
(the cost of equity capital) should be bigger than g(the 
growth rate) (Weston and Brigham 1978:647). Consequently, 
when the growth rate is very high t h is condition is unlikely 
to prevail. Weston and Brigham (1978:647) stipulate that the 
Gordon model can only be used for 'normal' growth firms, 
that is firms that display a growth rate similar to that of 
the Gross National Product. 
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van Wyk and Joubert concluded that preference for calcula-
tion of the cost of equity capital should be given to the 
more 'traditional' methods found in simple ratio analysis of 
financial statements. One can o n ly assume they refer to 
methods discussed in sections 5.4.4.4-5.4.4.7 viz. rate of 
return on shareholders funds, dividend rate, dividend yield 
and earnings yield. 
6.4.3.3 CONCLUSION 
The researchers might have improved the quality and value of 
their findings had they formulated their concept of the 
firm's 'financial objective' before they employed base 
value orientated methods for calculating the cost of equity 
capital. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
Studies on cost of capital in the USA, UK and RSA seem to 
have exposed one common denominator: there is a widespread 
19norance of time related methods by which cost of equity 
may be calculated. It furthermore a ppears that a serious in-
formation gap exists between decision makers and theorists. 
A large number of inappropriate methods are employed ln the 
calculation of equity costs ranging from subjective evalua-
tion, management policy, overdraft rate to profitability al-
lowed by the price controller. 
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Firms using the overdraft rate as a 'cut off' rate for in-
vestment decision making are particularly prominent and they 
ignore the fact that, overdraft facilities do not represent 
long term funds. To use the rate on these funds as cost of 
capital for long term decision making is consequently er-
roneous. 
Smaller firms appear to be complete l y ignorant of cost of 
capital issues. Their attention appears to be focussed on 
cash and liquidity issues. 
Chapter seven will deal with the actual selection of invest-
ments from among alternative investment proposals. Different 
methods will be evaluated in terms of their contribution 
towards the objective of the firm. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SELECTION FROM ALTERNATIVES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has thus far being argued that the objective of the firm 
should be to maximize the utility of the consumption of the 
owners of the firm over time. This is achieved through the 
maximization of the market value of the ordinary shares. 
The market value is a function of investor expectations 
regarding future dividends and future dividends are in turn 
dependent on future cash flows. In order that the acceptance 
criterion, which ought to be the cost of capital, be consis-
tent with the objective and the method of measuring it, it 
has also been defined in terms of future cash flows. 
It is logical to suppose that the price of a share on the 
market should reflect the cumulative results of a series of 
investment decisions that have been taken within the firm. 
It is furthermore logical to assume that the method that is 
used for the valuation of ordinary shares should also be 
used for investment decisions within the firm. The rationale 
for this being that if a certain investment proposal is 
evaluated according to a method that is consistent with the 
goal of wealth maximization, and it is found that it will 
contribute positively toward wealth maximization it will 
also contribute positively towards maximization of the share 
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pr1ce. The reason for this is that the evaluation method has 
taken into consideration the factors upon which the market 
price depends and operates. Thus, the method of measurement 
of any investment, whether it is an ordinary share or 
whether it concerns the purchase of a new forklift, will be 
the same as long as they are consistent with the goal of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
Methods which take into account the factors upon which 
market price depends and operates are called discounted cash 
flow methods. These methods are discussed below. 
7.2 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW METHODS 
7.2.1 NET PRESENT VALUE METHOD (NPV) 
Weston and Brigham (1978:294) describe the implementation of 
this method as one by which the present value of the ex-
pected net cash flows of an investment is discounted by ap-
plying the weighted average marginal cost of capital as the 
discount factor. If the net present value is positive, the 
project should be accepted, and if negative it should be 
rejected. If two projects are mutually exclusive the one 
with the higher NPV should be chosen. The equation for this 
method can be depicted as follows: 









In the above equation F1, F2, etc. represents the net 
projected cash flows; I is the initial cost of the cash 
flows; k is the marginal cost of capital and n is the 
project's expected life. 
According to Weston and Brigham (1978:295) the logic of this 
method can be seen in the fact that a project with a posi-
tive NPV will increase the value of the firm by the amount 
of the NPV. 
Gup (1983:249) observed that the NPV method assumes that all 
positive cash flows are reinvested at the marginal cost of 
capital. However, actual reinvestment returns may differ 
from the original marginal cost of capital significantly, 
thereby distorting the meaning of the NPV. 
A second problem noted was that the cost of capital 1S un-
realistically assumed to remain constant throughout the life 
of the project (Gup 1983 : 249). 
Thirdly the author argues that the concept of NPV i~ con-
fusing to some managers 1n that they incorrectly interpret a 
project with a zero NPV as one with a zero return. Such a 
project, in fact promises the required rate of return. This 
difficulty can of course be overcome by suitably educating 
the decision maker. 
A further problem noted by Gup (1983 : 249) arises when 
prospective mutually exclusive investments are of substan-
tially different sizes. A project with a NPV of R500 would 
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for instance normally be preferred against a project with a 
NPV of R400. However the first project might require an in-
vestment of Ri million whereas the second might only require 
an investment of R50 000. Therefore the second project 
provides a larger return per Rand of investment and would 
accordingly boost shareholder's wealth to a greater extent. 
This problem can be avoided by converting NPV's to what is 
known as profitability indices. 
7.2.2 PROFITABILITY INDEX 
A profitability index is calculated by dividing the present 
value of future cash flows by the investment outlay. It 
shows the relative profitability of any project in terms of 
the present value of benefits per Rand of cost. 
Moyer, et al. (1981:225-226) describe the method as follows: 
"Any project whose profitability index is greater or 
equal to one is considered acceptable while a project 
having a profitability index less than one is con-
sidered unacceptable. The rationale for this being that 
when a project has a profitability index of one the 
present value of the cash flows is exactly equal to the 
net investment. Thus the project has.a net present 
value of zero, meaning that it is expected to earn the 
minimum required rate of return (weighted average mar-
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ginal costs of capital). In such a case the value of 
the firm will neither be increased nor decreased and 
the value of the shares will remain unchanged." 
However, Moyer, et al. (1981:226) point out that if projects 
are mutually exclusive, not as a result of capital rationing 
(section 7.4.3) but because of technical considerations the 
normal NPV approach is preferred since it will select the 
project which is expected to generate the largest total Rand 
return. Capital rationing compels the firm to choose the 
profitability index approach since i t will indicate which 
projects will maximize the return per Rand of investment, an 
appropriate objective when a funds constraint exists. 
7.2.3 DISCOUNTED PAYBACK 
Uliana, et al. (1987:221) describe this method as one which 
takes into account the time value of money. The discounted 
payback period is the time it takes for the present value of 
I 
a project's cash flows to equal the cost of the investment. 
This approach in fact provides more of a liquidity measure 
than one of profitability. Because it recognizes the time 
value of money, it would however, be more acceptable than 
its common counterpart which simply measures the payback 
period with no cognizance being taken of the time value of 
money. However in terms of underlying principles it does not 
differ from the payback period method (section 7.5.2) and 
will accordingly not be discussed further here. 
179 
7.2.4 INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (IRR) 
Whereas the acceptance criterion for new investments viz. 
the marginal cost of capital was used in the NPV approach as 
the discount rate to be applied to expected cash flows, the 
marginal cost of capital is used in the IRR method as a 'cut 
off' point or hurdle rate that is compared against the in-
ternal rate of return of the investment. 
The IRR is the direct rate that equates the present value of 
expected future cash flows or receipts to the initial cash 
outlay (Weston and Brigham 1978:295-296). 
This time adjusted method of evaluation of investment 





+ . . . . . . . . Fn 
(l+k)n 
I = 0 
Here the value of I is known as well as the values of F1, F2 
..• Fn, but the value of k is unknown. Some value of k will 
caUse the sum of the discounted receipts to equal the criti-
cal cost of the project, causing the equation to equal zero. 
That value of k, which is the solution value of the equa-
tion, is defined as the internal rate of return. 
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It is significant to note that the same basic equation is 
used for the IRR and the NPV. In the NPV method the discount 
rate is specified and the NPV found, while in the IRR method 
the NPV is specified to equal zero, and the value that 
causes the NPV to equal zero is found. 
Arithmetically the IRR is found by trial and error. An ar-
bitrarily selected discount rate is initially used to com-
pute the present value of an investment from the cash flows. 
This procedure is repeated using a rate which is judged to 
be 'closer' until the present value of cash flows from the 
investment is approximately equal to its cost. 
The discount rate that brings about this equality is defined 
as the internal rate of return. The selection of any project 
using the internal rate of return method will depend upon 
the yield exceeding some minimum cost standard such as the 
marginal cost of capital. In effect, this means that if the 
internal rate of return equals the marginal cost of capital, 
the firm will be able to use the cash flow generated to 
repay the funds obtained, and to cover the cost of the funds 
(Weston and Brigham 1978 279). If the IRR exceeds the 
marginal cost of funds, the value of the firm will increase 
and if less, the value will decline. It is this breakeven 
characteristic that makes the IRR method very appealing. 
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caution needs be exercised ,when the IRR method is used to 
evaluate mutually exclusive investment proposals of differ-
ing sizes. To avoid pitfalls in this respect it is wise for 
the decision maker to make use of the incremental approach 
to IRR where appropriate (Schall and Haley 1986 :213). This 
method consists of first determining whether the smaller in-
vestment opportunity alternative is the most profitable by 
applying the normal IRR approach. If it is, it is necessary 
to determine whether that opportunity is sufficiently more 
profitable than the alternative to warrant peference. The 
larger investment opportunity is preferred if the incremen-
tal IRR exceeds the cost of capital. To demonstrate, take 
for example two mutually exclusive investments 0 and E, in-
volving outlays of R3 000 and R2 000 respectively. 0 has ex-
pected level cash flows of R900 per year for 5 years and E 
R610 per year for 5 years. Projects 0 and E promise expected 
returns of 15,2 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. As-
sume that the marginal cost of capital is 10 per cent. Be-
cause the smaller opportunity has a higher IRR, the in-
cremental approach is appropriate. 
To compare alternatives 0 and E using the incremental IRR 
method, it must be established whether an incremental in-
vestment of R1 000 in 0 as compared with E is justified. If 
o is picked instead of E an additional investment of R1 000 
must be made and it would be expected to receive compara-
tively, an additional R290 for 5 years. The IRR on the addi-
tional investment is found to be 13,8 per cent. As the 
firms' cost of capital of 10 per cent is less than 13,8 per 
182 
cent D is preferred to E. Had the cost of capital however, 
been greater than 13,8 per cent, E would have been better 
than D. If the cost of capital had for example been 15 per 
cent E would have been chosen over D because the additional 
investment required by D would not provide a high enough 
rate of return. 
The final step is to decide whether the better alternative, 
D, is sufficiently profitable to be acceptable. D is accept-
able since its rate of return of 15 , 2 per cent exceeds the 
cost of capital of 10 per cent. I f more than two mutually 
exclusive alternatives of different sizes are involved a 
series of comparisons would be necessary. 
The IRR method has been criticized by reference to the fol-
lowing issues: 
7.2.4.1 THE REINVESTMENT RATE ASSUMPTION 
According to Herbst (1982: 89) it may not be unreasonable to 
assume that a firm in a growth situation, where profitable 
investment opportunities exist, coul d reinvest cash flows at 
a rate of earning equal to the IRR. For other firms however, 
and government institutions, analysts think it more realis-
tic that cash flows can be reinvested at a rate equal to the 
cost of capital. This he states is the usual formulation of 
the reinvestment rate assumption. 
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Herbst (1982: 89) now proceeds to consider the IRR and rein-
vestment rate in a rather controversial manner. 
He furnishes an example of a R100,OOO loan that is made by a 
bank to an individual business proprietor for a period of 5 
years. The loan is repaid in equal instalments of R38,438 
per annum. From the lender's viewpoint this investment has 
the following cash flows: 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 
-R100,OOO R33,438 R33,438 R33,438 R33,438 R33,438. 
The yield (IRR) on the investment is 20 per cent. 
From the borrower's point of view, the cash flows are iden-
tical except that the signs are reversed. The cash flows of 
the borrower are the cash flows of the lender multiplied by 
minus one: 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 
--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ----------
+R100,OO -R33,438 -R33,438 -R33,438 -R33,438 -R33,438. 
The effective cost . on the loan to the borrower is 20 per 
cent. The borrower must earn at least 20 per cent per period 
on the loan just to be able to repay it. The pretax return 
to the lender on the investment (loan) cannot be less than 
the cost to the borrower. Even if the lender does not rein-
vest the cash flows as the loan is repaid the implicit 
return will still be 20 per cent. The return is measured as 
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a time-adjusted percentage of the principal amount outstand-
ing, and 1S independant of what disposition is made of the 
cash flows as they are received. 
Herbst (1982: 90) continues by observing that the uses to 
which the cash flows are put will have an effect on the or-
ganization. However, although the yield on funds originally 
invested may be increased by such uses, it cannot be reduced 
by lack of such investment opportunities. The author ex-
plains his stance by stating that the payments made by the 
borrower, once given over to the lender, can earn nothing 
for the borrower. The borrower must, in absence of other 
sources of funds, be able to earn 20 per cent per period on 
the remaining loan principal. If t he borrower is unable to 
earn anything on the remaining loan principal, he or she 
must still make the required periodical payments. The pay-
ments, even if made from other sources of funds, will be the 
same as those required if the loan were to generate fund,s at 
20 per cent per period. If funds must be diverted from other 
projects to repay the loan, the opportunity cost to the bor-
rower may be ~ than 20 per cent, if the funds could have 
earned more than this percentage in other uses. The cost in-
ternal to the loan itself, however is 20 per cent. Table 7.1 
depicts a breakdown of the loan payments into the principal 
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Source Herbst (1982: 91) 
Herbst (1982: 90) points out that it should be noted that 
interest is computed at 20 per cent per annum on the begin-
nlng of period principal balance. The excess of payment over 
this amount is used to reduce the principal. 
A second loan (to the borrower) wil l have identical cost of 
20 per cent, but the principal is not amortized but paid 1n 
full of the end of the loan. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 
-------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
+R100,00 -R20,000 -R20,000 -R20,0~0 -R20,000 -R120,000 
The borrower may place the loan - principal in a bank account 
that pays exactly 20 per cent annually. At the end of each 
year the borrower withdraws the interest and pays it to the 
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lender. At the end of the loan the borrower withdraws the 
principal plus interest and repays t he loan. Since he or she 
pays the interest to the lender as soon as it is earned, the 
person does not earn interest on interest. The bank pays the 
borrower exactly 20 per cent annually on the deposit, which 
he or she immediately turns over to the lender. The loan 
costs exactly equal the 20 per cent annual interest the bank 
pays the borrower for the deposit, 
the borrower. (Transaction costs 
so there is no gain to 
are ignored). For the 
lender the loan also yields exactly 20 per cent. There is, 
however, an important difference in that the lender may 
reinvest the interest payments if desired and increase the 
gain. The 20 per cent return remains the minimum return on 
the loan and this is independant of reinvestment oppor-
tunities. The reinvestment rate could be zero and still the 
lender would earn 20 per cent on the loan. 
The only difference between the two loans, Herbst (1982: 91) 
points out, is the handling of the principal repayment. In 
the first case the principal is amortized over the life of 
the loan. In the second case the entire principal repayment 
is. made at the loan maturity date. The first loan does 
provide better reinvestment opportunities to the lender 
since larger payments are received in all but the last year. 
Once again however, 20 per cent is the minimum return to be 
expected, even if the reinvestment opportunity rate were to 
be zero. 
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Herbst (1982: 91) observes that if a zero reinvestment rate 
is assumed and it is considered that the R100,000 principal 
is returned in equal installments of R20,000 over the five-
year loan maturity it means that the amount of R13,438 over 
and above the principal repayment is earned on the remaining 
principal. The percentage return on the remaining principal 
in each year is then as shown in table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 
PER PERIOD RETURN ON REMAINING PRINCIPAL (CONSTANT AMORTIZA-
TION OF R20,000 PER PERIOD) 
T PRINCIPAL REMAINING PER CENT RETURN 
1 R100,000 13,438 
2 80,000 16,798 
3 60,000 22,397 
4 40,000 33,595 
5 20,000 67,190 
--------------------------------------------------------
Source Herbst (1982: 92) 
The geometric mean return is 29,4 per cent, the arithmetic 
mean return is 30 per cent and the median return 22.4 per 
cent. 
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This treatment according to the author differs from the IRR 
formulation in assuming a fixed allocation of periodical 
payments to principal amortization rather than a gradually 
increasing amortization payment. 
The principal is more quickly reduced, consequently yielding 
a higher return on that which remains • 
. These results Herbst (1982: 92) observes, do not require any 
reinvestment rate other than zero. They show however that 
the percentage return on an investment does not depend on 
the available reinvestment rate. 
The available reinvestment rate will have an impact if 
greater than zero but that fact, the author observes, is a 
condition external to the investment. 
The IRR is concerned with the internal characteristics only, 
and therefore provides a measure of the minimum return on 
investment. 
Herbst (1982: 92) concludes that the conceptual difficulty 
with the reinvestment rate assumption arises from focusing 
on the superficial aspects of the mathematics of the IRR 
while neglecting the economic interpretation of the initial 
investment and the subsequent cash flows. 
author states, is a tool in f i nancial 
Mathematics, the 
mathematics and 
economics the master. The reinvestment rate problem arises 
from confusion of this hierachy, from trying to make 
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economics conform to mathematics. He finally states that the 
IRR might be called more properly return on invested capital 
to make clear its economic assumptions. 
The IRR method implicitly assumes reinvestment at the inter-
nal rate of return and this is unrealistic (Herbst 1982:72). 
7.2.4.2 MULTIPLE RATES OF RETURN 
Under certain conditions this method may produce multiple 
rates of return. This may occur when there is a mixed se-
quence of receipts and outlays in successive years over the 
life of the investment. For a simple investment there is an 
initial cash outlay followed by a series of net cash 
receipts in all successive periods. In a more complex case 
however, there may be periods with net cash outlays inter-
spersed with those having net receipts. This situation gen-
erates mUltiple rates of return for the same investment and 
therefore produces a serious problem (Fremgen 1981:99). 
7.2.4.3 MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER'S WEALTH 
Clark, Hindelang and Pritchard ( 1 979: 94-95) observe that 
the IRR does a good job of measuring the compounded rate of 
return over time on the funds that remain invested in the 
asset, but the problem is that this figure has nothing at 
all to do with maximizing shareholder's wealth. 
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The authors state that a firm that attempted to maximize IRR 
could very well find that the highest IRR project had an 
original cost of R100 and a return next year of R150, lead-
ing to a 50 per cent IRR. Shareholders would be very pleased 
over the R50 return, but would raise more questions about 
how the remaining portion of the capital budget was in-
vested. If management indicated that they did not want to 
invest any more than R100, because to do so would 
deteriorate the IRR below the very attractive 50 per cent 
level achieved, they might well lose their jobs. Clark, et 
al. (1979: 94-95) furthermore underline the fact that the 
NPV criterion shows clearly and unambiguously the impact of 
projects on shareholder's wealth or the present value of the 
firm. The same however, cannot be said of the IRR. 
An example of three projects is furnished (Clark, et al. 
1979: 94-95). The three projects have NPV's of R10,000, 
R14,000 and R16,000. These figures show the magnitudes of 
the increase in shareholder's wealth if the respective in-
vestments are accepted. On the other hand if these same 
projects have IRRs of 40 per cent, 30 per cent and 25 per 
cent respectively there is no indication which of the three 
will lead to the greatest increase in shareholder's wealth. 
The increase in shareholder's wealth can therefore be the 
opposite of the rankings indicated by the IRR. 
Clark, et al. (1979: 95) also quote Keene (1974: 78-82) who 
regards the IRR method as invalid, not because of any lm-
plicit reinvestment rate assumption or because of the pos-
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sibility of producing multiple yields but simply because a 
rate of return expressed in percentage terms is inap-
propriate for discriminating between projects of different 
sizes. All but identical projects have different sizes 
whatever their initial outlays or expected lives may suggest 
and although the IRR method might appear at times to give 
correct investment advice, it is .never correct in principle. 
7.2.4.4 CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate that Pritchard, et al. (1979: 94-95) 
failed to relate the IRR to the firm 1 s cost of capital: they 
take a rather incomplete view. Weston and Brigham (1978: 
297) states explicitly and correctly that a firm 1 s value in-
creases if the IRR exceeds the cost of capital. 
As regards the observations of Herbst (1982), some valid 
points are made which underline the limitations of the IRR 
method. Accordingly, while the IRR method of investment ap-
praisal can be applied correctly at times, the NPV method 
must be preferred as being more generally valid. This matter 
is considered further in section 7.4. 
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7.2.5 TERMINAL VALUE 
strictly speaking, the 'terminal value' method is not a dis-
counted cash flow technique. It is not widely accepted in 
financial literature. 
The terminal value method differs from conventional DCF 
methods in that it handles the time value of money dif-
ferently when calculating profitability. It assumes that all 
net cash flows are immediately reinvested, and that these 
cash flows are compounded forward at the reinvestment rate 
and accumulated to provide a terminal value at the end of 
the life of the project. This method is therefore different 
, 
in that it accumulates cash flows whereas NPV and IRR dis-
count it back to the present (Banda and Nolan 1971:15); 
(Porterfield 1965:37-41). Porterfield (1965: 35) indicates 
that under this method explicit assumptions are made as to 
reinvestment rates and future capital costs that are ex-
pected to prevail over the period in question. These rates 
and costs may differ from each other and may also vary over 
time. The author states that the.major problem with this 
method is that of forecasting future reinvestment rates and 
capital costs under conditions of uncertainty. This is com-
plicated by the dependance of tomorrow's opportunities upon 
the financial decisions that are made today. The approach is 
~ccordingly unacceptable and will not be considered further. 
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7.3 ACCOUNTING PROFITS AND THE SHAREHOLDER 
Solomon and Pringle (1980:332) have attacked DCF methods for 
ignoring the effect of accounting profits on the perception 
of shareholders. 
It is not unusual for a DCF validated investment to generate 
low, or even negative, net cash flows in early years, but 
substantial cash flows later on. In such cases, near term 
accounting profits of the firm can be adversely affected and 
investors on the stock market tend to react strongly to ac-
counting profits. Accordingly, an apparantly sound invest-
ment by the firm can lead to a drop in the share price 
rather than a gain. 
This criticism of DCF methods 1S considered to be mis-
directed. In practical terms there is a duty on the part of 
directors to ensure that shareholders and the investment 
community are properly informed on the merits of company in-
vestments. Should the directors fai l in this duty the situa-
tion described by Solomon and Pringle would apply. But the 
fault then lies with directors and not DCF methods. 
7.4 NPV VERSUS IRR 
The NPV method and the IRR method in most cases provide the 
same accept and reject decisions for specific projects. This 
means that for mutually exclusive projects, generally the 
one with the higher NPV or higher IRR, depending on the 
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method implemented, should be selected, whereas with inde-
pendant projects, those with a positive NPV or an internal 
rate of return higher than the cost of capital should be ac-
cepted. There are however certain circumstances under which 
these methods can give conflicting answers. 
7.4.1 SIZE DISPARITY 
Johnson and Melicher (1982:328) provide an example, the ele-
ments of which are depicted in Table 7.3. 
TABLE 7.3 






NET CASH INFLOWS 
END OF 1ST YEAR 
R10 000 R11 500 
R22 000R24 860 
IRR NPV AT 10 PER CENT 






Although projects A and B both offer a rate of return 
greater than the cost of capital and have positive NPV's it 
is assumed that we cannot accept both, either because they 
are mutually exclusive or because the firm is constrained by 
capital rationing. 
The first observation one can make 
provided by the NPV and IRR approaches 
lS that the ranking 
are not the same. 
This difference exists because of an implicit assumption ln 
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the IRR result concerning the reinvestment of the extra 
R12,000 that would be available if project A, rather than B, 
were selected. If project A is chosen on the basis of the 
IRR result there is an implicit assumption that the extra 
R12 000 can be reinvested in some other project for at least 
the same return as earned by project A, viz. 15 per cent. 
This is an unrealistic assumption and the fact is pointed 
out by Johnson and Melicher (1982:329). They observe that if 
shareholders have established the firms marginal return at 
10 per cent it cannot be assumed that investment oppor-
tunities for the excess cash will yield 15 per cent; cer-
tainly not if the firm remains in the same risk class. 
Table 7.4 depicts the situation where the proper theoretical 
assumption is made that the extra R12 000 can be reinvested 
in some project C at the marginal r ate of 10 per cent. The 
terminal value at the years end of this investment strategy 
will be R24 700. 
TABLE 7.4 
INVESTMENT OF EXTRA R12 000 (PROJECT C) AT 10 PER CENT 
PROJECT INITIAL IRR CASH EARNINGS NET CASH INFLOWS 
OUTLAY PER END OF YEAR END OF YEAR 
CENT 
A R10 000 15 1 500 R11 500 
C R12 000 10 1 200 R13 200 
A & C R22 000 R24 700 
Source: Johnson and Melicher (1982:329) 
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The terminal value of project B however is R24 860 (table 
7.3). Accordingly there is no doubt that B is a better in-
vestment than A which has an effective comparable terminal 
value of R24,700. It is thus clear that in these cir-
cumstances the NPV approach provides a more valid ranking of 
the two projects. 
7.4.2 TIME DISPARITY IN GENERATION OF CASH FLOWS 
The problem of underlying assumptions also arises when there 
are timing disparities in the cash flows of mutually ex-
clusive investment alternatives. To illustrate the dif-
ficulty, the NPV's and IRR's are calculated for mutually ex-
clusive projects D and E having the cash flows reflected in 
table 7.5. 
TABLE 7.5 


















In contrast to the level cash inflows for project D, cash 
inflows decrease over time for project E and the relative 
NPV's, calculated at a variety discount rates, are shown in 
table 7.6. 
TABLE 7.6 
RELATIVE NPV'S CALCULATED AT VARIOUS DISCOUNT RATES 





















Source: Johnson and Melicher (1982:330) 
* The project which would be preferred 
From table 7.6 it is evident that project E has lower NPV's 
for discount rates of 10 per cent and below. Above 11 per 
cent (the cross over point) project E would get preference 
over project D until the point where neither project would 
be acceptable. This is depicted graphically in figure 7.1. 
By contrast, the IRR for project D is 12,52 per cent and for 
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E it is 13,6 per cent. The IRR method would thus consis-
tently favour project E until the cost of capital exceeds 
its IRR when neither project is deemed feasible. 
The differing results between the two methods has to do with 
the reinvestment rate assumption viz. that the NPV method 
assumes reinvestment at the marginal cost of capital whereas 
the IRR method assumes reinvestment at the internal rate of 
return. 
FIGURE 7.1 






, 15"" 20' , , , 25 
D E 
DISCOUNT RATE (PER CENT) 
Source: Johnson and Melicher (1982:330) 
In summary it can be said that the· NPV of project E is 
higher than D when the cost of capital is 11 per cent or 
more. Above 11 percent it is also consistent with projects' 
E higher IRR of 13,16 per cent. Below 11 per cent, however, 
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conflicting rankings exists. Johnson and Melicher (1982:331) 
suggests that when this disparity exists the NPV method is 
preferable since it assumes that cash flows are reinvested 
at the usually more conservative firm's marginal cost of 
capital rather than, at the IRR. This approach is however 
debatable : neither approach is totally satisfactory. 
7.4.3 CAPITAL RATIONING 
When there is no capital rationing and the cost of capital 
is not expected to change, a firm's value is maximized when 
it accepts all projects with a NPV of zero Of greater (Gup 
1983:255). 
When a firm operates in the above manner it adheres to the 
laws formulated by the economic theory of the firm, namely 
that it should operate at the point where marginal revenue 
is just equal to marginal cost. When this rule is applied to 
the capital budgeting decision, marginal revenue is taken to 
be the percentage rate of return on investments while mar-
ginal cost is the firm's marginal cost of capital (Weston 
and Brigham 1978:286). 
However, when capital rationing does exist value maximiza-
tion cannot be achieved because the firm has to forego some 
profitable projects. The firm can therefore only maximize 
its value subject to the capital it has available. 
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Two basic approaches to capital rationing are the IRR and 
NPV approaches: 
7.4.3.1 THE IRR APPROACH 
According to Gitman (1988: 357-358) the IRR approach in-
volves selecting the investment projects yielding the 
highest IRR's (provided their yields exceed the cost of 
capital) within the budget constraint. The problem however 
with the IRRmethod is that it does not guarantee the maxi-
mum Rand return to the firm. Table 7.7 depicts six invest-
ment projects indicating their relative Rand sizes, present 
values and IRR's. 
TABLE 7.7 











R 80 000 
R 70 000 
R100 000 
R 40 000 
R 60 000 
Rl10 000 
Gitman (1980 357) 
201 
PV OF INF'I.CM AT IRR 
10 PER CENl' (PER CENl') 
RlOO 000 12 
Rl12 000 20 
R145 000 16 
R 36 000 8 
R 79 000 15 
Rl26 500 11 
Table 7.7 indicates that the hypothetical firm is confronted 
with six projects competing for the firm's fixed budget of 
R250 000. If it is furthermore assumed that the firm has a 
cost of capital of 10 per cent only projects B, C and E 
should be selected under the IRR approach. These three 
projects will absorb R230 000 of the R250 000 budget. There 
is no guarantee however that projects B, C and E will maxi-
mize, total Rand returns and therefore owner's wealth. This 
problem will be cleared up when the NPV approach is dis-
cussed. 
7.4.3.2 THE NPV APPROACH 
'The NPV approach is based on the use of present values to 
determine the group of projects that will maximize owner's 
wealth. It is implemented by ranking projects on the basis 
of IRR's and then evaluating the present value of the 
benefits from each potential project to determine the com-
bination of projects with the highest overall present value. 
This is the same as maximizing net present value, since 
whether the entire budget is used or not, it is viewed as 
the total initial in~estment. The portion of the firm's 
budget that is not used does not increase the firm's value. 
At best, the unused money can be invested 1n marketable 
securities or returned to owners in the form of cash 
dividends. In either case the wealth of the owners is not 
likely to be enhanced' (Gitman 1980 :357-358). 
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It was noted- that if the IRR approach is implemented to 
select the best possible combination of projects for the 
capital budget of R250 000 projects B, C and E would have 
been selected. These projects however which together require 
R230 000 yield a present value of R336 000. However, if 
projects B, C and A were selected, which together require 
R250,000 the present value of the expected cash flows would 
be R357 000. This is greater than the return expected from 
selecting the projects on the basis of their IRR's. Gitman 
(1988 358) observes that the firm's objective is to use 
its budget to generate the highest present value of inflows. 
Assuming that any unused protion of the budget does not gain 
or lose money, the total NPV for projects B, C and E would 
be R106 000 (R336 000 - R230 000), whereas for projects B, C 
and A, the total NPV would be R107 000 (R357 000 - R250 
000). Selection of projects B, C and A would therefore maxi-
mize NPV. 
It would be appropriate under conditions of capital ration-
ing to choose projects which yield the highest NPV provided 
there is no great size disparity. In the latter case, con-
version to the profitability index would provide a more 
reliable indicator (section 7.2.1). 
Uliana, et al. (1987: 288) observe that manual manipulation 
of possible combinations becomes onerous when a firm is 
faced with hundreds of possible investments. To solve this, 
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techniques such as linear programming have been developed. 
Due to complexity and cost however, widespread use of these 
techniques is limited at present. 
7.4.4 CHOICE BETWEEN NPV AND IRR 
In most instances the NPV and IRR methods will generate 
identical results. However, Gitman (1985:354) asserts that 
on a theoretical basis the NPV method is far superior to the 
IRR method in that the former method assumes reinvestment at 
the marginal cost of capital whereas the IRR method assumes 
reinvestment at the higher IRR. Choice of the NPV method ac-
cordingly eliminates the anomalies discussed earlier and 
also avoids the possibility of having more than one answer 
for the same cash flow data; a possibility which does arise 
when using the IRR method. 
In spite of the superiority of the NPV method, evidence led 
by Gitman (1985:356) suggests that financial managers of 
large companies prefer the IRR method. This preference Git-
man ascribes to a general disposition of business people to 
relate more easily to rates of return rather than to the 
monetary results of NPV calculations. This is probably the 
case because interest rates and profitability measures are 
in everyday life most often cited as annual rates. Conse-
quently IRR measures make sense to decision-makers. They 
find it easy to relate to such numbers. 
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The same people find NPV results harder to comprehend since 
they do not really reflect the benefits relative to the 
amount invested. 
In the final analysis what is of overriding importance ln 
relation to both the NPV and IRR methods of evaluating in-
vestment proposals is the fact that both are consistent with 
the objective of the firm namely the maximization of owners 
wealth which is attained through the maximization of the 
market value of the ordinary shares. Despite their flaws 
both measure proposed investments in terms of time adjusted 
cash flows and as such both are superlor to any other 
evaluation method available today. 
7.5 USE OF OTHER METHODS 
Financial literature identifies two other basic methods 
which are used in practice for determining the acceptability 
of capital expenditure alternatives. 
Gitman (1985:338) regards both as unsophisticated capital 
budgeting techniques which can furnish false signals. The 
first of these is known as the average rate of return 
method. 
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7.5.1 AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN METHOD 
This method is a popular approach for evaluating proposed 
capital expenditures in that it is calculated from account-
ing data (profits after taxes). The average rate of return 
method, also called 'accounting rate of return' is calcu-
lated as follows: 
Average rate of Return = 
average profits after taxes 
average investment 
Average profits after taxes are found by adding up the after 
tax profits expected for each year of the project's life and 
dividing the total by the number of years. 
Average investment 1S found by halving the initial invest-
ment. The averaging process implies that the cost of the as-
set is written off at a constant (straightline rate) over 
the life of the project. This in effect means that, on the 
average, the firm will have one half of the assets' initial 
purchase price on the books. 
The division of the average profits after taxes by the 
average investment, results in the average rate of return 
for each project CGitman 1985:340). 
Variations of this method do exist. One approach involves 
using average annual cash inflows instead of average annual 
accounting profits as numerator. 
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Another approach is to use the initial investment rather 
than the average investment as denominator in the ratio. 
This approach will half the percentage answer. 
Gitman (1985:340) points out that in order to use this 
general approach for decision making, the decision maker 
must compare the average rate of return against some 
predetermined 'cut off' rate or minimum acceptable rate of 
return. 
7.5.1.1 ADVANTAGE OF THE AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN METHOD 
Gitman (1985:340) observes that the only advantage of this 
method appears to be its ease of calculation. The only In-
puts, being projected profits are easily obtainable. 
This advantage is however overwhelmingly outweighted by the 
methods' weaknesses. 
7.5.1.2 DEFECTS OF THE AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN 
The average rate of return method's key weakness lies in the 
fact that it is unable to specify the appropriate average 
rate of return in light of the wealth maximization goal. 
This is so because share values are not a function of 
average rates of returns. Instead this method which is book 
value oriented, has as its implicit objective, the maximiza-
tion of the book value of the ordinary shares. 
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A second weakness sterns from using accounting data which, 
amongst other things, ignores the time value of money. 
These weaknesses of the average rate of return method are so 
limiting that it renders the method totally unacceptable. 
7.5.2 PAYBACK PERIOD 





of investment proposals is simple, 
because of its widespread use, 
easy to ex-
has been 
Its' shortcomings are however, of such a nature 
method is completely unsatisfactory from a 
theoretical viewpoint. 
This method is described as the length of time it takes to 
recover the initial investment on a project. For example, if 
a Ri 000 investment returns an after tax cash flow each year 
of R400, the payback period is 2 1\2 years (1 000/400). This 
method dictates acceptance of a project only if the project 
has a payback period less than some level specified by 
management. In comparing 2 alternatives using this method, 
the 1 with the smaller payback period is preferred and is 
accepted provided its payback period is less than the 
specified requirement. 
208 
7.5.2.1 ADVANTAGES OF THE PAYBACK PERIOD METHOD 
An argument for payback is that a firm with cash shortages 
should give great emphasis to a quick return of its funds in 
order that they may be put to use in other places. However, 
better methods exist for handling cash shortages (Weston 
annd Brigham 1978:293-294). 
J 
Payback is furthermore defended on grounds of its impact on 
earnings per share. Typically, projects with faster paybacks 
have more favourable short run effects on earnings per 
share. On the other hand it can be said that firms uSlng 
payback for this reason may be sacrificing future growth for 
current accounting income, and in general such a practice 
will not maximize the value of the firm if the shareholding 
public are properly informed by directors on investment 
merits. 
Ease of application is probably the most important advantage 
of this method (Weston and Brigham:1978:293-294). 
Payback is sometimes defended on grounds that after the 
payback period the uncertainty may be so great for some 
projects, that requiring recovery of capital within that 
period is a good way to avoid undue risk. However, the risk 
is rarely so great that returns beyond payback should be 
completely ignored (Schall and Haley 1986:218). 
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A good point in favour of the payback method is that if a 
firm is making many small capital expenditure decisions, the 
cost of using more complex methods may outweigh the benefits 
of possibly better choices among competing projects (Weston 
and Brigham 1978:294). The authors furnish an example of 
electric utility companies which employ very sophisticated 
capital budgeting techniques, using discounted cash flow 
principles for large projects but payback on certain small 
replacement decisions. When these sophisticated companies do 
use the payback method, they do so after studies have shown 
that the payback method will provide sufficiently accurate 
answers for the decisions at hand. Weston and Brigham also 
state that many firms use payback in combination with dis-
counted cash flow procedures. The latter method is used to 
appraise projects' profitability while the payback method is 
utilized to show for how long the investment will be at 
risk. In other words it 1S used as a risk indicator. The 
longer the payback period, the longer the investment is 
regarded to be at risk. It is also pointed out that recent 
surveys indicate that when larger firms use payback in con-
nection with major projects it is almost always used in this 
manner. 
In the last instance one can add that the use of payback 
period method provides a firm with some flexibility in that 
funds need not be locked into a project for too long. 
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7.5.2.2 DISADVANTAGES OF THE PAYBACK PERIOD METHOD 
The payback method fails in that it does not consider 
returns after the payback period. If the project is one that 
matures in later years, the payback period can lead to the 
selection of less than optimal desirable investments (Schall 
and Haley 1986:217). 
It is furthermore indicated that the payback method fails in 
that it ignores the time value of money. Benefits occurrlng 
in all the years are given the same value. 
7.5.2.3 EVALUATION OF PAYBACK PERIOD 
Williams (1982:38) states that ever increasing levels in the 
sophistication of techniques for app raising investment have 
led to a situation where the humble payback time criterion 
is today viewed with some disdain. He feels that the 
criticisms are justified because the complexities which dis-
counted cash flow were designed t o handle are real enough 
whilst payback in it simplicity evades issues. The question 
is then posed as to what actually p r eserves the longevity of 
the payback criterion. 
In this regard Piper (1981:20) indi cates that although sur-
veys show that the use of DCF are on the increase, payback 
holds a significant position in project analysis and might 
even be on the increase in relation to DCF. 
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Andrews and Butler (1986: 31-37) have however indicated in a 
recent study that just the opposite has happened in the RSA. 
Williams (1982:38) is adamant that payback's longevity is 
due to the diversity of groups associated with investment in 
capital projects. The people involved may be designers, 
project engineers, marketers or production managers, each of 
whom faces complexity in his own sphere. They do not wish to 
be confused by financial analysis and have an essential need 
to estabilsh a simple relationship between capital and 
revenues. To them financial analysis is worthless if it does 
not convey the effects of decisions which they are making. 
They would, Williams argues, prefer to be approximately 
right rather than precisely wrong and they would prefer to 
do so rather early in a project than later. 
Williams does not provide reasons why the choice falls on 
payback but his reference to decision makers who prefer to 
see the impact of their decisions early rather than later 
implies that the payback period methods' simplicity enables 
them to utilize a method where they can appreciate results 
quickly. To them the investment proposal with the fastest 
cash flow will be the most acceptable. 
To overcome what is clearly a communication problem, train-
ing is required. This would ensure that professional people 
will be better equipped to appreciate the sophistication of 
more appropriate evaluation techniques. 
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Progress should not be stifled because some people are 
reluctant to adapt. Widespread ignorance of decision makers1 
can very well be the reason why so many listed as well as 
unlisted companies of various sizes in the Unites states the 
United Kingdom and in the Republic of south Africa prefer 
payback period method, either exclusively or in conjunction 
with another method. 
The crucial question, in the final analysis, remains whether 
the measurement of proposed investments in terms of the 
payback period method is consistent with the firm's objec-
tive of wealth maximization as manifested in the maximiza-
tion of share values. In this respect the method quite 
clearly fails. It would be consistent with the wealth maxi-
mization objective only if share values were a function of 
payback period. 
7.5.3 THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPMr 
The CAPM can, apart from being used as a model for the cal-
culation of cost of equity, also be 'used as a valuation 
model for prospective investments. Its name denotes its 
function, it is a model that prices capital assets. 
1. See Soldofsky and Olive (1974:12). 
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Whereas valuation models always have a rate at which future 
returns are discounted to arrive at a value and this rate is 
often subjectively calculated, the CAPM provides a model for 
calculating this rate (Uliana et al. 1987:187). This rate as 
was already established, is termed the required rate of 
return and depicts that minimum rate that induces an inves-
tor to buy and hold a security. This rate equals the risk 
free rate plus a risk premium (rf + p) for any security with 
a given level of risk. 
Martin, et al. (1979:348-349) provides the following example 
to explain the CAPM method of valuation. If the expected 
return on the market (rm) as a whole (diversified market 
portfolio, like Johannesburg stock Exchange) is 12 per cent 
and the risk free rate (rf) is 8 per cent, the risk premium 
on the market portfolio would be 4 per cent. 
This in effect means that the same risk premium would apply 
to any security having systematic risk equivalent to the 
general market, or a beta of 1. 
As previously stated (section 5.4.4.2) a firm or security 
with a beta of 1 means that it is as risky as the market 
portfolio, a beta of 2 denotes twice as risky as the market 
whereas a beta of ,5 denotes half as risky as the market. 
Let it now be assumed that a firm with a beta of 2 wants to 
make a marginal investment in a security with the same beta 
having an expected annual return of 14 per cent. 
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By applying the equation of the CAPM the marginal investment 
should have the following required rate of return: 
re = rf + b (rm - rf) 
= 0,8 + 2,0 (0,12 - 0,08) 
= 0,16 or 16 per cent 
In the above case the security should not be acquired since 
the required rate of return (16 per cent) is higher than the 
expected rate of return (14 per cent). 
The CAPM, as a market price for risk measure, provides a 
risk adjusted required rate of return for analyzing risky 
projects (Weston and Brigham 1978:374). 
This discount rate can be utilized in the basic capital 
budgeting equation that was discussed in chapter four. It 
was also mentioned in chapter four that one way to treat 
risk was to adjust the denominator of the equation. Since we 
are, ho~ever, only evaluating projects that are in the same 
risk class as that of the firm its use in that respect wouid 
be restricted to a risk adjusted rate that is relative to 
that specific firm's beta. 
Evaluation of marginal investments by the CAPM model is not 
appealing for the following reasons: 
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* Investments in assets or secur i ties implies a long term 
commitment with cash flow expectations emanating over 
many years. As we have already stipulated the CAPM is a 
one period model. 
* 
* 
Freear (1980 :274) refers to Fama (1970 :163-174) who 
has demonstrated that an investors utility function 
with regard to risk exhibits similar characteristics 
whether it is a single-period f unction or part of a 
multi-period function. Freear (1980:274) asserts 
however that the CAPM remains incapable of handling ir-
regular returns over time. This he states is hardly 
surprising, given that theories which allow for 
portfolio revision over time are still at an early 
stage of development. 
The security market line which depicts the market price 
for risk and which is assumed to be a composite of the 
utility functions of all investors can change over-
night. This can happen as a result of a change in sys-
tematic risk which is a function of factors inter alia 
like depression, inflation, political events, interna-
tional incidents and war. 
Firms evaluating only investment proposals that fall 
into a risk class equal to its own would probably not 
be diversified. This means that such a firm cannot com-




This approach clearly does not contribute to the objec-
tive of the firm: since it is a one period model it ig-
nores future streams of benefits. 
SELECTION FROM ALTERNATIVES UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
INFLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Inflation has been running double digits in the South 
African economy since 1973 (Reeve 1981 : 9). It is therefore 
important to analyze the effects, if any, that inflation 
will have on the capital budgeting decision (Uliana, et al. 
1987:232). 
7.6.2 THE DISCOUNT RATE 
Uliana, et al. (1987:22) say that the marginal cost of capi-
tal used as a discount rate to evaluate marginal investment 
decisions will include an inflation premium. 
The reason for this is that investors will attempt to 
protect themselves against a decline in purchasing power, by 
including an adjustment for inflation in the required rate 
of return. The company's cost of capital is therefore a 
'nominal' rather than 'real' rate, because it takes into ac-
count expected inflation. 
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The authors state the nominal rate as follows: 
M = [(1 + R)(1 + i)] - 1 
where 
M = nominal rate of return 
R = real rate of return 
1 = expected inflation rate . 
If a firm requires an investment to earn a real rate of 
return of at least 6 per cent and the expected inflation 
rate is 15,1 per cent, 
return of at least 
depicts the situation: 
then projects must provide a nominal 
22 per cent. The following equation 
M = [(1,06)(1,151)] - 1 
= 0,22 or 22 per cent 
A return of 22 per cent will protect the firm against the 
loss in purchasing power and also provide a real rate of 
return of 6 per cent. 
The real rate can thus be stated as: 
R = [(1 + M)/(1 + i)] - 1 
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7.6.3 INVESTMENT BIAS 
Companies sometimes estimate future cash flows at current 
prices but discount these flows at a nominal rate. In other 
words inflation is ignored in the numerator but not in the 
denominator of the NPV equation. This situation, where fu-
ture cash flows are incorrectly stated in real terms but the 
discount rate in nominal terms, can result in an unjustified 
bias against long term investment projects (Uliana, et al. 
1987:232). 
It 1S essential according to Uliana, et al. (1987:234) to 
adjust cash flows for inflation. If this is not done, the 
bias against investing in long term assets would be ex-
tremely prejudicial to the firm. 
7.6.4 DISCOUNTING CASH FLOWS AT THE 'REAL RATE' OF 
RETURN 
If on the other hand, cash flows are projected in nominal 
terms and the discount rate used is expressed in real terms 
with no allowance for inflation poor investment projects 
will be mistakenly accepted, thereby eroding the value of 
the firm in real (purchasing power) terms. 
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7.6.5 CONCLUSION 
Discounting cash flows projected at current prices at the 
'real rate' results in the same NPV as discounting nominal 
cash flows at the nominal rate of return (only a slight dif-
ference might occur as result of rounding). 
Uliana, et al. (1987:234) stress, however, that conceptually 
the former approach assumes inflation neutrality in that in-
flation affects all components of net cash flows equally. 
The nominal approach on the other hand allows specific price 
changes to be taken into the NPV analysis e.g. if the 
general inflation rate is expected to be 12 per cent but 
wage rates are expected to rise by 15 per cent, this may be 
taken into account. 
7.6.6 TAX ALLOWANCES 
A second objection to using the 'real' approach refers to 
the effects that inflation has on tax allowances based on 
historical cost. The initial allowance 2 and the wear and 
tear allowance 'shield' a certain portion of income from 
being subject to tax. 
2. Plant and machinery which is used in a process of 
manufacture or similar process and is brought into use 
for the first time on or after, 1 January 1989, 
qualifies for a depreciation tax allowance of 50 per 
cent in the year of assessment the asset is brought 
into use, and 30 per ce-nt and 20 per cent in the second 
and third years respectively. (Income Tax Act No. 90 of 
1988 amending Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962). 
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These tax allowances, however, are based on historical cost 
and therefore_do not keep up with inflation. An increasing 
part of income therefore becomes subject to tax and a 
projects' NPV declines (Uliana, et al. 1987:234). 
Accordingly, the NPV of an investment's after tax cash flow 
which is projected at today's prices and discounted at the 
real rate of return, will be higher than the NPV calculated 
by using after tax cash flows at future nominal prices dis-
counted at the required nominal rate of return. 
The presence of inflation therefore results in lower real 
rates of return and less incentive for companies to under-
take capital investments. The cash flow situation is im-
proved with accelerated depreciation but the same un-
favourable comparisons remain. There simply is a disincen-
tive for companies to undertake capital expenditures, so 
they typically invest less and become less capital intensive 
in periods of inflation (van Horne 1983:127). 
During inflationary periods, tax allowances based on his-
torical cost may also have the following real effects: 
* 
* 
A lower capital/labour ratio due to the effective in-
crease in the cost of the investment. 
The rankings of mutually exclusive projects may change 
if the timing of tax allowances of various projects 
differ. 
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* Short term investment will be preferred as tax al-
lowances will keep up at a faster rate with inflation 
due to the more frequent replacement of projects. 
* Old machinery with high operating costs may be 
preferred to new machinery with lower operating costs. 
The old machinery's higher operating costs are tax 
deductable and will keep up with inflation whereas, tax 
allowances on new machinery, will not keep up with in-
flation. 
The possibility, 
that could be 
great that it 
however, still remains that the benefits 
reaped from improved technology could be so 
could offset disadvantageous cash flows 
resulting from tax allowances based on historical costs. 
In the Republic of South Africa a lower capital/labour 
ratio, apart from its disadvantages, might at least be 
beneficial in the sense that it could lead to fuller employ-
ment of labour. The condition of course for the above to 
prevail is that market opportunities should be taken and 
that labour intensive discounted cash flows should be at a 




The goal in this chapter was to identify different methods 
of evaluating prospective investment proposals. It was more 
specifically endeavoured to isolate methods that are consis-
tent with the goal of wealth maximization and consequently 
maximization of the share price,.from methods that are not. 
It was found that discounted cash flow methods viz. net 
present value, internal rate of return and the profitability 
index take into account the factors upon which market price 
depends whereas non discounted cash flow methods do not. Of 
the latter, the payback period and average rate of return 
methods were found to be invalid despite their being widely 
used. Their continued popularity seems to stem primarily 
from their simplicity of application. The third of the non 
discounted cash flow methods i.e. the capital asset pricing 
model which evaluates prospective investments in a portfolio 
context, is utilized for new investments which fall in the 
same risk class as that of the firm. The volatality of fac-
tors upon which systematic risk depends as well as its in-
ability to incorporate a stream of benefits beyond one year 
are severe limitations. 
It is finally noted, that under conditions of inflation 
where cash flows are sometimes stated in current terms and 
the discount rate in nominal terms a bias can develop 
towards underinvestment. A second case where a bias can 
develop against under investment relates to tax laws in the 
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RSA. Tax allowances that shield a portion of income from 
being taxed are based on historical cost and not replacement 
cost. This leads to an increasing portion of future income 
being taxed which on it's part leads to lower or even nega-
tive NPV's. 
In the next chapter a survey will be made of empirical 
studies on investment decision making of listed and unlisted 
firms in the United States of America, the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE PROCESS OF INVESTMENT DECISION 
MAKING 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whereas chapter six dealt with empirical studies concerning 
the acceptance criterion (cost of capital) of invesment 
decision-making, this chapter deals with empirical studies 
relating to the methods of measuring investment proposals. 
As in chapter SlX, the orientation here is to establish 
whether methods of measuring investment proposals are con-
sistent with the objective of the firm, namely maximization 
of the utility of the consumption of the owner's of the firm 
over time. As already stated this objective is attained 
through maximizing of the market price of the ordinary 
shares of the investing company. 
In this respect, interesting studies, out of which Slg-
nificant findings have emanated have been conducted in the 
USA, the UK and the RSA. A closer look will now be taken at 
these surveys on investment decision making. 
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8.2 SURVEYS ON METHODS OF INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING 
UNDERTAKEN IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) 
8.2.1 THE FREMGEN SURVEY 
Fremgen (1981:94-98) conducted a survey on capital budgeting 
practices in the USA1 
A questionnaire containing 25 questions about capital 
budgeting practices was sent to the financial executives of 
250 business firms. The firms in the sample were selected 
randomly from Dun and Bradstreet's Reference Book of Cor-
po rate Managements. 
Questionnaires were sent to companies engaged in manufactur-
ing, retailing, mining, transportation, land development, 
entertainment and utilities. Unfortunately the researcher 
does not indicate whether the survey included both listed 
and unlisted companies. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the sizes of their firms' 
annual capital budgets. 
They were further questioned on the following matters: 
* methods employed in evaluating prospective investment 
proposals; 
1. It must be pointed out that although this article was pub-
lished in 1981, the actual survey took place in May, 1973. 
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2. 
* "mutually exclusive investments; 
* multiple rates of return; 
* rate of return on reinvestment; 
* risk and uncertainty and 
* capital rationing. 
The results of the survey will now be dealt with according 
to the above sequence. 
8.2.1.1 METHODS EMPLOYED IN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED INVEST-
MENTS 
Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to indicate 
which of the following five methods (which were described to 
them) they actually used in evaluating a proposed capital 
investment. (If other methods were used this was to .be 
indicated) : 
* internal rate of return (IRR); 
* net present value (NPV); 
* profitability index (PI); 
* payback period and 
* simple rate of return. 2 
computationally, this is similar to the return on investment 
in assets calculated from financial statements of the end of 
a year. It is the expected average annual net income from an 
investment divided by the initial outlay for that invest-
ment. It is sometimes referred to as the accounting or the 
financial statement method of computing rate of return. 
(Fremgen 1981 :95). 
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The responses are summarized in table 8.1 
TABLE 8.1 
INVESTMENT APPRAISAL METHODS IN ACTUAL USE 
SIZE OF ANNUAL DISCOUN- NPV PI PAYBACK SIMPLE RATE OTHER 
CAPITAL BUDGET TED RATE PER PER PERIOD OF RETURN METHODS 
OF RE- CENT CENT PER CENT PER CENT PER CENT 
TURN PER 
CENT 
Over $100 million 78 34 9 72 60 
50-100 million 79 21 10 62 55 
10-50 million 64 14 2 68 44 
Under 10 million 67 0 5 52 33 
No size given 67 33 0 67 0 
All respondents 71 20 6 67 49 
Source Fremgen (1981 :96) 
Unfortunately Fremgen does not specify how many firms there 
were in each category. 
Fremgen observed that the most popular single method was the 
IRR, which recognizes the time value of money. Next in order 
of popularity were two methods that do not recognize the 
time value of money namely payback period and simple rate ~f 
return. 
"Other methods" were reported as follows: 








* minimum life required to achieve a predetermined dis-
counted rate of return; 
* rate of return on sales; 
* revenue required to cover average annual costs includ-
ing depreciation and interest on investment; 
* rate of return calculation required by the Federal 
Power Commission; 
* payback period based on discounted cash flows; 
* effect of the investment on the earnings per share; 
* MAPI formula 3 
* necessity to maintain current operations or product 
lines; 
* requirements for new products; 
* future corporate needs; 
* safety and 
* management judgement. 
Fremgen points out that the last 5 methods are not finan-
cially orientated at all. He furthermore observes that by 
adding the percentages horizontally in table 8.1 they add up 
to considerably more than 100 per cent in each case which 
indicates that most respondents used two or more different 
methods. 
--------------------
3. The MAPI method involves calculating the time adjusted annual 
average cost of the project or projects under consideration. 
See also Herbst (1982:103-113). 
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If a respondent indicated that his firm used more than 1 
method of investment analysis, he was asked to indicate 
which was considered most important in the decision making 
process. Responses to this question are summarized in table 
8.2. This time the percentages add up to less than 100 per 
cent horizontally (except in the case of firms with the 
smallest capital budget.) Fremgen i ndicates that the reason 
for this is the fact that not all respondents who use more 
than one method answered this particular question. He recog-
nizes the possibility that no single method is always con-
sidered to be most important. 
TABLE 8.2 
MOST IMPORTANT INVESTMENT APPRAISAL METHOD 
SIZE OF ANNUAL IRR NPV PI PAYBACK SIMPLE OTHER 
CAPITAL BUDGET PER PER PER PERIOD RATE OF METHODS 
CENT CENT CENT PER CENT RETURN PER CENT 
PER CENT 
Over $1 million 34 5 0 2 31 7 
50-100 million 38 7 3 7 14 0 
10-50 million 39 3 0 23 18 5 
under 10 million 47 0 5 24 24 0 
No size given 0 0 0 33 0 33 
All respondents 38 4 1 14 22 5 
Source: Fremgen (1981 :98) 
Fremgen observed another significant aspect when he compared 
table 8.1 and table 8.2. Although the IRR still featured 
most prominently, the payback period declined dramatically 
in frequency of mention: although 67 per cent of all firms 
used it, only 14 per cent considered it the primary in-
dicator of an investment's profitability. This is consistent 
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with the notion that the payback period is not a valid index 
of investment profitability by itself, but it may be a use-
ful supplementary tool. 
8.2.1.2 ANALYSIS OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE INVESTMENTS 
As pointed out in chapter 7 mutually exclusive investments 
can pose problems in that different alternatives can entail 
significantly different outlays. 
Most respondents stated that, in choosing among mutually ex-
clusive alternatives they looked for that alternative with 
the 'best rating as determined by the index of financial at-
tractiveness' which they regularly used to evaluate invest-
ment proposals. Fremgen interpreted this 'rating' as the 
highest IRR or the shortest payback period. 
The survey furthermore revealed that where different alter-
natives entailed different outlays, respondents using the 
IRR method of appraisal were relatively unconcerned about 
incremental cash flow determination. Only 29 per cent of the 
relative respondents indicated that they used it. 
8.2.1.3 MULTIPLE RATES OF RETURN 
In the survey questionnaire respondents were asked two ques-
tions regarding the phenomenon of mUltiple rates of return. 
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Firstly, how freq~ently they actually encountered invest-
ments with mixed sequences of cash receipts and outlays and 
secondly if they used the IRR method, how frequently they 
actually encountered investments with multiple rates of 
return. The responses are reflected in table 8.3. 
TABLE 8.3 






INCIDENCES OF MIXED INCIDENCES OF MUL-
SEQUENCES OF CASH TIPLE RATES OF RE-











Source Fremgen (1981 :100) 
Fremgen notes that the condition of multiple rates of return 
is encountered frequently by a significant minority of 
firms. Those who do use IRR revealed one incidence of mul-
tiple rates that is sufficient to warrant attention. His 
conclusion to this question however, is that it would appear 
that the problem is not so prevalent as to invalidate any 
use of IRR in investment analysis. 
8.2.1.4 RATE OF RETURN ON REINVESTMENT 
Respondents to the survey were asked whether they made any 
explicit assumption about the rate of return to be earned on 
reinvestment of cash receipts. Amongst the respondents 29 
per ceht indicated that they did in fact do so. Most of the 
firms indicated that they explicitly assumed that the rein-
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vestment rate would be equal to either the current invest-
ments' or the current average cost of capital. As result of 
this answer Fremgen came to the conclusion that most of the 
explicit assumptions seemed to accept the nature of implicit 
assumptions. 
8.2.1.5 RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
Amongst the responding firms 67 per cent stated that they 
considered risk and uncertainty explicitly in the analysis 
of individual investment proposals. This was true somewhat 
more frequently in firms with larger annual capital budgets 
than in those with smaller budgets. 
Table 8.4 summarizes the methods used by the respondents to 
allow for risk and uncertainty in investment analysis. Per-
centages in the table are based on the number of firms that 
stated they did adjust for risk and uncertainty, not on the 
total number of firms in the survey. Many of the firms 
reported use of two or more methods of allowing for risk and 
uncertainty. Hence, the figures in table 8.4 add up to more 
than 100 per cent. 
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TABLE 8.4 
ADJUSTING FOR RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
Requirement for a higher-than-normal index of pro~itability 
Requirement for a shorter than normal payback perl?d . 
Adjustment of estimated cash flows by use of quantltatlve 
profitability factors 
Purely subjective non qualitative adjustment 
other methods 
Source Fremgen (1981 :101) 
Among other methods mentioned were the following: 
* sensitivity analysis of critical variables;4 
* Monte Carlo simulation;5 
* comparative analysis of results at high and low es-
timates of benefits and 
* analysis of project profitability. 
Fremgen's findings in this respect reflected that the most 
popular methods of dealing with the problem appear to in-
volve the placing of more stringent requirements on the cus-
tomary financial criteria for inve~tments. For example, a 
relatively risky investment is expected to offer a higher 
4. Sensitivity analysis measures how a project's net present 
value or internal rate of return changes if the value of any 
input variable changes. It is assumed that the other vari-
ables stay constant (Uliana, et al. 1987:274). 
5. Monte Carlo simulation analysis represents a refinement on 
sensitivity analysis in that probability estimates are at-
tached to different outcomes. For a more extensive discus-










rate of return, a higher present value index or perhaps a 
shorter payback period than a safer investment. Fremgen 
found logic in the approach although he questions the fact 
that 'risk premiums' are not specified. 
In this regard he states that a major deficiency ln the risk 
adjustment methods of the respondents seem to be that their 
methods do not permit them to adjust for varying degrees of 
risk. 
A final objective of the survey was to determine the in-
cidence and causes of capital rationing and to determine 
the practices used by management in dealing with the condi-
tion. 
8.2.1.6 CAPITAL RATIONING 
Capital rationing was experienced by 73 per cent of the 
respondents whilst 64 per cent of these firms indicated that 
it was a restriction they had to contend with every year. 
The other 36 per cent encountered the problem only in cer-
tain years. Finally, 87 per cent of the firms faced with 
capital rationing stated that the limitation was not a 
single fixed monetary amount but an inexact amount within a 
certain recognized range. 
Only 56 per cent of the firms reporting a fixed monetary 
capital limit stated that it was caused by a restriction im-
posed by higher management. 
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Most respondents ranked projects according to one or more of 
the financial methods used earlier to determine whether or 
not investments were profitable. 
8.2.1.7 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE 'FREMGEN STUDY' 
i) Structure of the 'Fremgen Questionnaire' 
It appears that the questionnaire used by Fremgen was highly 
structured and of a closed end nature. Boyer (1974:12) 
(section 8.2.6.2), who undertook a similar study on capital 
budgeting practices, is of the opinion that certain respon-
dents select methods that they neither use nor understand 
when given structured choices. She noted in her study that 
respondents sometimes indicated that specific methods were 
used by their firms but when requested to describe them they 
were unable to comply. 
This possible response phenomenon places a question mark 
against the Fremgen study findings. 
ii) Methods of Investment Decision Making 
Although the IRR method emerged as the single most used 
method in the Fremgen survey, there is an anomaly in that it 
1S perceived by firms with smaller capital budgets as more 
important than firms with larger capital budgets. This seems 
inconsistent with the sophistication level expected. In 
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larger firms 
of DCF methods. 
one would expect greater rather than less use 
It is true of course that those few or-
ganizations which used the NPV method had large budgets. But 
they were the exception and not the rule. It is probable 
that Gitman's (1985:354) observation that businessmen often 
prefer decision criteria in the form of percentages rather 
than monetary returns was true also of the Fremgen study. 
The smaller respondents clearly preferred the IRR to the NPV 
method. In a seperate study Doenges (1979 : 207) came to the 
same conclusion. 
A very significant finding of the Fremgen survey was the ex-
tremely low usage of the most sophisticated, NPV time value 
method of evaluating investment proposals. Of all respon-
dents only 20 per cent used it at all and only 4 per cent 
regarded it as the most important method. 
Another significant finding was that 67 per cent of respon-
dents used the payback period method, which is not time ad-
justed. In this regard Fremgen's findings coincide with 
those of Weston and Brigham (1978:294) i.e. that payback 
period is frequently used in combination with a discounted 
cash flow method; the former to indicate how long the in-
vestment will be at risk and the latter to indicate the 
project's profitability. 
Table 8.2 however, indicates that payback period seemed to 
decline in importance relative to the size of the companies 
capital investment. Although this could be interpreted as a 
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tendency towards greater sophistication, in that these com-
panies perceive IRR as much more important, they perceived 
simple rate of return to be equally important. This suggests 
that some large companies, those with an annual capital 
budget in excess of 100 000 dollars are still very unsophis-
ticated in their investment decision-making. Indeed, forty 
nine per cent of the respondents used the 'simple rate of 
return' method. Taken together, the payback period and 
simple rate of return methods proved to be nearly as popular 
as the time related methods. 
A feature which emerged prominently from this survey was the 
minimal usage or ignorance of time related methods of In-
vestment decision making in the sample of USA firms. 
iii) Risk and Uncertainty 
It seems that Fremgen dealt with the issue of risk and un-
certainty in isolation. 
It was pointed out in chapter SlX that firms using the 
weighted average marginal cost of capital as criterion for 
investment decision making, tend only to evaluate invest-
ments that are in the same risk class as existing invest-
ments. 
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One would expect risk adjusted discount rates to be used by 
firms evaluating investment projects belonging to a risk 
class other than its own. Fremgen fails to address this 
aspect. 
iv) Capital Rationing 
A most disturbing feature of the Fremgen study was that only 
6 per cent of the respondents used the profitability index 
method for ranking mutually exclusive projects. This is 
despite the fact that this method is recognized in financial 
, 
literature as a powerful method of appropriately ranking 
mutually exclusive projects. Perhaps this feature was linked 
to the fact that so few of the respondents used the NPV 
method. 
8.2.2 THE KIM AND FARRAGHER SURVEYS 
8.2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Kim and Farragher undertook surveys in 1975 and 1979 which 
embraced inter alia project evaluation techniques, risk as-
sessment and risk adjustment. 
The data for the study were derived from responses to a 
questionnaire sent to the chief financial officers of all 
firms ln the 1979 Fortune 1000 largest industrial corpora-
tions list. 
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Responses returned totalled 200 and were categorized by as-
set size, industry classification and risk. The authors 
found a significant difference in the evaluation methods 
used by large and small companies. It should be noted, 
however that such 'small' companies would, by South African 
standards be rated as large. It is most probable that the 
shares of all respondents were listed on stock markets in 
the USA. 
8.2.2.2 RESEARCH RESULTS 
In order to place the work of Kim and Farragher in perspec-
tive reference should be made to table 8.5. Table 8.5 
provides a summary of some surveys dating back to 1959 in-
cluding those of Kim and Farragher. 
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TABLE 8.5 
USE OF QUANTITATIVE TOOLS IN CAPITAL BUDGETING - OVERALL PER 
CENT 
A. PRIMARY FREM3EN KIM AND GI'lMAN AND KIM AND 
TECHNIQUE FARRAGER FORRESTER FARRAGHER 
1959 1964 1970 1971 1975 1977 1979 
Payback 34 24 12 14 15 9 12 
Accounting 
Rate of 
Return 34 30 26 22 10 25 8 
IRR 19 38 57 38 37 53 49 
NPV 5 26 13 19 
B. SEmNDARY 
METOODS 
Payback 53 33 44 39 
Accounting 
Rate of 
Return 27 3 14 3 
IRR 33 7 14 8 
NPV/PI 21 7 28 8 
Source: Kim and Farrager (1981:28) 
Kim and Farrager (1981:28) found that large industrial com-
panies were becoming increasingly sophisticated in the use 
of quantitative DCFtools in the capital budgeting process. 
They found the degree of sophistication to be linked to size 
: the larger the company the more sophisticated would be the 
techniques of evaluation. Thus Kim and Farrager (1981:30) 
expected that the observed tendency toward sophistication of 
the evaluation techniques used by large companies would con-
tinue at an accelerated pace in the 1980s. 
What is also notable in table 8.5 is the steady decrease in 
non time related methods from the period 1959 to 1979. 
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Further surveys which have been conducted in the USA, and 
which focus on the 'small business' need review. Some par-
ticularly interesting and relevant findings have emerged 
from these studies. 
8.2.3 THE SOLDOFSKY STUDY 
8.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Boyer (1978:8) makes mention of a study undertaken by Robert 
Soldofsky in 1964 with the objective of determining the ap-
proach to capital budgeting used by owners and executives of 
'small' manufacturing concerns. Selection of the firms was 
stratified by employment size. Soldofsky did not differen-
tiate between listed and unlisted companies but closely as 
well as widely held firms were included in the survey. 
Very small firms with employment size less than 20 were 
eliminated from the study. 
8.2.3.2 RESEARCH RESULTS 
Soldofsky found that out of 123 firms in Iowa, 71 or 58 per 
cent used payback. It was, furthermore, established that not 
one of the firms employed any form of discounted cash flow 
method. Soldofsky further found that many of the respondents 
described their methods as both vague and flexible, indicat-
ing a lack of a formalized decision making criterion. No at-
tempt was made to determine the reason for this approach 
(Boyer 1978:8). 
242 
8.2.4 THE OHIO STUDY 
8.2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nolan and Banda (1971:12-18) conducted a study on capital 
investment policy which used a stratified sample of in-
dustrial companies in the state of Ohio in the USA. Again 
there was no differentiation between listed or unlisted com-
pani: s but 'size' was classified on the basis of the number 
of employees and relative size within an industry. Table 8.6 
depicts this classification. 
TABLE 8.6 
SIZE CLASSIFICATION AND THE TEN INDUSTRIAL GROUPS SELECTED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
Food 
Printing and Publishing 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Rubber and Plastic 
Stone Clay and Glass Products 
Primary Metal Industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Machinery (except electrical) 
Electrical Equipment Supplies 
Transportation Equipment 













NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
MEDIUM LARGE 
200-499 500+ 
150-999 1 000+ 
150-399 400+ 
200-999 1 000+ 
200-599 600+ 
450-1999 2 000+ 
400-999 1 000+ 
400-999 1 000+ 
500-1299 1 300+ 
600-1249 1 250+ 
8.2.4.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
It was decided that a sample of 10 firms be drawn from each 
of these 10 largest industrial classifications for a total 
sample of 100. The firms in each industrial classification 
were further divided into size classifications: small, 
medium and large. Since the use of uniform size ranges for 
all industrial classifications was not feasible, the basis 
for size classification was the number of employees and the 
relative size within the specific industry. 
The desire to obtain an approximately equal number of 
responses in each group size led to the conclusion that 3 
large, 3 medium and 4 small companies should be sampled. 
This decision was initiated as result of the assumption that 
small companies would not be as responsive to the survey as 
large or medium sized firms. 
Firms were asked to indicate which of the following (fully 






net present value; 
internal rate of · return; 
payback; 
average rate of return and 
terminal value. 
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8.2.4.3 RESEARCH RESULTS 
Of a total of 87 firms which responded 57 firms checked only 
one method, 20 firms used two methods and 10 firms checked 
more than two methods. In all, responses totalled 128. The 
order of popularity in which the methods featured was as 
follows: 
1. payback period (used by 27 respondents); 
2. average rate of return (used by 27 respondents); 
3. NPV (used by 17 respondents) and 
4. IRR (used by 10 . repondents). 
The net terminal value was used by 3 firms whereas 11 
respondents did not specify any useful criteria. In 5 of the 
latter cases "need" was indicated as a basis for capital in-
vestment decisions. In 3 cases it was admitted that the 
decisions were subjective in nature whereas the last 3 
responses made use of a rate of return on assets criterion. 
The study furthermore established that the use of the 
payback method was not a function of the size of the firm. 
categories, regardless of size, made equal use of the 
payback method. 
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8.2.5 THE GRAY, BIRD AND SCOTT STUDY 
8.2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Gray, Bird and Scott (1972:29-38) conducted a survey relat-
ing to the investing and financing behaviour of small busi-
ness firms. A two page questionnaire was sent to a random 
sample of 500 small manufacturers. 
From this sample 135 responses were received for a response 
rate of 27 per cent. 
Firms with net assets totalling less than 1 million dollars 
were regarded as 'small'. 
Firms were asked to select their investment evaluation 







accounting rate of return; 
net present value; 
internal rate of return and 
profitability index. 
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8.2.5.2 RESEARCH RESULTS 
Results of the survey indicated that payback period was used 
by 51 per cent of the firms whilst 30 per cent used some 
variation of an accounting rate of return on investment. 
Only 10 per cent of the firms identified one of the DCF 
methods as their method of valuation. 
In conclusion, Gray, Bird and Scott indicate that their 
findings coincide with those of Soldofsky. They also refer 
to a study by Amling (1963) who reported that 52 per cent of 
large industrial firms use the payback method either as a 
single valuation method or in conjunction with some other 
system. 
In 1974, Boyer conducted a survey on cost of capital to the 
small firm. 6 Apart from questions on cost of capital, 
however, part of the survey covered capital budgeting 
methods. 
6. The research method of this study was outlined in section 
6.1.3. 
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8.2.6 THE BOY ER STUDY 
8.2.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in chapter 6 Boyer (1974:12) determined the 
size of her survey sample on basis of an employment criteria 
of 250. This constituted a suggested maximum employed by the 
Small Business Administration of the USA. In the area under 
surveillance 462 firms met this criteria. 
8.2.6.2 RESEARCH RESULTS 
During the pilot stage 
phenomenon appeared in 
of this study an interesting 
that when traditional forms of in-
vestment evaluation techniques were suggested, the owners 
would indicate use of one or more of these procedures. On 
further questioning however, it would be determined that 
they had no understanding of any of these methods. It was 
also established that interviewees had a reluctance to 
answer 'yes' to using formal procedures when asked to 
describe them. The author feels that when a choice mechanism 
is used a post testing based on open ended questions could 
yield interesting results. 
In this study payback period featured prominantly as the 
most practical formal method of project evaluation. Other 
methods, were based on profit as compared to cost. There was 
no hint of cash flows or ' discounting. 
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8.3 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE USA STUDIES 
Although the Boyer study suggests that there may be confu-
sion with regards to the evaluation methods used in the USA 
a certain pattern emerged from the other studies. Although 
not all the studies conformed it seems that in general the 
smaller the business, the less sophisticated its investment 
evaluation techniques (payback and average rate of return) 
tends to be. It is furthermore clear that 'payback' is very 
popular as a basis of at least secondary evaluation for the 
vast majority of firms in that it is simple to understand 
and apply and provides a quick measure of liquidity. 
Amongst discounted cash flow methods, the internal rate of 
return method seems to appeal most to decision makers. Net 
present value, supposedly the most sophisticated DCF method 





SURVEYS ON METHODS OF INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING 
UNDERTAKEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) 
THE PIKE SURVEY 
INTRODUCTION 
Pike (1982:36-37) conducted a survey among 150 large British 
companies concerning their capital investment appraisal 
methods. 
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8.4.1.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
Pike (1982:36) found, despite all of its deficiencies, that 
paybaek period is still the most popular investment ap-
praisal criterion. In this respect Pike relates that one 
manager summed up the endearing qualities of payback. 'It is 
simple, quick to produce and rapidly understood by non 
financial over-extended management'. 
The IRR method, although less extensively used than payback, 
was found to be the most popular primary evaluation method. 
The NPV method proved distinctly less popular with only 17 
per cent of firms surveyed regarding it as the primary 
evaluation technique. Pike found that the main arguments of 




managers do not understand them; 
they are not necessary when payback periods are rapid 
and 
difficulties are experienced in estimating the 
'correct' discount rate. 
It was made clear by respondants that the main appeal for 
the IRR method was that it measured investment worth in per-
centage terms. It consequently supplied a comparative 
measure against current interest rates and current account-
ing rates. 
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Pike regarded this perception as extremely dangerous in that 
'book yield' is not a generally reliable measure of the true 
yield; and current interest rates (such as the overdraft 
rate) may not be a reliable measure of a project's cost of 
capital. 
Pike also established that 74 per cent of the respondents 
used a combination of appraisal criteria rather than a 
single method. The most popular combination proved to be IRR 
and payback period. 
Pike makes much of the obvious disparity that exists between 
theory and practice. In particular he observes that in 
theory the NPV method is regarded as being entirely com-
patable with the prescribed financial objective of the firm, 
namely wealth maximization, and yet it is virtually non-
existent in practice. 
8.4.1.3 CONCLUSION 
In the light of the latter observation by Pike one can 
seriously question whether firms are actually attempting to 
maximize wealth in the context of which the objective of the 
firm is formulated. 
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8.4.2 A 'MECHANICAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY SURVEY' 
8.4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Woods, Pokorny, Lintner and Blinkhorn (1984:36-37) conducted 
a survey on capital budgeting practices amongst 101 firms in 
the mechanical engineering industry. 
The surveys were conducted by means of personal interviews 
and covered firms in the UK with employment ranging from 
3000-8000. 
8.4.2.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
Evidence obtained from 93 respondents confirmed that payback 
was the most popular appraisal method in the mechanical en-
gineering industry: 49,5 per cent of the responding firms 
used payback period, 12,9 per cent used a discounted cash 
flow system and 10,8 per cent used both methods (DCF and non 
DCF) on a comparative basis. Non financial criteria were 
specified by 8,5 per cent as being dominant in the invest-
ment decision, whilst remaining firms specified a variety of 
influential factors, such as essentiality of equipment and 
control of investment decision making by holding companies. 
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In interviews, the impression was given that firms often 
realised the technical inadequacies of the payback system 
but at the same time their immediate problem was short run 
cash flows. This problem, according to them cannot be al-
leviated by the use of DCF methods. 
Woods, et al (1984: 36-37) furthermore followed up work un-
dertaken by Pike (1982) who suggested that capital budgeting 
behaviour is strongly influenced by the extent of capital 
rationing experienced by firms, with capital rationing it-
self being influenced by firm size. 
The authors accordingly collected details of turnover for 58 
firms between the years 1979 to 1983 with the objective of 
establishing the relationship between turnover and invest-
ment appraisal. 
Table 8.7 depicts the relationship between turnover and in-
vestment appraisal method which emerged during the study. 
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TABLE 8.7 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURNOVER AND INVESTMENT APPRAISAL 
METHOD, 1983 
TURNOVER (Pounds p.a~) FIRMS USING A GIVEN APPRAISAL METHOD 
PAYBACK 
PER CENT 
Less than 500 000 50 
500 000-1 million 0 
1-2 million 62,5 
2-10 million 51,6 
More than 10 million 70,0 









NON FINAN- OTHER 
CIAL PER 






Sample : 58 Firms 
(1984:36-37) 
According to the conductors of the survey, table 8.7 indi-
cates that the bias towards payback occurs across all sizes 
of firms and that there is no suggestion that it is used 
more heavily by the smaller businesses which may lack the 
management expertise to employ more sophisticated tech-
niques. 
At the same time, the fact that DCF or comparative methods 
only come into use when turnover exceeds 1 million pounds 
may suggest that, at least among smaller firms, there exist 
an 'information gap' as regards such methods. 
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8.4.3 THE CARSBERG AND HOPE SURVEY 
8.4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Carsberg and Hope (1981:9-14) obtained empirical evidence 
for their study of investment decisions under inflation by 
means of a postal questionnaire survey. The questionnaire 
was sent in August 1973 to a sample of 325 companies chosen 
randomly from 'The Times' list of 1000 leading U.K. com-
panies for 1971-72. 
8.4.3.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
Of the firms surveyed only 32 per cent responded. Their 
responses revealed appraisal methods in terms of the primary 
most popular method. These are depicted in table 8.8. 
TABLE 8.8 





Payback Period - with Disounting 
First Year Accounting Rate of Return 
(First year profit/initial investment) 
Average Rate of Return 
NPV 
Net Terminal Value 
















Carsberg and Hope observed that, despite the wide use of DCF 
(85 per cent), these were supplementing rather than displac-




Also, of the two main DCF methods the IRR method 
wider usage than its counterpart, the NPV 
Although qualitative judgement might appear to be an unsound 
evaluation method relative to methods that recognize time 
value Carsberg and Hope (1981:45-46) provides some rationale 
for it. They reason that projects will often have important 
effects which are 'remote' and hence not readily estimated 
in cash terms. As example can serve the case of favourable 
publicity associated with the development of an advanced 
technology, or the advantage, in attracting customers, or 
offering for sale a product which will complement a range of 
similar products. Effects such as these can, they say, can 
best be considered in the appraisal by subjective judgement 
after carrying out as many explicit measurements as pos-
sible. 
Anbther reason that favours qualitative judgement, Carsberg 
and Hope observe, is the uncertainty associated with busi-
ness undertakings. Therefore exclusive reliance on single 
valued forecasts of direct financial results might expose a 
manager to the danger of criticism should the actual results 
differ from the forecasted. 
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They state however that provided managers have some 
forecasting ability, the use of numerical calculations seems 
likely to improve the chances of optimal decisions. 
Carsberg and Hope (1981:10) believe that the evidence ac-
cumulated in their study provides strong support for the 
contention that investment appraisal practices used by large 
British firms tend to lead to investment below optimal 
levels. Their rationale for this statement rests on the ob-
servation that a large number of firms use a money target 
rate of return (nominal rate) whereas cash flows are es-
timated in current prices (real values>. These firms dis-
played the added disadvantage of failure to predict the ef-
fects of inflation on their resources. 
Evidence of under investment stemmed from the fact that 
several firms used the IRR as well as a first year account-
ing rate of return (first year profit/initial investment). 
Both methods, according to the authors, ln comparison with 
the NPV method will favour 'under investment'? 
Carsberg and Hope do not properly substantiate this state-
ment but it has been shown in chapter 6 that the IRR method 
is biased against investments where the bulk of the cash 
flows occur very late in the investments life. 
7. By 'underinvestment' is meant that the total amount invested 
in capital assets will eventually be smaller (below the op-
timal level) as a result of the usage of certain methods in-
stead of others. 
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The 'first year accounting rate of return' criterion will 
have an adverse effect on the 'rate of return' in subsequent 
years in that profits will become more subject to taxes 
since wear and tear allowance is based on historical cost 
and not replacement cost. 
8.5 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE UK STUDIES 
Studies in the UK seem to supply evidence that the larger 
the company the slightly stronger the bias towards DCF 
methods. Also the most favoured DCF method appears again to 
be IRR. 
However, there are contradictory items of evidence in some 
studies. The Carsberg and Hope study for example revealed 
that the most popular method of investment evaluation ap-
peared to be qualitative judgement. But in other studies 
payback period remains a firm favourite amongst large as 
well as small companies. At least one study viz. Woods, et 
al. (1984 37) suggests that the largest companies in the 
survey used payback period and DCF in the proportion of 7:2. 
This evidence further contradicts the findings of Carsberg 





SURVEYS ON METHODS OF INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING 
UNDERTAKEN IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA(RSA) 
THE LAMBRECHTS SURVEY 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1972 Lambrechts (1976:27-31) conducted a survey on capi-
tal investment appraisal methods in the RSA. 
The 100 top quoted companies (in terms of total assets) 
which appeared in the Financial Mail top 100 list in 1971, 
were approached in 1972. The assets of the companies ranged 
from R19 million to R290 million. Positive reactions were 
received from 57 of the 100 companies. Of this number 48 
were included in the investigation and personally visited by 
the researcher. Of the 48 companies, 38 were manufacturing 
companies. 
8.6.1.3 SURVEY RESULTS 
The responses of the 48 companies in respect of appraisal 
methods followed are depicted in table 8.9. 
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TABLE 8.9 
INVESTMENT EVALUATION METHODS IN THE RSA 
METHOD 
Priority Rating 
Accounting (average) rate of return 
Payback Period 




Net Terminal Value 
Source: Lambrechts (1976:28) 
PERCENTAGE 









Although not evident in the table Lambrechts indicates that 
30 per cent of the sample did not apply any form of finan-
cial evaluation for replacement decisions. 
Lambrechts mentions that the percentage users of IRR and NPV 
methods compared favourably with those of the USA and UK. He 
points out however, that DCF methods were used to a greater 
extent by companies controlled from overseas than South 
African controlled companies. The converse applied for non 
DCF methods. Also, 93 per cent of the users of DCF methods 
preferred IRR because it provides results in terms of per-
centages. 
Lambrechts gathered significant information when he compared 
prlmary company objectives with evaluating methods of co-
operating companies. Of. the companies which applied DCF 
methods as primary evaluation methods about 40 per cent for-
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mulated their primary company objective in terms of earnings 
per share and about 50 per cent in terms of average rate of 
return. 
This phenomenon appeared to point out a contradiction be-
cause it is a well known fact that there can be considerable 
differences between a discounted rate of return on the one 
hand and an average rate of return or earnings per share on 
the other hand. 
This finding indicates a serious deficiency in the com-
prehension of executives regarding the causative relation-
ship between the time value of future benefits and the value 
of the firm. 
The following study in the RSA was conducted in 1978. 
8.6.2 THE REEVE STUDY 
8.6.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reeve (1981:10-14) obtained the Carsberg and Hope question-
naire and in 1978 conducted a similar survey on capital ap-
praisal methods in the RSA. He set out to prove inter alia a 
hypothesis that investment appraisal methods in the RSA tend 
to lead to investment below the optimal level. 
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The subjects utilized were the top 100 South African com-
panies given in the April 1977 edition of the 'Financial 
Mail' top companies report. The industrial companies used 
were ranked by asset size. Of the replies received 50 were 
usable. 
8.6.2.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of the survey revealed a remarkable similarity 
to those obtained in the UK. The primary most popular in-
vestment appraisal method in the RSA proved to be the IRR 
method as indicated in table 8.10. 
TABLE 8.10 





Payback Period - with discounting 
First Year Accounting Rate of Return 
(First year profit/Initial Investment) 
Average Rate of Return 
NPV 
Net Terminal Value 














It was revealed by the responses, that despite the wide use 
of DCF methods in the RSA (84 per cent), these supplement 
rather than replace traditional methods like payback period 
and average rate of return. It was furthermore established 
that 78 per cent of South African companies used more than 
one method of appraisal. 
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The conclusion from this study was that it gives strong sup-
port to the hypothesis that investment appraisal practices 
used by large South African industrial firms will tend to 
lead to investment below the optimal level. 
The reasons for this Reeves concluded, seem to coincide with 
those of the British study by Carsberg and Hope viz. real 
cash flows discounted by a nominal rate, use of IRR and ap-
plying payback period lead to over conservative decisions, 
resulting in investment below the optimal level. 
8.6.3 THE ANDREWS AND BUTLER STUDY 
The most recent survey conducted ln the RSA on capital 
budgeting was conduted by Andrews and Butler (1986 : 31-37). 
Using a questionnaire, data was gathered from investment 
decision makers in some of South Africa's largest industrial 
and mining corporations in respect of such issues as: 
1. · What capital budgeting techniques were employed? 
2. When were the techniques introduced? 
3. How were such complicated factors such as inflation, 
risk and mutually exclusive alternatives dealt with? 
The questionnaires were mailed to the chief financial of-
ficers of 500 of South Africa's major mining and industrial 
companies. The replies received totalled 132. 
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8.6.3.1 SURVEY RESULTS 
i) Methods of Capital Appraisal 
Respondents were asked which capital budgeting methods they 
used ln evaluating the profitability of a proposed invest-
menta 
Table 8.11 shows that the most popular method used is the 
payback period. However, the discounted cash flow methods 
(internal rate of return, net present value and 
profitability index received considerable support). 
TABLE 8.11 
CAPITAL BUDGETING METHODS IN USE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
SIZE OF ANNUAL CAPITAL BUDGET 
TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED 
INTERNAL 




~ PER CENT 
PER 
PAYBACK ACCOUNTING 
PERIOD RATE OF RETURN 
PER CENT PER CENT 
OTHER 
----------------~---------------------------------~----------------------------------------------------
Over R50 million 40,0 81,8 9,1 12,7 45,2 0;0 
R25 million - R50 million 80,0 46,1 13,3 66,1 46,1 20,0 
RIO million - R25 million 63,2 42,1 15,8 68,4 47,4 10,5 
R5 million - R10 million 68,7 31,5 12,5 93,7 43,8 12,5' 
R2 million - R5 million 63,2 36,8 26,3 84,2 42,1 5,3 
Below R2 million 36,6 31,7 12,2 51,2 34,1 4,9 
All respondents 59,5 39,1 14,1 68,6 41,3 . 8,3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Andrews and Butler (1986:36) 
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Andrews and Butler (1986:36) point out that the percentages 
total far more than one hundred per cent. The reason for 
this is that several methods was common. The average number 
of techniques used per firm was 2,31. The firms were asked 
if they used any technique aside from those tabled. The most 
common of these tabled were the CAPM, MAPI and assessment of 
earnings and dividend yield. 
Table 8.11 furthermore indicates that time-weighted criteria 
play a more important role in firms with larger capital 
budgets. No definite trend is however discernable in the 
data regarding the other methods surveyed. 
The respondents were also asked what their primary method of 
evaluation was at present and had been five and ten years 
ago respectively. The findings appear in table 8.12. 
TABLE 8.12 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MOST IMPORTANT CAPITAL BUDGETING 
METHOD IN USE 
YEAR 
CAPITAL BUDGETING METHOD 1982 1976 1971 
PER CENT PER CENT PER CENT 
-------------------~--------------------------------------
Internal rate of return 
Net present value 
Profitability index 
Payback period 


























Andrews and Butler (1986:33) observe that what is il-
lustrated is a trend, with time, away from the less sophis-
ticated methods of payback period and accounting rate of 
return to the more sophisticated time weighted methods of 
IRR and NPV. The sample also revealed that 57,3 per cent use 
time-weighted methods as the most important basis of evalua-
tion. 
IRR proves to be the most popular method which is in agree-
ment with the study of Reeve (section 8.6.6.2). 
The authors also investigated the type of investment to 
which South African firms employed modern budgeting tech-
niques. Over 40 per cent said they used the techniques for 
all investment decisions and 43 per cent said that they 
restricted their use to investment purposes over a set 
amount. The average value of this amount proved to be R148 
546 with a standard deviation of R259 672. 
This indicated that the value was very wide, ranging from 
R100 up to R1,000,000. Of the remaining respondents 5,9 per 
cent claimed they did not use capital budgeting techniques 
for any investment decision. Andrews and Butler (1986: 33) 
found this surprising since the sample firms were regarded 
as leading firms. 
Another alarming fact proved to be that one out of 20 of the 
leading firms relied only on intuition. The remaining 10 per 
cent said they only employed capital budgeting techniques 
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for certain type of investment. Among those names were in-
vestments for new products, major expansions, take overs and 
capital used in the production of income. Table 8.13 sum-
marizes these findings. 
TABLE 8.13 
TYPES OF INVESTMENTS WHERE CAPITAL BUDGETING METHODS ARE 
EMPLOYED 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS 




RESTRICTED TO OVER A CERTAIN 
AMOUNT 43,2 
RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN TYPES 




Source Andrews and Butler (1986: 33) 
ii) Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty 
According to the survey results - 76,8 per cent of the 
responding firms made some explicit adjustment to account 
for risk and uncertainty. Hence, nearly a quarter of the 
firms are ignoring a critical factor in assessing major In-
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vestments and another quarter of the firms are using subjec-
tive judgement alone to cater for risk. A summary of the 
findings appears on table 8.14. 
TABLE 8.14 
ADJUSTMENTS MADE FOR RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
RISK ADJUSTMENT METHOD 
Requirement of higher-than-normal 
index of profitability 
Requirement of shorter-than-normal 
Payback period 
Adjustment of cash flow by 
probability factors 
Purely subjective non-quantitative 
Adjustment of cash flows 
No adjustment made 
Other methods 









Source Andrews and Butler (1986: 35) 
The authors point out that the techniques specified under 
'other methods' were stochastic models, break-even analyses 
of the cash flows and attempts to apply the CAPM. 
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iii) The Effects of Inflation 
The respondents were also required to indicate what methods 
they used to take account of inflation. 
Findings are presented ih table 8.15. 
TABLE 8.15 
ADJUSTMENTS MADE FOR INFLATION 
INFLATION ADJUSTMENT METHOD 
No allowances made for inflation 
All items in cash flow inflated at 
an agreed rate 
Inflated at an agr~ed rate for a 
certain number of years 
Some other method 






----- ---- - ---------- - -----------------------------------
Source Andrews and Butler (1986: 35) 
Andrews and Butler observe that it is essential that cash 
flows be adjusted for the effects of inflation when assess-
ing major investments (section 7.6). However over 40 per 
cent of the respondents made no such allowances. This find-
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ing is in agreement with that of Reeve (section 8.6.2.2). 
Several firms inflated items in their cash flows for a 
specific number of years and then continue cash flows 
uninflated for the remainder of the life of the project. "The 
average period of inflation allowance for these firms was 
6,75 years, the shortest being 2 years and the longest 10 
years, with a standard deviation of 3,95 years. Almost one 
half of the respondents inflated all items in the cash flow 
but some listed other methods such as viewing current 
economics and subjecting the payback allowances alone to in-
flation. 
iv) Rate Of Return on Investment 
Respondents to the survey were asked whether they made any 
explicit assumption about the rate of return to be earned on 
reinvested funds. Only 17 per cent of those who answered the 
question made an assumption regarding reinvestment rates of 
return. In most cases this was their cost of capital rate 
which is implicitly assumed in the NPV model in any event 
(Andrews and ' Butler 1986: 35). 
The authors mention that Fremgen in his study of American 
firms in 1971 found that a substantially higher percentage, 
namely 20 per cent (section 8.2.1.4) of firms made explicit 
assumptions on the models they used ". This fact the authors 
concluded provides further evidence that South African firms 
lag behind their American counterparts in terms of invest-
ment sofistication. 
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It must be pointed out to Andrews and Butler that this dis-
crepancy could be much bigger since American firms at this 
point in time could be much more sophisticated than in 1971. 
v) Choice Between Mutually Exclusive Alternatives 
The survey reveal~d that in this respect only 31 per cent of 
the responding firms apply the theoretically accepted tech-
nique of incremental cash flows. Most of the respondents 
(54,9 per cent) stated that they decide on the alternative 
that gives the best rating as determined by the index of 
financial attractiveness they regularly use. Several other 
methods were proposed by the sample, many of them non-
financial. 
vi) Sophistication in Investment Decision Making 
With the co-operation of a panel o~ knowledgeable financial 
analysts, five ke'y factors in a firm's investment decision 





most important capital budgeting method used; 
risk assessment method; 
allowance made for inflation; 
analysis of mutually exclusive alternatives and 
technique for dealing with reinvestment of cash flow. 
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Ratings for each factor produced scores between 0 and 10, 
with 0 indicating a low level of sophistication and 10 a 
very high level of sophistication. 
The mean sophistication index with its standard deviation by 
industrial sector appear in Table 8.16. The listing is ar-
ranged in descending order of sophistication. 
TABLE 8.16 
SOPHISTICATION IN CAPITAL BUDGETING BY INDUSTRY CATEGORY 
INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Coal, petroleum and chemical 
industries 





Food, beverage and tobacco 
Other 
Primary metals and fabrication 
Wood, pulp and paper 
.Electrical and electronics 
Construction and industrial 
equipment 






























Source Andrews and Butler (1986: 36) 
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Linear regressions of the sophistication index against the 
net asset size, capital budgets size, growth rate and 
profitability of the respondent firms provide interesting 
correlations. 
In general the following seems evident 
i) Larger firms are more sophisticated in capital budget-
ing techniques than smaller firms. 
ii) Firms having larger capital budgeting expenditures use 
more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques. 
iii) Firms that are using more sophisticated capital budget-
ing techniques are growing faster. 
iv) Firms that are using more sophisticated capital budget-
ing techniques are more profitable (Andrews and Butler 
1986: 36). 
8.7 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE RSA SURVEYS 
A most significant 
that companies which 
conclusion in the Lambrechts study was 
apply DCF methods have book value 
orientated objectives. This suggests a serious information 
gap between theory and practice. 
A disturbing factor that emerged from the Reeve survey is 
the fact that large South African companies have a bias 
toward less than optimal investment. This could have 
detrimental long term effects on the South African economy. 
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8.8 CONCLUSION 
The evidence from studies of investment evaluation methods 
indicates that businesses seldom utilize properly validated 
theories. Despite a clearly defined trend towards greater 
sophistication, there is still a minimal usage of theoreti-
cally valid techniques. Where these techniques are used, 
firms seem unable to relate their benefits to the objective 
of the firm viz wealth maximization. The reasons for this 
seem to be twofold: 
1. there is a lack of knowledge on the part of the deci-
sion maker and 
2. smaller firms do not have the ability to apply theory 
fully. 
An unfortunate aspect of the surveys scrutinized was that 
there was no differentiation between listed and unlisted 
companies. In most cases 'relative size' is a function of 
assets employed. 
Evidence generated by surveys in the USA, UK and RSA indi-
cate that investment appraisal methods are becoming more 
sophisticated ln the sense that discounted cash flow methods 
are used to an increasing extent. This is especially true 
for large size firms. However an anomaly exists in that a 
large percentage of firms still use payback period. Some 
though, as is the case ln the UK and USA use DCF in conjunc-
tion with payback period. 
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A significant finding in the Andrews and .Butler (1986: 36) 
survey, that did not eminate from any other study, was that 
sophisticated capital budgeting methods can be coupled to 
foster growth and increased profitability in business firms. 
It is puzzling, however, as to how firms can realistically 
and consistently use these two methods in conjunction with 
each other as they are fundamentally incompatable. 
As mentioned, a disconcerting aspect of the surveys stemmed 
from the fact that no differentiation was made between 
listed and unlisted firms. Since the study at hand focusses 
on investment decision making of unlisted firms, specific 
information in this respect would have been of immense value 
in the construction of an investment decision making model 
for the unlisted firm. 
8.9 SUMMARY 
The evidence generated by the surveys reviewed in this chap-
ter reveals that investment appraisal methods in the USA, UK 
and RSA are becoming more sophisticated in the sense that 
DCF methods are used to an increasing extent. This appears 
true for large size firms. It is puzzling however that some 
of these firms use DCF in conjunction with payback period 
since- these two methods are fundamentally incompatable. 
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There furthermore seems to be a bias towards usage of IRR in 
the USA, UK and' RSA. This seems to stern from the fact that 
businessmen prefer investment information in the form of 
percentages. 
A popular evaluation method appears to be 'qualitative 
judgement' 1n the UK and RSA. Qualitative judgment is 
defended on grounds that certain projects will have effects 
that are remote and hence not readily estimated in cash 
terms. 
Evidence of possible investment below the optimal level ex-
ists in the UK and RSA. This sterns from the fact that firms 
use a nominal rate of return whereas cash flows are measured 
in current prices. Under-investment can furthermore be at-
tributed to use of IRR and first year accounting rate of 
return. Both these methods according to the researchers will 
favour investment below the optimum level. 
An alarming fact is that according to all the surveys con-
ducted, the NPV method, supposed to be the most sophisti-
cated investment appraisal method, 1S virtually the least 
used. 
Although there is a trend toward sophistication in the usage 
of valid techniques, the relative usage is still minimal. 
This points to a lack of knowledge on the part of the deci-
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sion maker. This phenomenon also manifests itself in the in-
ability of decision makers to relate their benefits to the 
objective of the firm viz. wealth maximization. 
In the next chapter available theory regarding investment 
decision making specificially in unlisted firms will be ex-
plored. Problems in this respect viz. the absence of a for-
mal market and the establishment of an appropriate discount 
rate, will also be investigated. The problem will further-
more be addressed as to whether, in the absence of a formal 
market, DCF methods are still appropriate in the evaluation 
of investment proposals. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING FOR UNLISTED FIRMS 
9.1 OBJECTIVES REVISITED 
9.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been stated that the investment objective of the firm 
should be to aid the owners In maximizing the utility of 
their consumption over time. This is tantamount to maximiza-
tion of owner's wealth and is obtained through maximization 
of the market value of the relative shares. 
When this criterion is applied to the unlisted firm one is 
confronted with various problems. 
9.1.2 
9.1.2.1 
PROBLEMS IN THE FORMULATION OF AN 'OBJECTIVE' FOR 
THE UNLISTED FIRM 
THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL MARKET 
The nature of this problem is that the unlisted firm has no 
formal market to value its shares. Consequently the gauging 
of the market value of ordinary shares through which owner's 
wealth in the listed firm is affected is ruled out. 
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9.1.2.2 THE DISCOUNT RATE 
The second but related problem concerns the discount rate. 
It has been stated that the appropriate criterion for ac-
cepting or rejecting an investment proposal is the marginal 
cost of capital. The complexity of such a calculation for 
the listed company has been stressed in previous chapters 
and it was pointed out that in most cases such a cost is a 
mere approximation. This w&s recognized by Walker and Petty 
(1978:190) in their discussion of the objective of the small 
firm. They point out that most writers of financial theory 
refer to the concept of enhancing the value of the firm and 
many use the cost of capital as the criterion simply because 
it has been defined in terms of investors expectations. It 
is extremely difficult, they say, to use the cost of capital 
as a criterion in either small or large companies Slnce it 
is extremely difficult to calculate. While there are those 
who say that they can compute an acceptable cost of capital 
for middle size or large firms, it must be concluded that it 
cannot be done for unlisted companies. 
This problem centres mainly around the implicit nature of 
the cost of equity capital which will be addressed ln depth 
·In chapter 10. In this chapter however, 
be taken at the objective of the unlisted 
a closer look will 
or small firm. 
Some commentors in this regard refer to the problems of 'DCF 
objectives' . 
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9.1.3 NON DCF OBJECTIVES VERSUS DCF OBJECTIVES 
9.1.3.1 PROPONENTS OF NON DCF OBJECTIVES 
i) Roland Robinson 
Robinson (1969:55) notes that it is not at all clear that 
capital expenditure in small businesses has yet been in-
fluenced by DCF techniques, nor is it certain whether they 
should be. He points out that the more sophisticated for-
mulas for the evaluation ' of capital expenditure assume some 
degree of certainty in the returns from such expenditures or 
that the expected return can be represented by the mean of a 
probability distribution. But, he points out, small 
business's capital expenditures are characterized by a con-
siderable degree of uncertainty. He further notes that when 
the future is so uncertain the computation of expected cash 
flows become less dependable foundations for the evaluation 
of capital expenditures. 
Robinson observes that the history of difficulties and mor-
tality clearly shows that unlisted companies and specifi-
cally the small ones, are subject to a higher degree of un-
,certainty than large listed companies. This he postulates, 
is another way of saying that the precise computation of 
capital expenditure returns, while having some evidential 
value, should not be made the centra l or decisive feature in 
planning small business expenditure. 
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The owner may find it useful to look the problem square in 
the face. If he has great confidence of success or at least 
of staying in business, he can justify fairly long range 
decisions. But if in all candor, he recognizes that this may 
not be the case, then he may find it more prudent to use all 
of the temporizing devices at his disposal. Robinson 
(1965:55) suggests the decision maker follows the simplest 
of all capital expenditure rules: 'As little as possible.' 
Apart from this strategy he says, the small businessman must 
also consider the fact that he has fewer resources with 
which to deal with uncertainty. He cannot survive many mis-
takes. He notes that a giant oil company for instance can 
drill for oil in unlikely places on the off chance of open-
ing up a new oil field but for a small firm this is "Russian 
Roulette" and unless it is willing to play 'go for broke' it 
cannot afford the same risks. This great uncertainty in the 
returns of capital expenditures makes most of the refined 
computations of present value and rate of return largely ir-
relevant for the small company. 
ii) Ernest W. Walker 
Walker (1975:195) insists that it is impossible for small 
firms to employ any of the known methods such as NPV, IRR or 
ptofitability index in their present design when evaluating 
investment proposals. His rationale for this statement 1S 
that in order to use any of the abovementioned methods ef-
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fectively, a firm must know its cost of capital. This he 
states, because of its computational complexity, is vir-
tually impossible for the small firm to establish. 
Apart from those theorists who oppose DCF, there are others 
who feel that financial decision making that involves the 
time value concept is so important that the unlisted firm, 





PROPONENTS OF DCF OBJECTIVES 
O'Connor and Bueso 
to O'Connor and Bueso (1981 : 33-34) the present 
owners'equity in closely held corporations, 
proprietorships and partnerships is determined by the same 
method as the present value of ordinary shares. The prlce or 
market value of smaller firms may be thought of as the 
present value of the net cash flows to the owners. 
They then proceed to provide an equation by which the price 
at which a business can be sold will be reflected in the 
Slze of the expected cash flows to the owners and the dis-
count rate employed. 
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PricesB = NCF 
KSB 
Where PricesB = Price of small business 
NCF = Net cash flows to owners 
KSB = The rate of return that could 
elsewhere on comparable investments (opportunity 
be earned 
cost) 
O'Connor and Bueso substantiate their view by indicating 
that this proposition is confirmed by real estate practices 
in the USA. For example, the prices paid for apartment com-
plexes and office buildings are based on cash flow estimates 
and discount rates based on opportunity costs. It 1S fur-
thermore seemingly a fact that federal and state courts in 
the USA use the above stated equation in establishing the 
values of non publicly owned businesses. 
A very good point is made by the authors regarding the 
markets in which large publicly owned firms operate and 
those in which small businesses operate. The valuation be-
tween these two are going to be influenced by the fact that 
the one asset, the publicly owned firm, is going to be sold 
in a large national market which is naturally competitive 
whereas the other asset, the small firm, must rely in most 
cases on the peripheral of the local market. 
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But this limited marketability must surely compound the rlS-
kiness of the unlisted firm!1 It mus t necessarily have an 
impact on the discount rate and will be discussed further in 
chapter ten. 
Q'Connor and Bueso fail to provide a definition of market 
value. They appear to accept that a firm's market values and 
present values are always in equilibrium or that it is one 
and the same value since they refer to the price of the 
business as its market value, but without proper definition. 
ii) Walker and Petty 
Walker and Petty (1978:190) propose the following solution 
to the impasse of an investment objective of the small firm. 
They indicate that the predominant reason why businesses In-
vest funds in assets is to increase the present value of the 
firm's equity capital. This objective is achieved only if 
the return on invested funds equals or exceeds the returns 
desired by both suppliers of debt and equity capital. If the 
return is equal to these expectations then there will be no 
change ln the value of the firm; however if it is below or 
above, a change in value may be expected. It can therefore 
, be assumed they conclude that the objective of the small 
business should be the maximization of owners equity. 
1. In this respect, see Martin, et a l . 
limited marketability of securities. 
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(1979:377) regarding 
In this regard Reynders (1975:438-439) views the investment 
objective of the firm as a 'target rate' in that if an in-
vestment is made at this rate it would not increase or 
decrease the market value of the net worth. Reynders, 
however, refrains from coupling his 'target rate' to a time 
value. 
Walker's and Petty's appealing statement above namely that 
the objective of the unlisted firm should be the maximiza-
tion of the present value of owner's equity presents two 
problems. The first one is the discount rate which will be 
dealt with in chapter 10 and the second, concerns a market 
for the unlisted firm. In this respect Weston and Brigham 
(1987 :502) observe that it is difficult to argue for value 
based techniques when the value of the firm itself is unob-
servable. 
It is therefore imperative that a closer look be taken at 





OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM MARKET VALUE OF THE UNLISTED 
FIRM 
An objective of maximizing the market value of the unlisted 
firm is conceptually not all that different from the 'DCF 
objective.' The nature of the underlying problem is however 
more clearly defined. 
To have a market value for the unlisted firm is an appealing 
thought. Such a value can be compared to present value of 
owners equity and should the two values be the same, an 
equilibrium value would exist. 
A downswing in the economy could for example result in the 
market value being lower than the present value whereas in a 
period of upswing the contrary could be true. Whatever the 
case may be the buyer or seller has an idea of the equi-
librium between two important values. 
The listed firm invests funds in assets in order to increase 
the market value of its ordinary shares. This however, can 
- only happen as has already been observed, if the present 
value of the equity lncreases. Only when investors have 
taken cognizance of this increase will they price the share 
upwards. 
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Whilst the listed firm has a market for its shares where it 
is formally priced, the market price of the unlisted firms 
equity is much more informally and infrequently determined. 
It is consequently much more the product of risk preferences 
of individual investors on the periphery of the local market 
and the negotiating skills of buyers and sellers. 
Olson (1975:268-269) illustrates this point. He states that 
'fair market value' is defined in the Federal Estate Tax 
Regulations and the Gift and Tax Regulations of the USA. 
This value is the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. He points out, 
however, that it is a time honoured definition and often 
quoted by experts, but, unfortunately of no help in valuing 
a closely held corporation. 
Conradie (1982 34) regarded a study of Engler (1978:5), 
who refers to 'market value' in his definition of the norma-
tive objective of the small firm: 
"If the owners interest 18 in a proprietorship the ob-
jective of management should be to operate in such a 
manner that the owners can obtain a maximum price 1n 
the market place for their interest." 
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This 'market value' as has been suggested, is based concep-
tually on present value. If owner's interest is given time 
value, such interest becomes the present value of owners 
equity. It therefore seems appropriate to accept that, in 
the absence of a formal market place for the unlisted firm, 
the market value when in equilibrium is determined by the 
formula suggested by Henderson, et al. (1984:86). 
According to Henderson and his co-authors the market value 
of equity is the present value of the after tax earnings, 
capitalized at the required rate of return or equity rate. 
It must be pointed out however that Henderson's numerator 
namely 'after tax earnings' does not represent cash flows. 
This formula can be depicted as follows: 
present value of owners equity = 
where: 
present value of owners equity = 
net income after taxes = 
cost of equity capital = 
net income after taxes 
cost of equity capital 
present value of owners 
interest 
net income 
(earnings before interest 
and taxes less payments 
to financing sources 
and after deduction of 
applicable taxes) 
cost of owner supplied 
funds 
There 1S a problem however for the unlisted firm in that 1n 
the absence of a formal market the cost of equity cannot be 
computed. 
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Apart from the possible objectives discussed up to now there 
are still other objectives which may be of overwhelming im-
portance to investment decision making in the unlisted firm. 
One such objective concerns risk of insolvency. 
9.1.4.2 MINIMIZING THE RISK OF INSOLVENCY 
Small firms face greater uncertainty than large firms in the 
cash flows they might generate beyond the immediate future. 
Large firms like IBM and Genera l Motors have 'staying 
power': they can generally make an investment and then ride 
out cyclical downturns. Such per i ods are referred to as 
'shake outs', and it is usually the smaller firm that is 
'shaken out.' Therefore most small business managers feel 
uncomfortable when called upon to make forecasts beyond a 
year or two. Since DCF techniques require explicit estimates 
of cash flows through the life of the project, small busi-
ness managers may feel that they cannot take seriously an 
analysis that hinges on what they regard as guesswork which, 
if wrong, can lead to bankruptcy (Weston and Brigham 1987 
:501). 
Walker takes up this dilemma and observes that because of 
the larger risk associated with unlisted firms an investment 
decision making problem is created. This risk does not only 
refer to business risk but also to financial risk (Walker 
1978 :953). 
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Because of the increased risk problem, Walker suggests that 
the unlisted firm should try to avoid investments which 
might prove lethal. He furthermore recommends that the un-
listed firm ,should not pursue investment criteria of ex-
pected value and risk associated with dispersion, but rather 
pursue a strategy of avoiding risk that could bring about 
insolvency. 
According to Walker the reasons for the unlisted firms high 
risk profile are threefold: 
1. unlisted small firms are not diversified; 
2. they have less equity to form a cushion against losses 
and 
3. they generally do not have the same credit status or 
assets to weather such losses (Walker 1978:953). 
Weston and Brigham (1978:953) also discuss the small firm's 
high risk profile. They state that these firms usually do 
not have much initial capital. As a consequence, the typical 
small firm incurs an inordinate amount of trade credit, it 
has a weak current ratio, it 1S slow in paying its bills, 
and if it is inefficient, what little capital it has is 
'quickly eroded. 
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It is consequently considered imperative by most observers \ . 
that small firms should avoid investment alternatives that 
have the slightest possibility of precipitating insolvency 
(Walker 1975 :195-196). 
An aspect that is very closely related to risk of insolvency 
concerns the way in which the unlisted small firm finances 
its long term investments. 
9.1.4.3 CAPITAL STRUCTURE OBJECTIVE 
This objective can best be explained by quoting from Weston 
and Brigham (1978:145): 
"Suppose a firm borrows on a one year basis and uses 
the funds obtained to build and equip a plant. Cash 
flows from the plant (profits plus depreciation) are 
not sufficient to payoff the loan at the end of the 
year, so the loan has to be renewed. If for some reason 
the lender refuses to renew the loan, then the firm has 
problems. Had the plant been financed with long term 
debt, however, cash flows would have been sufficient to 
retire the loan, and the problem of renewal would not 
have arisen. Thus, if a firm finances long term assets 
with permanent capital and short term assets with tem-
porary capital, its financial risk is lower than it 
would be if long term assets were financed with short 
term debt." 
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Apart from the risk of insolvency problem in the above 
situation it must be remembered that by convention the mar-
ginal cost of capital is a function of only long term funds. 
If short term funds are introduced into the computation, the 
already problematic computation becomes nearly impossible. 
It must furthermore be remembered that DCF computations re-
quire fairly accurate cost of capital calculations. 
Despite the lesson outlined ln the Weston and Brigham's 
quotation there is overwhelming evidence that in South 
Africa, small unlisted firms make considerable use of short 
term funds in their capital budgeting programmes. Conradie 
(1982:396) for example found that because of the inac-
cesibility of long term sources of capital to the small 
business in the RSA, many of them utilize short term sources 
especially bank overdrafts and trade credit to finance their 
permanent capital requirements. 
Walker (1975:201) explains that the use of a larger debt 
ratio is favoured by the small firm for the reason that 
short term debt is fairly easy to obtain. Sources of equity 
are limited in that retained earnings are usually small or 
non existent and no market exist for sale of shares to the 
.public. 
Conradie's study (1982:211-212) generated . the results 
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Loans by owners 
Hire purchase agreements 
Mortage bonds 
Personal bank loans 
Loans by members of family 
Loans by private individuals 
Other forms of capital (bills 
receivable, advances by suppliers 
and loans by statutory develop-
ment corporations) 





























Conradie undertook a parallel opinion survey amongst bank 
managers concernlng their opinion inter alia on the 
debt/equity ratios of small unlisted firms. Of the managers 
interviewed 66 per cent were of opinion that the small 
firms' equity capital ought to comprise at least 51 per 
cent of its total capital. Of bank managers that have 
authority over granting of bank finance only 33,3 per cent 
deemed a 40 per cent level of equity as sufficient. Only 6,2 
, per cent thought a 30 per cent equity in the capital mix was 
sufficient. 
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This in effect means that any small firm with an equity/debt 
ratio of less than 50 per cent will experience problems in 
acquiring additional capital (Conradie 1982:214), and yet 
bank overdrafts are the second most popular source of 
financing for the small unlisted firm. 
Conradie furthermore conducted research into the financial 
statements of 116 small businesses. He compared the results 
of the survey with a study by the Bureau of Financial 
Analysis of the University of Pretoria (1972:73) and that of 
a British study by Wilson (1979:57). His results correlated 
positively with the other two showing an equity/debt propor-
tion in the financial structures of small unlisted firms of 
+-40:60. 
Conradie's study seems to verify Walker's (1975:195-196) ob-
servation, namely that small unlisted firms have relatively 
small equity bases and secondly that of Weston and Brigham 
(1978 :953) who stated that the typical small firm incurs an 
inordinately large amount of trade credit. 
The capital structure objective might thus be of overriding 
importance at times. The small business with an equity/debt 
· ratio (which includes short term debt) of 30 per cent might 
well have no option but to strive for a more respectable 
ratio by deliberately reducing trading levels dramatically. 
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9.1.4.4 THE CERTAINTY EQUIVALENT OBJECTIVE 
What makes the certainty equivalent method so appealing is, 
according to Walker (1975 : 199) that, the necessity of 
knowing the firm's cost of capital is eliminated. Further-
more the point is made that the individual is able to relate 
his personal objectives and risk attitude to the project un-
der consideration. This means that a risk taker is permitted 
to accept those projects with greater risk but at the same 
time the risk averter is permitted to select less risky 
projects. 
Walker claims that small businessmen are generally more 
capable of equating the expected value of a risky project 
with returns that are certain, than managers of large firms. 
He supports his argument on the following grounds: 
'1. Most small businessmen are able to determine their risk 
characteristics. The result is that they are able to 
relate the risk 6haracteristics of proposed projects to 
their risk attitudes. 
2. The method requires no knowledge of the firm's cost of 
capital' (Walker 1975:201). 
Schwab and Schwab (1975:219) assert that ideally, in 
evaluating an investment proposition, the decision maker 
would like to derive the probability distribution of the net 
present value of the benefits to be derived from the invest-
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ment. Be would then assign a personal value derived from his 
particular utility curve to the present value of each of the 
possible gains and losses as given by the probability dis-
tribution. From this would be derived the expected value 
which the investment proposition has to meet, thus obtaining 
a truly valid measure of the pref erences involved in the 
evaluation of investment alternatives. 
However, Schwab and Schwab observe, that while it is very 
valuable to have a clear conceptual understanding of what it 
1S one wants to accomplish, from an operational viewpoint 
one might have to compromise such an ideal simply because of 
the time and costs needed to carry it out. 
It would of course be difficult to effectively communicate 
such an objective to other decision makers in the firm and 
it is highly likely that practical implementation of this 
approach would result in the 'subjective methods' attended 
to in UK and SA studies. 
A further and perhaps more urgent investment objective that 
can be of extreme importance, since various studies have 
shown that small unlisted firms are mainly cash orientated 
. (section 9.1.4.5), is the liquidity objective. 
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9.1.4.5 THE LIQUIDITY OBJECTIVE 
A firm 1S said to be liquid when it can meet its maturing 
short term obligations. The ratio that is intended to 
measure this rate of liquidity is the current ratio and is 
depicted as follows 
current assets 
current liabilities 
The quick ratio 1S also a measure of liquidity, but a much 
more stringent one in that is recognizes the fact that in-
ventory may not easily be converted to cash at book value. 
It is consequently measured as follows: 
current assets - inventories 
current liabilit i es 
The objective <though not always attainable) of liquidity 
seems to be a dominant requirement for many small firms. 
Walker (1975 :188) refers to a study by Gupta (1969 :527) 
for example which revealed that small firms were generally 
less liquid than large firms. 
Soldofsky observed that small firms are first and foremost 
concerned with basic survival, so they tend to look at ex-
penditures from the standpoint of their near term effects on 
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cash. This cash and survival orientation leads the firm to 
focus on a relatively short term time horizon, and this in 
turn leads to an emphasis on the payback period method. 
The payback method gives the firm an indication of the time 
required to recover the cash committed to an investment and 
thus of when cash will again be available for new oppor-
tunities (Weston and Brigham 1987:501). 
It therefore seems logical to reason that if survival of the 
small firm is dependant on liquidity it could become an in-
vestment objective that would exclude all others. It would 
of course be a derived objective : the fundamental objective 
1S to survive. 
9.2 CONCLUSION 
It seems clear from literature that i n so far as unlisted 
small firms do not use time related methods in their invest-
ment decisions they ~re placirig themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage vis a vis firms who do use such methods. 
Studies reveal a substantial utilization of short term debt 
, by small unlisted firms in the financing of their invest-
ments. These firms will accordingly be unable to correctly 
utilize DCF methods in their investment decision making 
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since they would be unable to realistically calculate the 
marginal cost of capital (quite apart from the problem of 
market value of equity). 
Although at first sight appealing the certainty equivalent 
method contains measurement difficulties. Furthermore, 
partnerships or private companies can have more than one 
relevant decision maker involved. This means that the 
utility preferences of all the decision makers are relevant. 
It is thus often simply not possible to specify expected 
values of utility preferences. 
Although the certainty equivalent method cannot be directly 
employed it might however contribute an ingredient of a dis-
counted cash flow process in which the degree of a projects 
risk is directly related to the managers perception of the 
extent to which cash flows will vary in any future period. 
The analysis of risky projects is consequently dependant 
upon the managers perceptions of cash flow characteristics 
and his personal risk preferences (see chapter four). The 
discounting rate consequently becomes a function of the 
decision makers utility preferences. 
It might be appropriate at this point to reiterate Weston's 
and Copelands (1985 : 388) statement in this regard namely: 
'that risk aversion is reflected in the discount rate inves-
tors apply when determining the value of the firm.' 
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A valid point is made by Walker in that the unlisted firm is 
likely to refrain from making an investment decision that 
has any chance of 






resources make it difficult to weather a bad 
limited capital 
decision. The 
'market value' objective has not been resolved. The absence 
of a discount rate for equity, due to the absence of a for-
mal market makes it virtually impossible to compute a 
'present value' that will according to Henderson, et al. 
reflect the 'market value'. Even if the 'present value' of 
owners equity could be computed it would be necessary for a 
transaction to actually take place in order to gauge whether 
the 'market value' is above or below 'present value'. 
The liquidity objective of the unlisted small firm appears 
to be of such supreme importance that it can easily lead to 
the exclusion of all time related evaluation methods. 
9.3 SUMMARY 
Two main problems in the utilization of the classic profit 
maximization objective for the unlisted small firm have been 
identified. The first being the absence of a continuous for-
. mal market for its shares or equity and the second being the 
apparant impossibility of computing an appropriate discount 
rate. 
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Some opponents of DCF methods for small firms such as Robin-
son and Walker adopt their stance primarily because of the 
discrepancy in risk profiles between the small unlisted com-
pany and the listed company. 
The theory put forward by proponents of DCF techniques for 
small business, is at first sight appealing in that it 
hinges around the time value of money. This 'value' can fur-
thermore be compared to a 'market value' and lS supposedly 
equatable to the valuation model developed for the listed 
company. Henderson, et al. suggested _that the 'market value' 
of equity is the present value of the after tax earnings 
capitalized at the equity rate. However the computation of 
the capitalization rate of the equity of the unlisted firm 
is impossible in the absence of a formal market. 
The problem of a reliable 'present value' and consequently 
'market value' therefore remains unresolved and the approach 
really 'hangs by its own boot straps.' There is evidence 
that small unlisted companies make substantial use of short 
term funds in their financing of capi tal expenditures mainly 
because of limited access to capita l markets. Accordingly 
the computation of a reliable discount rate is further com-
plicated. 
Further objectives considered include the avoidance of in-
solvency. Walker quite rightly states that the small un-
listed firm, because of its limited capital should refrain 
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from making investments that have the slightest probability 
of bringing about insolvency (unless the owner is really a 
risk seeker or gambler). 
The certainty equivalent objective approach by Walker does 
at least accommodate risk preferences directly. It has ad-
vantages in that it does not require a cost of capital cal-
culation and secondly the individual is able to relate his 
risk attitude directly to the project under mention. The 
method is, however, impractical in that the compared utility 
preferences of directors of private companies or partners of 
a partnership cannot be measured or effectively communi-
cated. 
A final vital objective considered is that of liquidity. It 
seems very often to be of overriding importance to small un-
listed firms and ties in neatly with the avoidance of the 
insolvency objective. Both of these objectives are undoub-
tedly rooted in the more fundamental quest for survival 
which the small unlisted firm must tackle from a relatively 
disadvantaged position. it seems that survival rather than 
profit maximization ought to be driving force of small busi-
ness. 
While the objective of the small firm might render the DCF 
approach inappropriate, the elusive search for a suitable 
discount rate might well render the DCF approach an lmpos-
sibility. This aspect will now be addressed. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE DISCOUNT RATE FOR UNLISTED FIRMS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of an appropriate discount rate for the un-
listed firms lies in the fact that such a rate is needed to 
gauge whether an investment is acceptable or not in terms of 
adding to the present value of owners equity. 
Whereas the cost of debt can be computed since it is of con-
tractual nature the same cannot be said of the cost of 
equity. The absence of a formal market for the equity of the 
unlisted firm is a formidable problem in the determination 
of an appropriate discount rate. 
Weston and Brigham (1987:578) recognize this problem and 
suggest the CAP M be used in order to solve it. 
10.2 THE USE OF THE CAPM TO CALCULATE THE COST OF 
EQUITY OF THE UNLISTED FIRM 
Since the unlisted firm's equity is not publicly traded its 
,beta cannot be calculated and hence the above method cannot 
be applied, directly. However the so called 'price play' 
technique might be considered for the unlisted firm. This 
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involves finding a firm in the same line of business that 
does have public equity, estimating its beta and then using 
this beta' as a proxy for that of the unlisted firm in ques-
tion in the CAPM model (Weston and Brigham 1987 :578). They 
furnish the example below to illustrate the approach. 
Assume for example that a small privately held company in 
the paper manufacturing industry wants to calculate the 
cost of its equity capital. Using the paper industry beta 
(1.11) as a proxy for the firms beta, an expected market 
return of 14 per cent and a risk free rate of 10 per cent, 
the firm's cost of equity capital is estimated to be: 
ke = rf + b(km - rf)2 
= 10 + 1,11(0,14 - 0,10) 
= 14,4 per cent 
van Horne (1983:215-216) justifiably warns that caution be 
exercized ln the application of the CAPM approach for the 
calculation of the cost of equity of the unlisted firm. His 
argument includes the following observations: 
1. In the RSA beta's for different firms on the JSE are calcu-
lated and compiled by the Bureau fo Financial Analysis at 
Pretoria University. 
2. Refer to section 5.4.4.2 for an explanation of these symbols. 
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10.2.1 RESIDUAL (UNSYSTEMATIC) RISK 
The CAPM assumes the presence of perfect capital markets. 
Under this as well as other assumptions the required return 
on equity is determined by the company's systematic risk. 
When these assumptions are relaxed, we take account of real 
world conditions. Consequently the residual risk of a firm 
may take on a significant degree of importance. Theassump-
tion of the CAPM, as will be remembered, is that residual 
(unsystematic) risk can be completely diversified away, 
leaving only systematic risk (van Horne 1983:215). 
The unlisted firm, most of them having their eggs ln one 
basket, does not live up to this assumption and will conse-
quently have substantial residual risk. The total risk of 
the firm thus becomes a factor of concern. Stated dif-
ferently, the probability of the firm going bankrupt depends 
on the total variability of its cash flows. Thus the greater 
the residual risk of a company, the greater the expected 
bankrupcy costs to be incurred, h~lding systematic risk con-
stant. As a result, investors will demand a higher required 
rate of return for a company than that dictated by its sys-
tematic risk alone. 
Therefore, the required rate of return given by the CAPM 
needs to be adjusted upwards by some arbitrary percentage if 
this factor is to be taken into account. 
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10.2.2 DIFFERENT CAPITAL STRUCTURES 
If it happens that the proxy company has a capital structure 
different to that of the unlisted company which proposes to 
use its beta, (i.e. more or less leverage), the beta will 
have to be adjusted (van Horne 1983:194). 
Van Horne recommends that the beta for the proxy firm first 
be estimated in the absence of leverage and that this figure 
then be adjusted for the proportion of leverage the unlisted 
firm wishes to employ. The overall required rate of return 
for a company would then be comprised of the risk free rate 
i, plus a premium for business risk, (rm - i) bju and a 
premium for financial risk. 
This is depicted as follows: 
rj = 






i + (rm - i) bju[l + b/s(l - t)l 
required return (including a premium for 
business risk and one for financial risk) 
risk free rate 
return on the market portfolio 
the beta measuring the responsiveness of the 
excess return for the security (returns for 
the security less risk free rate) in the ab-
sence o£leverage to the excess returns for 
the market portfolio (returns for the market 






If rj is now the required rate of return for the proxy com-
pany with a beta (bj) of 1.4 and a bls ratio of .6 and the 
unlisted company has a bls ratio of .3 the following proce-
dure should be used. 







[1 + b/s(l - t)] 
1,4 
[1 + 0,6(0,5)] 
1,08 
Adjust the unlevered beta to comply the total risk of 
the unlisted firm: 
Adjusted bj = 
= 
= 
bju[l + b/s(l - t) 
1,08[1 + 0,3(0,5)] 
1,24 
Mechanically this is a satisfactory approach for overcoming 
financial risk. However, it does nothing to solve the previ-
ous mentioned problem of residual risk. 
A further difficulty considered by van Horne relates to a 
'liquidity premium', a matter raised by Weston and Brigham 
(1987 :579) themselves. 
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10.2.3 LIQUIDITY PREMIUM 
A highly liquid asset is one that can be sold and thus con-
verted to spendable cash on short notice. Actual markets, 
which provide liquidity, exist for government securities, 
the shares and debentures of large companles and the 
securities of certain financial intermediaries. If a 
security is not liquid, investors will add a liquidity 
premium when they establish the market interest rate on the 
security (Weston and Brigham 1987 : 71). 
The shares of unlisted firms are not traded in the markets 
and are accordingly relatively illiquid. Accordingly, the 
authors indicate that a 'liquidity premium' should be added 
to reflect the illiquidity of the small unlisted firm. They 
acknowledge that it is very difficul t to objectively assess 
liquidity premiums, but observe that a differential of at 
least 1 and probably 2 percentage points exists between the 
least liquid and the most liquid financial assets of similar 
default risk and maturity. 
10.3 CONCLUSIONS 
· Although the utilization of the CAP M to calculate the cost 
of equity of the small firm seems at first sight to be con-
ceptually appealing, it in fact presents formidable 
obstacles: 
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* it is doubtful whether the greater percentage of small 
businessmen, would be able to comprehend the CAPM with 
all its ramifications and adaptations; 
* even if they were to master the theory of the model, a 
number of matters are of an extremely arbitrary nature. 
For example, how many percentage points should the re-
quired rate of return be adjusted upwards for relative 
degrees of residual risk that could lead to bankruptcy. 
The same can be said for the liquidity premium, and 
* identification of an approximate proxy firm is not an 
easy matter in South Africa as many potential proxy 
firms are subsidiaries within large conglomerates which 
do not necessarily seek to optimize the financial 
structure of each subsidiary in isolation. 
The small businessman furthermore finds himself very much in 
a real world situation where capital markets are imperfect 
and taxes and transaction costs are very real. These and 
other assumptions of the CAPM makes it unfit to calculate 
the cost of equity of the unlisted firm. 
As was pointed out in chapter five the cost of equity in the 
large firm represents the values of investor's opportunity 
expectations. It is however unlike the small firm, quantifi-
able, although the method (the Gordon model) is questionable 
and subject to a multitude of assumptions. 
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In rejecting the CAPM for the purpose under consideration, 
alternative approaches need to be explored. Since oppor-
tunity cost is regarded as a valid criterion in financial 
literature for measuring the value of the firm it warrants 
closer scrutiny. 
10.4 OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
Solomon (1963:52-54) considered two approaches to this 
problem viz the 'personal use' approach and the 'external 
yield' approach. 
10.4.1 THE PERSONAL USE APPROACH 
This approach examlnes 
would put the retained 
the use to which the shareholder 
earnings had he received it in 
dividends. It consequently concerns the rate at which inves-
tors are assumed to be able to reinvest their dividends. 
Freear (1980:133) observes that the problem with this ap-
proach is that shareholders are very different from one 
another in their attitudes and the time patterns of their 
consumption. Apart from this they have different tax rates. 
, High rate income tax payers would tend to prefer lower tax 
capital gains which would not necessarily be the case among 
low or even zero rate income tax payers. 
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The personal use approach is thus considered to be impracti-
cal for the purpose of calculating the cost of equity and 
will not be dealt with further. 
The second approach concerns the external yield that could 
be earned in the market. 
10.4.2 THE EXTERNAL YIELD APPROACH 
In the 'external yield' approach Solomon (1963:52-55) sug-
gested that the assumption should be made that shareholders 
would invest the money, if released to them, in alternative 
risk securities in the market. Therefore the minimum rate 
would be the rate at which the firm could reinvest the money 
on their behalf in other firms' secur ities. 
This approach suffers from the disadvantage that it offers a 
minimum required rate of return rather than an accurate 
measure of the best alternative to internal investment. Fur-
thermore individual shareholders may well have opportunities 
which exceed the rate that could be earned by the company 
externally (Freear 1980 :133). This statement by Freear ac-
tivates the following question: Is the small businessman 
aware of better external investment opportunitie~ of similar 
risk? 
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Scheurkogel (1971 :291) refers to Meij and Willems 
(1966:156) who suggest that the biggest problem here is the 
determination of the external yield or 'lending rate,3 and 
secondly the quantification of the inherent risk. These two 
factors, they assert, will differ from person to person, 
from project to project, from firm to firm and from one 
period to another. 
This criticism makes sense for the unlisted firm in that 
different utility preferences among small businessmen will 
naturally give rise to different degrees of risk aversity 
that will again result In different capitalization rates. 
In order to avoid the problems put forward by Meij and Wil-
lems, Scheffer (1968:107-112) proposed a variant of the 
'external yield' approach. 
10.4.3 'AVERAGE FIRM'S EARNINGS YIELD' IN THE INDUSTRY 
BRANCH 
The 'external yield' or 'lending rate' is seen by Scheffer 
as the 'investment opportunity rate' which he equates to the 
average earnings yield achieved over a sufficiently long 
. period by a similar representative undertaking in the same 
branch of industry, provided it is efficiently managed. 
3. Scheurkogel (1971:293) also describes the 'external yield' but 
calls it the 'lending rate'. 
312 
This is by interpretation the earn1ngs yield of the 'model' 
undertaking in a specific branch of industry. This average 
must serve as a criterion against which all undertakings 1n 
that branch of industry should use to compare their internal 
rate of return. 
Scheffer notes two advantages to this approach: 
1. This approach to the cost of capital concept does away 
with the implicit assumption embodied 1n the NPV 
method, namely that all cash flows are reinvested at 
the cost of capital. 
Scheffer's approach consequently assumes reinvestment 
at the internal rate of return. 
2. The second advantage Scheffer notes is that this ap-
proach also provides the business that lacks a listing 
on the stock exchange with a cost of capital that is 
very real in value. 
Scheurkogel (1971:292) refers to Meij and Willems (1966:157) 
who on the other hand, question the concept of a representa-
tive undertaking. This according to them, is not easy to es-
tablish. They furthermore feel that there is absolutely no 
reason why any undertaking in a specific branch of industry 
should aim to attain a yield equal to that of a so-called 
representative undertaking in the same industry. It is fur-
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thermore felt that a representative yield is without any 
real significance since the problem at hand is centered 
around the significance of the project for the specific un-
dertaking involved. 
Finally Meij and Willems make the conclusion and valid point 
that Scheffer implicitly denies the fact that differences in 
capital structures between a firm and the so called repre-
sentative firm will compel the management of the former to 
look for different yield targets: firms with relatively 
higher debt ratios will have a relatively higher cost of 
capital because of greater inherent risk and vice versa. 
It will be useful to list certain additional aspects that 
have been overlooked by Scheffer: 
Firm Size 
This point concerns the fact that not all small under-
takings in the same branch of industry are of the same 
relative 'size,.4 Brigham and Smith (1967:10) state 
that in respect of cost of equity the usual argument is 
that the required rate of earnings should be higher for 
small firms, not only because they are more risky but 
also because they are less liquid. The small business 
----------- -------- -




must therefore require a higher return to compensate 
for the fact that it is much more difficult to liqui-
date its investment. 
As will be remembered a liquidity premium was also sug-
gested by Weston and Brigham for the small firm under 
discussion of the CAPM. 
Industry Averages 
The unfortunate fact exists that industry averages are 
not freely available in the RSA. This means that a so 
called 'target yield' will be difficult and costly to 
establish. 
Distortion of Reported Profits 
Reported profits of many unlisted firms are understated 
because of apparantly exceSSlve salaries and 
withdrawals by the owners, motivated primarily by per-
sonal tax considerations (Brigham and Smith 1967 :11). 
The reported profit position of such a firm can there-
fore not serve as a true criterion to be measured 
against 'the average earnings yield' propagated by 
Scheffer. 
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Another aspect that will tend to affect the real opportunity 
cost of the unlisted firm is what can be called 'non 
economic satisfactions.' It seems to be such an important 
aspect in the cost of capital composition of the small firm 
that it warrants an in depth investigation. 
10.4.4 NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS - AN OPPORTUNITY COST 
10.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Brigham (1967:114) highlights non economic satisfactions as 
an important aspect in the composition of the cost of equity 
capital for the small business. This aspect, he claims, ac-
tually tends to lower the effective cost of equity for such 
a business. 
control is one "non economic satisfaction" identified by 
him. He asserts that the ability to buy control with a rela-
tively small investment may reduce the cost of equity. He 
furnishes an example as to how advantages of 'working for 
oneself' can be translated into cost of capital terms: 
"Suppose alternative investments each require an outlay 
of R25 000. The first consist of the shares of a large, 
listed company on which the investor expects a return 
of 10 per cent consisting of dividends and capital 
ga1ns. 
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The second consists of all the shares ina small busi-
ness, and on this the investor expects an 8 per cent 
return consisting of dividends, capital appreciation 
and incremental salary. Is it not possible that a ra-
tional well informed investor might choose the latter 
in spite of its lower expected returns, greater risk, 
and much lower liquidity, simply in order to be his own 
boss? If this is so, and this feeling is strong among 
many investors, then it is possible that the cost of 
capital could be lowered for certain smaller firms." 
Brigham (1967:115) warns that this theory should not be 
pushed too far. He says that although owner/managers may be 
willing to invest their own funds at a lower return, it 1S 
most unreasonable to believe that the owner/manager himself 
would be willing to accept marginal returns on unlimited 
increments of investment. 
Conradie (1982: 36) considered a study by Boswell (1973:5) 
who concurs with Brigham concerning the above theory. He 
notes that the small businessman's financial motives are of-
ten subject to this want for independance. 
The allegation that the required rate of return to the owner 
of the small business is a function not only of economic 
reward but also of non economic satisfactions was 1nves-
tigated further by Boyer (1978:76-77) in a study on cost of 
capital of the small firm. The author made an effort to 
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determine the non economic factors which provide these 
satisfactions. Her point of departure was summed up as fol-
lows (Boyer 1978 : 76 - 77). 
"A small businessman has an outside opportunity which 
would return 12 per cent on his investment. If he con-
tinues to own the small business, his monetary rewards 
on investment will be approximately 8 per cent, yet he 
chooses to continue ownership. What is suggested is 
that some of the required return is not of a monetary 
nature. There are behavioural circumstances which cause 
the 8 per cent monetary return to suffice, to be valued 
at least equally to the outside return of 12 per cent. 
This implies that owners are motivated, by other forces 
than money and rejects the economic man concept of Adam 
Smit~- as being applicable to the small business 
owner." 
In order to isolate the behavioural circumstances which per-
mit a substandard financial return to suffice Boyer 
(1974:77-90) reviewed a number of motivational approaches. 
5~ Adam Smith's 'economic man' concept states that man is a maxi-
mizer i.e. men, whether they are engaged in producing or in 
distributing th~ fruits of production, seek to gain as much 
wealth or pleasure as they can (Heilbronner and Thurow 1975 
: 34) . 
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10.4.4.2 MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES 
Initially Boyer (1974:77-90) researched the theories of Mas-
low (1964:6-19) and Hertzberg, Mausner and Snyderman (1959). 
Maslow suggested that there are different levels of needs 
which act as motivators namely physiological, safety, so-
cial, esteem and self-actualization. These needs are ar-
ranged in order of prepotency; when one is satisfied the 
next level becomes the motivating force. Of these needs the 
most vital are the physiological one's relating to the 
desire for food, water and sexual activity. Safety and 
security needs concern protection against threat danger and 
deprivation. Esteem and ego needs include esteem from others 
like prestige, status and recognition as well as self esteem 
like confidence, achievement and knowledge. The need for 
self-actualization is best described by what a man can be 
and must be, it concerns the realization of self potential. 
Hertzberg, et al. (1959) formulated the motivation-hygiene 
concept. Hygiene factors could be identified by supervision, 
interpersonal relationships, physical working conditions, 
salary benefits and job security. If these factors 
deteriorate to a point below the acceptable level of the 
employee he becomes dissatisfied. On the other hand, if 
these factors are increased the dissatisfaction will be 
eliminated but the employee will not be motivated. Only 
motivational factors like recognition, achievement, advance-
319 
ment, responsibility, potential for growth and challenging 
work will lead to positive attitudes. The reason being that 
the latter factors satisfy the individuals need for self ac-
tualization. 
Boyer (1974:79) concluded that the two theories (Maslow's 
and Hertzberg's, et al.) were not conflicting in terms of 
the types of needs that individuals perceive. Hygiene fac-
tors are similar to physiological safety and social needs 
whereas motivational factors correspond to the needs for es-
teem and self actualization. 
The difference in the theories rather rests in the motiva-
tional aspect of the needs. Maslow alleges that any un-
satisfied need can be a motivator and furthermore that once 
a need is fulfilled the next higher becomes the motivator. 
According to Hertzberg, et al. only motivational factors can 
motivate while adverse hygiene factors act as preventatives. 
Boyer (1974:79) furthermore asserts that her study on the 
cost of equity capital is more concerned with the existence 
and strength of these needs rather than their emergence as 
,motivators: disagreement over the role of the lower level 
needs would not alter the analysis of them as providing be-
havioural reward to the owner of a small business. 
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Boyer's next step was to determine which needs act most to 
motivate owner-managers of small firms. However, it was es-
tablished that no specific study had been made of motivation 
of persons in this particular role . Consequently it was 
decided to review works which might be applicable to these 
individuals, although they were not the subjects in the 
studies. 
The first research project studied was the need hierarchy 
concept by Porter (1962 375-384) relating to job at-
titudes. Porter proposed five levels of needs: 
1. security (related to aspects of the job); 
2. social; 
3. esteem; 
4. autonomy (related to authority, independant thought and 
participative decision-making) and 
5. self actualization. 
Porter found that job level influenced the extent to which 
needs are fulfilled. He found that higher level management 
received more fulfillment of the higher level needs for 
autonomy and self actualization than did middle management. 
In a second study Porter (1961 : 1-10) ascertained that the 
fulfilment of needs for security esteem and autonomy genera-
ted less satisfaction for lower level management than for 
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middle management. In yet a third study Porter (1963 : 386-
397) found that company Slze did not significantly impact on 
job satisfaction. 
A study was also made by Boyer of the work done by Greunfeld 
(1962 : 303-314) on the importance of job characteristics to 
industrial supervisors. The characteristics are ranked 
decreasing in order of importance: 
1. greater opportunity for advancement; 
2. better opportunity for education and self development; 
3. more opportunity to see concrete results of my own 
work; 
4. a higher degree of personal responsibility; 
5. more opportunity for independant action; 
6. more opportunity to lead and develop subordinates; 
7. greater job security; 
8. more opportunity for close association with higher 
level management; 
9. higher wages; 
10. more prestige within the company; 
11. more frequent and closer contact with workers; 
12. more power and authority; 
13. fewer people to please, less criticism; 
14. fewer worries, tensions and troubles; 
15. better fringe benefits; 
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16. less need for dealing directly with workers; 
17. more definite and regular working hours and 
18. safer, cleaner, less fatiguing work. 
Boyer (1974:82) concluded that relative to Hertzberg's 
theory the first hygiene factor encountered was number 
seven; above that all are motivational . . The most important 
items appeared to be higher level motivators, whereas the 
least important items appeared to be hygiene factors. The 
importance of higher level motivational factors in manage-
ment positions, Boyer decided, was therefore confirmed. 
Boyer (1974:82) then considered a study by Ghiselli (1963: 
631-642) on managers in different countries. Ghiselli iso-
lated one common factor that prevailed. This factor was the 
greater importance of the needs of self actualization and 
autonomy than prestige, social acceptance or security needs. 
Ghisellis' common denominator of higher level motivational 
. factors in management positions also emerged in a study by 
Vroom (1964) on work and motivation. Vroom concluded that: 
* 
* 
the level of performance varied directly with the 
strength of need for achievement, particularly with a 
challenging task; 
individuals performed at a higher level if they 
believed that the task required abilities which they 
valued (self esteem) and 
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* persons who were permitted to participate in decision 
making performed at a higher level than those who were 
not (Boyer 1974:82). 
Boyer (1974:83) firstly concluded that all the empirical 
results examined verified the motivational potency of higher 
level needs in managerial ranks. It was then assumed by 
Boyer that although none of the studies deal specifically 
with owners, the concept would also be valid for owner/ 
managers. Indeed, Boyer suggested that these needs were even 
more relevant for owner/managers because of a greater op-
portunity for their fulfilment. They would accordingly be 
prepared to accept a lesser monetary return than could be 
obtained through outside investment where ownership and 
management were separate. It is therefore suggested by Boyer 
that the cost of equity capital is a function not only of 
monetary return but also of what is termed behavioural 
reward (fulfilment of higher level needs such as achievement 
and self esteem). 














In order to verify this relationship the need to make be-
havioural reward more specific appeared to be obvious. This, 
it was decided, could be accomplished through enumeration of 
specific operating characteristics of the small business 
which might provide satisfaction and motivate continued in-
vestment in small business. 
10.4.4.3 THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF THE OWNER-MANAGER 
Boyer (1974:84) postulated that the environment in which an 
owner/manager operates differs from that of an outside 
owner: the owner manager 1S operationally oriented not only 
to himself, but also toward the firm and the community in 





OF OUTSIDE OWNER 
COMMUNITY 
The outside owner is identified as an entity which is 
separate from the firm and could even be seperate from the 
community. Boyer suggests that the following four 'aspects' 
descriptively lable the operating environment of the 
owner/manager as it differs from that of the outside owner: 
1. In the small business , the owner manager function as 
both manager and worker. This dual function allows con-
trol over his economic environment. The owner/manager 
furthermore holds job continuity at his option. These 
relevant needs are economic in nature and consequently 
it was decided to refer to the needs as self economic. 
2. The position of the owner/manager is essentially dic-
tated by the size of the firm and his share of owner-
ship. Boyer concluded that these two factors could be 
related to status motivation and specifically one's es-
timation of one's self. 
3. Because of the role that the manager fulfills within 
the firm he must be regarded as a decision maker. This 
decision making role creates a number of motivational 
opportunities in terms of need for ' achievement (as 
researched inter alia by Miner (1973 146-158), 
McClelland (1961) and Likert (1961) which are not 
available to the outside owners. 
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4. Based on a study by Roth, Ferrari and Ryans (1971:5-6) 
on the impact of social responsibility on the jobs of 
financial managers, Boyer states that the owner/manager 
will, as a representative of the firm, strive for so-
cial accomplishment in the community. 
10.4.4.4 AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Boyer (1974:90) based her empirical approach for determining 
behavioural rewards on the foregoing four factors, restated 
as follows : 
1. self economic (control over income and job security); 
2. self ego (pride in ownership and being one's own boss); 
3. firm executive (leadership and participation in deci-
sion making) and 
4. community (esteem by members of community and contribu-
tion to growth). 
A questionnaire was structured around these factors and the 
results are reflected below: 
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i) Establishment of Current and Expected Future Return on 
Investment. 
As a reference point it was first necessary to establish a 
platform of exisitng and expected future financial rewards 
of the owner/managers included in the study. These results 
are reflected in Table 10.1: 
Current 
< 4 % 
4-8 % 
8-12 % 
12 - 16 % 
16-20 % 
TABLE 10.1 
PRESENT AND EXPECTED FUTURE RETURNS ON EQUITY 
(PER CENT OF RESPONDENTS IN EACH CATEGORY) 
Future 







. over 20% 6,7% 
Source: Boyer (1974:92) 
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(Failure to respond to one or both questions 13,4 per cent.) 
It is striking that 73 per cent of the respondents expected 
future rates of returns to be about the same as current 
returns. Only 13,3 per cent believed that the rate of return 
would increase. 
ii) Returns from Possible Outside Investments 
Apart from questions on present and future returns, returns 
from possible outside investments were queried in an attempt 
to approximate an opportunity cost. 
Only 35,5 per cent of the owners stated that they believed 
that investments outside the firm offered higher monetary 
returns. Further questioning elicited the first of many be-
haviourally oriented responses: 37 per cent of the owners 
stated that regardless of the outside returns they would not 
consider alternative investments. Another 32 per cent stated 
they would switch investments only at a very high return: 
over 20 per cent. Boyer (1974:93) observes by reference to 
the results in Table 10.1 that only 10 per cent of the study 
owner/managers ever expected their returns to reach that 
figure. These responses, she concludes clearly confirm the 
theory that non monetary returns influence the actions of 
the owners. 
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iii) Relative Importance of Behavioural Factors Relating to 
Ownership Environment 
The factors appearing in Table 10.2 were proposed as being 
important to the owner of a small firm. It was not expected 
that all characteristics would be equally motivating for all 
owners. Satisfaction could vary based on the number and 
roles of owners in management and on the length of time of 
ownership. 
Two determinations for each factor were sought viz. whether 
the factor has any importance at all and if so its general 
strength of importance for small business owners. Table 
10.2 clearly shows the importance of these operating charac-
teristics of the owner manager environment. 
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TABLE 10.2 
IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS AS MEASURED BY PER CENT OF OWNERS FOR 
EACH RESPONSE 
DEGREEOF~ DEGREEOF~ ME!\N SUM S'll\NDARD 
l. r-filERATELY l. r-filERATELY OF DEVIATICN 
2. SLIGHI'LY 2. SLICRI'LY ME!\NS 
3. VERY 3. VERY 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
I can play a 
part in planning 63,3 20 16,7 1,53 ,78 
am rontrolling 
. ~ decisions 
~~ 
3,53 
I mId a 
leadership 56,7 6,7 26,7 3,3 3,3 3,3 2,00 1,36 
position 
I can J::e ny 
0NI1 ross 50 6,7 33,3 10 2,23 1,57 
~ 
3,90 
I take pride 
. ~ 
in running 66,7 13,3 13,3 3,3 3,3 1,67 1,18 
U) ny 0NI1 
hlsiness 
I kn<:w that 




I rontrol ny 
.. ~ incx::xre by ny 63,3 6,7 16,7 3,3 3,3 6,7 1,97 1,54 
U) 0NI1 actions 
Marters of ny 
a::rrm.mityre- 23,3 6,7 16,7 20 33,3 3,45 2,03 
ccgnize IT¥ 
position in Il¥ 
firm am hold 
me in esteem 
because of 
~ it 
! 5,92 I feel that I am rontril::u-
ling to the 36,7 20 23,3 10,0 10 2,47 1,57 
gravth of the 
a::rrm.mi ty 
Source : Boyer (1974 :94) 
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Table 10.2 reveals that participation in planning and con-
trolling decisions was rated as most important by all 
owners. Second was pride. Boyer (1974:93) points out that 
these results confirm that motivation toward fulfilment of 
higher level needs is most pertinent. 
Respondents also found a motivating force in the desire to 
be responsible for their businesses, and to achieve success 
in them. Also rated as important was control over owner in-
come. Respondents seemed more willing to accept lower profit 
knowing that they were directly responsible for it. 
Boyer observes that when community related needs, which 
seemed to be the least important, are eliminated, the rating 
of importance seems to give rankings similar to those of 
Maslow: economic needs are less important than ego or status 
needs and these in turn are less important than factors that 
provide potential fulfillment of the need for self ac-
tualization. 
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iv) Sacrificing Percentage Return on Investment for Non 
Monetary, Operating Factors 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would 
sacrifice large, moderate, small or no returns on investment 
for behavioural reward. Table 10.3 indicates that owners 
were very willing to sacrifice return on investment in order 
to achieve behavioural reward. 
TABLE 10.3 
SACRIFICE FOR BEHAVIOURAL REWARD 
(PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WILLING TO SACRIFICE RATE OF RETURN 
ON INVESTMENT 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACIDR LARGE M:IDERATE SMALL NONE MEAN MEAN 
CATE)3)RY 1 2 3 4 SUM 
I can be my own 
boss 17,2 20,7 27,5 34,4 2,70 
Self Ego 5,43 
I take pride in 
running my own 
business 10,4 27,5 31,0 31,0 2,73 
I can play a part 
in planning and 
controlling 
decisions 13,8 24,1 17,2 43,7 2,83 
Firm Executive 5,70 
I hold a leader-
ship position 13,8 17,2 27,S 40,5 2,87 
I control my in-
come by my own 
actions 20,7 20,7 27,5 31,0 2,60 
Self Economic 5,83 
I know that my 
job is secure 6,9 17,2 10,4 64,3 3,23 
I feel that I am 
contributing to 
the growth of the 
corrrnunity 0,0 27,5 31,0 40,3 3,03 
Corrrnunity 6,56 
Members of my 
corrrnunity recog-
nize my position 
in my firm and 
hold me in esteem 
because of it 3,4 3,4 17,2 74,6 3,53 












According to Table 10.3 top down the ranking of behavioural 
factors as measured by the mean of degree of sacrifice 





I control my 
I can be my 
I take pride 
I can play 
sions; 
income by my own actions; 
own boss; 
ln running my own business; 
a part in planning and controlling 
5. I hold a leadership position; 
deci-
6. I feel that I am contributing to the growth of the com-
munity; 
7. I know that my job is secure and 
8. members of my community recognize my position ln the 
firm and hold me in esteem because of it. 
Boyer also encountered a strenuous resistance amongst 
respondents when it was suggested that they work elsewhere 
and allow someone else to manage the business. 
Questions were also asked regarding willingness to accept an 
incremental salary by switching to paid employment. 
Table 10.4 depicts the outcome of these questions. 
334 
TABLE 10.4 
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OPPORTUNITY SALARY 
WOULD TAKE JOB ELSEWHERE FOR THE FOLLOWING MINI- PER CENT 
MUM CHANGE IN ANNUAL SALARY RESPONDENTS 
No change 6,9 
Increase of $0 to $2 500 0,0 
Increase of $2 501 to $5 000 10,4 
Increase of $5 001 to $7 500 3,4 
Increase of $7 501 to $10 000 0,0 
Increase of over $10 000 13,8 
I would not leave under any circumstances 65,3 
99,8 
Source: Boyer (1974 : 103) 
A willingness to sacrifice in terms of salary is quite ap-
parant in Table 10.4. No less than 65,3 per cent of the 
owners would not change jobs no matter how lucrative the 
salary offer made. 
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· 10.4.4.5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
Boyer concluded that the research results strongly support 
the contention that the cost of equity for the small busi-
ness is not only a function of required rate of return of a 
financial nature, but also of returns consisting only of 
psychological rewards or those behavioural in nature. 
In the light of her findings she evolved the following for-
mula: 
ke = RoEo - RoEs 
where: ke is cost of equity 
RoEo 1S opportunity return on owners investment 
RoEs is return of a non monetary or behavioural nature 
According to the author there is however, a limit to the 
size of the behavioural return. She makes the rather logical 
deduction that the overall cost of capital in the long run 
cannot fall below the weighted cost of debt or the owner 
will soon experience financial difficulties by accepting 
projects that are debt financed and on which he is unable to 
meet the interest payments. Given this limit on the overall 
cost of capital the minimum cost of equity will be zero. The 
behavioural sacrifice is limited then to a maximum of the 
opportunity return. 
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Boyer further implied that RoEo - RoEs = RoE~when RoE~ rep-
resents monetary return actually received. 
It 1S further implied that RoE~ = ke. It 1S pointed out 
however, that the formula ke = RoEo - RoEs 1S preferable 
since it eliminates salary interplay. It cannot be assumed 
1n RoE= that all other things are equal. An owner might only 
be allowing himself a subsistence salary or he may take a 
large one plus travelling expenses and entertainment al-
lowances. Unless these factors can be equalized RoE~ might 
not be comparable from firm to firm. The use of the first 
equation (ke = RoEo - RoEs) consequently eliminates this 
problem. 
10.5 EVALUATION 
Like the CAPM the 'opportunity cost' approach to the quan-
tification of an appropriate capitalization or discount rate 
presents some formidable obstacles. 
Firms in the same industry are not necessarily comparable. 
Their relative sizes differ as well as their capital struc-
tures. Firms with larger debt ratios are necessarily more 
risky, and consequently require a higher capitalization rate 
than ones with smaller debt ratios. These firms are usually 
also less liquid than firms with smaller debt ratios. 
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A further complicating factor 1S that of distortion of 
profits viz that not one of two firms have the same 
withdrawal system concerning salaries and profits. All these 
limitations make it extremely difficult to quantify the in-
herent risk of any alternative investment 1n the process of 
quantifying an appropriate opportunity cost. 
A final factor to complicate the opportunity cost approach 
concerns the fact that owner/manager's of unlisted small 
firms seem to have significant behavioural satisfactions 
that lower the cost of equity or opportunity cost but which 
are not quantifiable on a standa r dized basis since it 
depends totally on the utility values of the different 
owners concerned. 
10.6 SUMMARY 
The importance of an appropriate discount rate, to gauge 
whether proposed investments will increase or decrease the 
value of the firm, was stressed at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
The problem of the discount rate centres mainly around the 
establishment of the cost of equity capital, which forms a 
component of the weighted average cost of capital. 
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The CAPM is suggested inter alia in literature to overcome 
this problem. According to this approach it is suggested 
that the beta of a proxy company on the stock exchange be 
taken to serve as beta for the firm ln question. This beta 
is then used ln the CAPM model in order to calculate the 
cost of equity of the particular unlisted firm under men-
tion. This approach however, presents some formidable 
obstacles in that small unlisted firms usually have much 
more unsystematic risk than the proxy company to account 
for. The unlisted firm could furthermore have a different 
capital structure which could increase or decrease its ris-
kiness relative to that of the proxy firm. It was also been 
shown that small firms usually are less liquid than larger 
firms. All these factors will, because of their impact on 
risk, necessitate a change in the beta. 
Although van Horne supplies a formula that might accommodate 
changes in the beta relative to changes in the capital 
structures of the proxy firm and the unlisted firm the ques-
tion of differences in unsystematic risk and liquidity 
presents severe problems of risk quantification. 
A second approach propogated by literature is the oppor-
tunity cost approach. Scheffer proposes an opportunity cost 
that equals that of a 'model' undertaking in the industry. 
The problem however is how to identify the model undertak-
ing. In this context some authors feel that the problem 
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rather centres around the significance of the project for 
the specific undertaking involved rather than a representa-
tive yield. 
It is furthermore a fact that excessive but tax efficient 
withdrawals of profits and salaries in firms can distort 
profits to such an extent that opportunity figures are in-
validated. 
A final objection to the comparison of firms in the same in-
dustry ln order to quantify an opportunity cost centres 
around the fact that different firms have different capital 
structures and liquidity. These facts as we have seen, lead 
to different capitalization or discount rates. 
It has finally been shown that there are significant be-
havioural or 'non economic' satisfactions derived by the 
small businessman in his capacity as owner/manager of his 
own firm that tend to reduce his cost of equity. 
All these problems complicate the establishment of an ap-
propriate cost of equity. 
It therefore seems that in the absence of listing business 
enterprises have no option but to adopt related or even ap-
parently unrelated objectives for use in investment decision 
making. 
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In chapter eleven a normative model, the elements of which 
are derived from the material already considered, will be 
constructed. The purpose is to compare this model against 
the investment decision making profile of small businesses 
in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg areas. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
AN INVESTMENT DECISION MODEL 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to determine the investment 
decision making profile of small businesses in the Durban-
Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg (DPP) areas and to compare that 
profile against a normative model for investment decision 
making by unlisted firms. 
The elements of such a model are derived from the material 
already considered. However, some preliminary comments con-
cerning the DCF methods and risk are necessary. 
11.2 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) METHODS IN PRACTICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Despite some limita~ions DCF methods are conceptually sound 
and their use reflects well on the level of management 
sophistication. Evidence from empirical studies, however, 
reveals that relatively few listed companies employ the most 
, appropriate DCF method viz the net present value method. It 
was furthermore established by Lambrechts (1976:27-31) that 
those investment decision makers in listed firms in South 
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Africa who do use DCF methods, generally do not link their 
utilization to the normative objective of the firm which is 
wealth maximization. 
As regards unlisted firms, research both in South Africa and 
abroad has revealed that they tend to be relatively un-
sophisticated in their investment decision making. Few make 
any attempt whatsoever to utilize DCF methods. However, this 
should not be surprising. If listed firms, many of which are 
multi million Rand concerns employing skilled financial ex-
ecutives have difficulty in mastering DCF techniques it 
seems unreasonable to expect unlisted small firms to do so. 
Furthermore, DCF techniques have a bias towards listed firms 
in that they are accommodated by a formal market for their 
shares. This formal market facilitates the computation of an 
appropriate discount rate, without which DCF techniques can-
not be correctly applied. The unlisted firm is accordingly 
unable to utilize DCF techniques in a theoretically correct 
manner. 
In light of the above, a normative model for investment 
decision making in the unlisted firm cannot rest on a DCF 
foundation: the objective of wealth maximization lies at the 
heart of the IRR and NPV approaches taken as a whole and the 
unlisted firm technically cannot pursue this elusive objec-
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tive in ~ts investment decision making. And indeed there is 
considerable doubt as to whether it ought to, given the ele-
ments of risk with which it must contend. 
11.3 RISK FOR THE UNLISTED FIRM 
The problems that work together in order to compound the 
risk of the unlisted firm have been discussed in earlier 
chapters. In order to construct an appropriate normative in-
vestment decision making model for the unlisted firm it is 
necessary to recall them briefly: 
* the unlisted small firm is relatively less liquid than 
the listed firm; 
* the unlisted small firm is inclined to make liberal use 




the unlisted small firm is usually not diversified and 
the equity base of the unlisted small firm is initially 
low. 
The above points suggest a high risk profile for the un-
listed firm. Faced with the prospect of ruin in the event of 
, an investment not yielding a positive cash flow quickly 
enough to alleviate liquidity pressures there is no doubt 
that investment decisions ought to be taken with the utmost 
caution. Investments which are unlikely to damage liquidity 
or stretch reliance on outside funds should be favoured over 
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those which offer higher returns but threaten survival. The 
investments made must of course also be profitable, other-
wise the firm will perish in any event. A satisficing profit 
must therefore remain in the normative model which needs to 
give prominence to aspects of both liquidity and leverage. 
11.4 A NORMATIVE INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING MODEL FOR 
THE UNLISTED FIRM 
An emphasis on liquidity and limited leverage must neces-
sarily shift the normative decision making model for the un-
listed firm away from the accepted conventional DCF methods. 
Indeed as point of departure, the model specifies some prac-
tical and pertinent objectives, in the form of decision 
rules which inter alia screen out those investments which 
would significantly increase the risk of insolvency. 
11.4.1 PROHIBITIVE CONDITIONS 
11.4.1.1 RISK OF INSOLVENCY 
Projects that, should they fail, wi ll force the firm into 
, 
bankruptcy should be avoided. The mere possibility of in-
digestable losses being incurred wil l thus · render a par-
ticular investment alternative unacceptable. 
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11.4.1.2 UTILIZATION OF SHORT TERM DEBT 
Under no circumstances should the unlisted firm make use of 
short term debt funds in order to finance long term invest-
ments. Non adherence to this rule could, in the event of non 
extension of short term debt facilities, lead to financial 
embarrassment or even insolvency. 
Although this appears to be a financing rather than an in-
vestment issue, there may well be investment alternatives of 
such magnitude (relative to the resources of the firm) which 
require funds beyond the long term debt raising capacity of 
the firm. The temptation to use more easily obtainable short 
term funds can be overcome simply by avoiding the invest-
ment. 
11.4.1.3 DEBT RATIO 
A 'moderate' debt ratio should be maintained at all times. 
An exact ratio cannot be stipulated since it is bound to 
vary from industry to industry. Industries where cash flows 
and profits are relatively certain, such as certain sections 
of the food industry can afford relatively large debt 
ratios. In this respect professional advice would need to be 
sought from people conversant with the industry. The firm's 
auditor can certainly be consulted , in order to determine 
what might be regarded as 'moderate'. ' 
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11.4.2 THE REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
Where both debt and equity are used in the financing of an 
investment, the decision maker needs to be conscious of the 
fact that there is an overall cost of financing to be con-
sidered which includes a cost of equity. The equity and debt 
elements would need to be weighted by the amo~nts involved 
in order to arrive at an overall weighted cost of capital. 
An estimation of this cost is imperative since it will, as 
the required rate, be compared against projected returns of 
the investment alternatives. 
In estimating the cost of equity the controlling owners 
would need to monitor the returns on realistic, equal risk, 
investment alternatives outside the firm. Opportunity cost 
is thus the basic determinant of the cost of equity. If debt 
is used, its after tax cost would need to be determined. 
11.4.3 FINANCING MIX 
A comprehensive understanding of the component cost of capi-
tal and the overall cost of capital is a prerequisite for 
the understanding of a target capital structure. The deci-
sion maker should be aware of the fact that there exists a 
level of financing which represents an optimum mix between 
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debt and equity. This optimum level he should comprehend 
represents the point where the overall cost of capital is 
\ 
minimized. 
11.4.4 EVALUATION METHOD 
In making an investment the decision maker must give due at-
tention to both profitability and liquidity. He needs to 
comprehend that an acceptable project must return more than 
it costs to finance. He must furthermore have an idea as to 
how the acceptance of a project will affect the firm's li-
quidity. 
Since it is not expected of the decisionmaker of the un-
listed small firm to apply DCF methods in the evaluation of 
investment proposals, the only alternative left is to apply 
non time related methods. 
The small unlisted firm tends also to have only limited ac-
cess to the kind of information which may be relevant to in-
vestment decision making. Accordingly decision makers in 
such firms will invariably rely heavily on accounting data 
which is the most readily available and comprehensible 
source of information. 
Against this background it is considered most appropriate 
that the unlisted firm use the 'average rate of return 
method' in order to gauge profitability of a project. 
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11.4.4.1 PROFITABILITY 
The 'average rate of return' ratio to be applied in order to 
assess the profitability of an investment should be the fol-
lowing: 
Average rate of return = a~e. profit after depreciation and tax 
where : 
average profit after depreciation and tax = the average of 
the projected annual after tax and depreciation profits over 
the life of the investment 
total capital employed = total capital outlay required for 
investment. 
EXAMPLE 
A project that requires an initial outlay of R100 is con-
sidered. The project has an economic life of 5 years, will 
be depreciated on a straight line basis over this period, 
and is expected to yield the following after depreciation 
and tax returns: 
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YEAR 1 R10 
YEAR 2 R30 
YEAR 3 R40 
YEAR 4 R20 
YEAR 5 R20 
Average rate of return = 24 
100 
= 24 per cent 
The average rate of return calculated for a project would 
need to be compared against the firm's overall cost of capi-
tal in order to gauge if an investment yielding the rate as 
per above ratio is acceptable~ In this respect the decision 
maker should at least be able to comprehend some sort of op-
portunity cost. 
The second important criterion to be applied in the decision 
making process concerns liquidity. 
11.4.4.2 LIQUIDITY 
The shorter the payback period of an investment the lower 
the · risk will be of a change in environmental circumstances 
, impacting adversely on the actual cash flow of the invest-
ment. Accordingly, the small unlisted firm, which usually 
operates from a fragile liquidity base, will need to specify 
a 'cut off' payback period, beyond which a proposed invest-
ment cannot be accepted. The precise cut off point would 
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need to be established by each firm within the context of 
the pace of technological, financial and social change in 
its industry. For some firms, a two year cut off might be 
appropriate. In others, a five year cut off might be 
feasible. 
In addition to establishing a 'cut off' point, however, the 
small firm decision maker needs to project incremental cash 
flows on a monthly rather than annual basis. Frequently for-
gotten, is the fact that investments which result in in-
creased turnovers require cash outflows over and above the 
initial costs involved : negative cash flows to increase 
working capital. Careful attention thus needs to be given to 
this aspect when cash flows are projected. 
The initial costs of acquiring the capital item might well 
be financed on a long term basis but the subsequent outflows 
which usually occur before a positive cash flow material-
izes, will have to be financed from existing working capital 
resources. The question then to be answered is whether those 
resources are adequate. 
The traditional current asset ratio and the acid test are 
not adequate for this task. However, a ratio . has been 
developed by Hamblin (1976 :63) which will assist in deter-
mining how much working capital a firm needs given the 
credit terms given and taken in the industry and the rate of 
stock turnover. Actual working capital less the current re-
351 
quired working capital as calculated will indicate whether 
or not a surplus exists. If there is a surplus, it needs to 
be large enough to carry the working capital needs of the 
new investment. If there 1S a deficit, or the surplus is not 
large enough, it would be necessary to negotiate a loan or 
overdraft facilities until the eventual positive cash flow 
from the investment is sufficient to offset the early out-
flows. If such facilities cannot be arranged the investment 
should be avoided. 
Since liquidity forms such a high priority objective of the 
unlisted firm it is suggested that the firm should be will-
ing to sacrifice some investment returns, if necessary, in 
order to stay liquid. 
The exact percentage which might need to be sacrificed will 
differ from firm to firm depending on the investment oppor-
tunities available and on the existing liquidity conditions 
of the firm. 
11.4.4.3 SACRIFICING RETURNS FOR LIQUIDITY 
The. unlisted firm will have to make decisions regarding in-
,dependant investments and mutually exclusive investments. In 
order to explain the concept 'sacrificing returns for li-
quidity' hypothetical examples have been constructed in or-
der to accommodate both types of investment proposals. 
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i) The Independant Investment 
Table 11.1 depicts an independant investment I of R50 000 
which is expected to yield returns over a period of 5 years. 




EARNINGS OF INVESTMENT I 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 
R 100 R 1 000 R 3 000 
YEAR 4 YEAR 5 
R 5 000 R66 000 
It 1S assumed that depreciation is deducted from profits ac-
cording to the straightline method i.e R10 000 per annum. 
In the above example investment I yields an average rate of 
return of 30,04 per cent. 
The payback period for investment I being the exact amount 
of time required for the firm to recover its investment as 
calculated from cash inflows, is derived from the data 1n 
table 11.2. 
TABLE 11.2 
PAYBACK PERIOD OF INVESTMENT I 
YEAR 0 YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 
-RSa 000 RIO 100 R11 000 R13 000 R15 000 R76 000 
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Investment I has a fairly lenghty payback of 4,12 years. Ac-
cordingly, in spite of the fact that its yield is far above 
the firm's cost of capital, it might be rejected by manage-
ment on grounds of its weak liquidity prospects. This will 
of course depend on the payback 'cut off' point decided 
upon. 
Where the liquidity objective is a high priority of manage-
ment, it could well happen that an independant investment 
with a quick payback and a relatively small return is ac-
cepted. Table 11.3 depicts such a case. Investment 12 con-
sists of an initial outlay of R50 000 and generates returns 





RETURNS OF INVESTMENT 12 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 
R20 000 R15 000 R12 000 
YEAR 4 YEAR 5 
R 8 000 R 5 000 
It is assumed that depreciation is deducted from profits ac-
cording to the straightline method i.e. RiO 000 per annum. 
According to the 'average rate of return' method investment 
, 1 2 has a return of 24,00 per cent 
Table 11.4 depicts the payback period for investment 12. 
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TABLE 11.4 
PAYBACK PERIOD FOR INVESTMENT 12 
YEAR 0 YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 
-R50 000 R30 000 R25 000 R22 000 R18 000 R15 000 
According to table 11.4 investment 12 has a relatively fast 
payback period of only 1.8 years and a return of 24,00 per 
cent, only 4 per cent more than the firms cost of capital. 
In this case management might,because of the liquidity 
prospects, accept investment 12 in spite of its minimal 
return above the cost of capital. 
Liquidity preference can consequently also enjoy priority 
over returns where mutually exclusive projects are con-
cerned. 
ii) MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE PROJECTS 
Table 11.5 depicts two mutually exclusive investment 
projects M and E each requiring a R10 000 outlay. Investment 
M is expected to generate earnings over a period of 5 years 
with the bulk of its earnings accruing in its early years. 
Investment E is expected to generate earnings over a period 
of 5 years with larger earnings in years 4 and 5. The cost 
of capital is 20 per cent. 
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TABLE 11.5 





















Depreciation is assumed to be deducted from profits accord-
ing to the straightline method i.e. R2 000 per annum. 
Project M has an average rate of return of 22,02 per cent 
and project E has an average rate of return of 27 per cent. 
Table 11.6 depicts the payback period of the two invest-
ments. 
TABLE 11.6 





















On the basis of payback period however, project M is most 
acceptable since it has a payback period of 1.6 years 
whereas project E has one of 3,18 years. 
It 1S therefore quite possible for an unlisted firm with a 
high liquidity priority to sacrifice 4,98 percentage points 
1n returns in order to ensure a faster payback. In order to 
do this their choice of investment will be M. The 
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furthermore ensures flexibility in that more funds will be 
available at a relatively early stage for reinvestment in 
more lucrative investments if and when available. 
It 1S however necessary to realise that it will be un-
reasonable to expect the decision maker of the unlisted firm 
to sacrifice unlimited returns for liquidity. This tradeoff 
will depend -on the liquidity position of the specific firm 
as well as the utility values of the decision makers. 
Another important factor that could modify the perspective 
of the decision maker concerns inflation. 
11.4.5 INFLATION 
Decision makers must take inflation into account when they 
make their investment decisions. In this respect it is sug-
gested that they calculate depreciation according to re-
placement value and not according to historical book value. 
Decision makers · should furthermore take cognizance of 
salaries and drawings. 
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11.4.6 SALARIES TO OWNERS 
Owner/Managers should limit their salary withdrawals to an 
amount approximately equal to the salaries paid in the in-
dustry for equivalent work performed. Excessive drawings 
would distort return on investment calculations and could 
even impair liquidity. 
A final point to be made concerns the very important factor 
of 'non economic' satisfactions. 
11.4.7 NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS 
Owners should be aware that 'non economic' satisfactions can 
lower their cost of equity i.e. allow them to accept a sub 
standard financial return (one that is lower than alterna-
tive investments of similar risk). The cost of their non 
economic satisiactions is thus directly measurable a~d some 
limiting cost should be specified by the rational owner. 
11.4.8 CONCLUSION 
The normative model presented specifies some profitability 
conditions, some financing guidelines, and certain decision 
criteria relating to profitability, liquidity and non 
economic satisfactions which the decision maker must pre-
set. 
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It is now necessary to formulate a set of hypotheses which 
will utilize this model to place investment decision making 
in small businesses in the DPP metropolitan areas in ra-
tional perspective and permit the structuring of an ap-
propriate research programme. 
11.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The first or central hypothesis needs to be substantiated in 
order for the remaining hypotheses to be of any relevance at 
all. This hypothesis may be formally stated as follows: 
'Non listed business enterprises ln the DPP metropolitan 
areas do not apply an objective o f wealth maximization in 
the sense that wealth is measured in terms of expected cash 
flows from investments that are discounted at a rate that 
reflects the risk class of the firm.' 
A number of subsidiary hypotheses have been formulated in 
order to probe various dimensions contained in the normative 
model. 
These hypotheses are listed below: 
a) Investment projects that have the remotest probability 
of failing and in the event force the firm into insol-
vency will be avoided. 
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b) Because unlisted small firms have limited access to 
capital markets they make liberal use of short term 
debt to finance their investments. (Such action is, of 
course, regarded as unwise in the normative model). 
c) Unlisted small firms, because of a shortage of equity 
capital have high debt ratios. (This too is regarded as 
being unwise). 
d) Owner/managers of unlisted small firms are not aware of 
opportunity yields on investments that are in a risk 
class similar to the business. (They ought to be). 
e) The cost of financing a project is considered on a pre 
tax basis. (It ought to be after tax). 
f) Owner/Managers of unlisted small firms do not consider 
the cost of equity capital when making investments and 
they do not calculte the weighted average cost of capi-
tal when they make investment decisions. 
g) Owner/managers of unlisted small firms do not ralse 
. capital for the funding of investments according to a 
target capital structure. (They should) 
h) Inflation is not taken into consideration by owner/ 
managers of unlisted small firms when they make invest-
ment decisions. 
i) There exists a working capital shortage ln most un-
listed firms in the area. This will have the following 
affects on the decision maker's investment evaluation 
method: 
* independant investments with high returns but slow 
payback periods are rejected; 
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* independant investments with fast payback periods 
but minimal returns are accepted and 
* when mutually exclusive investments are considered 
there will be a bias towards an investment with a 
fast payback and lower returns relative to one 
with a slower payback and better returns. 
j) Returns will be sacrificed for l iquidity only up to a 
certain point. After this 'cut off' point returns will 
have predence over liquidity. 
k) Owner/Managers do not link their salaries and drawings 
to those of others working in the industry. (They 
should) 
1) Non economic satisfactions induce owner/managers to ac-
cept sub-standard returns relative to other possible 
investments of similar risk. 
m) Owner/managers ln the study area are relatively risk 
averse. 
11.6 SUMMARY 
Evidence from empirical studies reveals that relativity few 
listed companies employ DCF methods. These studies have fur-
thermore shown that those who do employ DCF do not relate 
their benefits to the normative objective of the firm V1Z. 
wealth maximization. 
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Since unlisted small firms display an unsophisticated 
profile regarding professional and academic expertise rela-
tive to the listed firm it was felt that it would be un-
reasonable to expect them to use DCF methods ln investment 
decision making. This argument is strengthened by the fact 
that the unlisted small firm has no formal market in which 
its shares are traded. Add to this, the absence of an ap-
propriate discount rate and the ingredients necessary to 
correctly utilize DCF methods are absent. 
It is consequently necessary to consider the investment 
decision making procedures of the unlisted small firm 
against the background of the problems that surround it. 
These problems mostly focus on risks which can directly or 
indirectly result in liquidity shortages. The liberal use 
of short term debt in the funding of capital expenditure, a 
non diversified investment profile and a low equity base 
render the small unlisted firm particularly vulnerable to 
liquidity shortages. 
In constructing a normative investment decision-making model 
for the unlisted small firm it is therefore suggested that: 
* 
* 
insolvency risks should be avoided; 
short term debt should not be utilized to fund invest-
ments; 
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* a 'moderate' debt ratio should not be exceeded. The 
ratio should preferably be not more than the industry 
average; 
* the decision maker should ensure that he is be aware of 
opportunity yields so that the cost of equity can be 
determined; 
* the cost of a project should be considered in terms of 
both borrowed funds (on an afte r tax basis) and equity 
funds; 
* the decision maker should calculate a weighted average 
cost of funds to be used as a criterion when deciding 
on prospective investments; 
* 
* 
the decision maker should take due cognisanze of 
profitability and liquidity when making investment 
decisions. In order to gauge profitability the 'average 
rate of return' method should be used whilst the 
'payback period' method should be used to assess one 
aspect of liquidity. Short term additional working 
capital needs would also need funding. 
Since liquidity forms such a high priority objective of 
the unlisted firm it is suggested that these firms 
should sacrifice some level of returns, if necessary, 
in order to stay liquid. The exact percentage to be 
sacrificed will depend on the utility values of the 
decision makers and 
decision makers should not sacrifice unlimited lncre-
ments in return for liquidity; 
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* owner/managers should refrain from making excessive 
drawings by means of salary or other means that could 
erode return on investment; 
* 
* 
capital should be raised for the funding of investments 
according to a target capital structure and 
account should be taken of inflation when making In-
vestment decisions. 
The hypotheses of the study have consequently been formu-
lated to permit an evaluation of investment decision making 
practices in unlisted small businesses in the DPP area in 
terms of a normative model. The research programme designed 





The focus of this study has been specifically orientated 
toward the unlisted firm. Most unlisted firms are small by 
any standards and do not qualify for a listing on any formal 
market for shares. Those unlisted firms which do qualify for 
a listing can overcome the difficulties of correctly deter-
mining their cost of capital by simply having their shares 
listed. It is accordingly the sma l l unlisted firms, which 
cannot obtain a listing for their shares, which will be 
probed in this study. 
By operationally defining as 'smal l ', those firms which do 
not conform to the most accommodating listing requirements, 
it will be possible to avoid any confusion. Accordingly, it 
will be 'small' firms in the DPP area that will be included 
in the research sample. In order to classify a firm as 
'small' it would be necessary to apply the listing require-
ments of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to firms in 
the sample. 
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12.2 CRITERIA FOR JSE LISTING 






a subscribed capital of at least R1 ' 000 000 in the form 
of not less than 1 000 000 shares in issue; 
a satisfactory profit history for the preceding 3 
years, with a current audited profit level of at least 
R1 000 000 before taxation; 
the public shall hold 30 per cent of the first 1 000 
000 shares, and an agreed percentage of the balance and 
the number of shareholders shall be at least 300 
(Uliana, et al. 1987:390). 
The Development Capital Market <DCM) of the JSE, however, 
has a set of listing requirements which are more lenient. 





share capital and reserves must amount to R500 000; 
there must be at least R1 000 000 shares in issue; 
an acceptable trading record for two years with a cur-
rent audited profit level of at leastR250 000; 
a minimum of 10 per cent of the first 1 000 000 shares 
issued shall be held by the public, and an agreed per-
centage of the balance and 
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* the number of shareholders shall at least be 75 (Cairns 
1989:63). 
Even more lenient in some respects are the JSE requirements 
for a listing on its recently launched Venture Capital 
Market. Unfortunately the requirements are in many respects 
not as clearly defined as those of the DCM: the listings 
committee has greater discretion in reaching a decision. 
However, the following criteria are considered: 
i) A venture capital conglomerate must have as its 
dominant business the professional operation of a com-
pany which holds, and will in the future hold, a 
portfolio of investments into ventures each of which is 
characterised by the fact that the venture capital con-
glomerate: 
a) has an investment in each underlying venture which is 
substantially an equity one; 
b) is able to support its underlying venture projects with 
added value by virtue of support services and proper 
financial disciplines; 
c) has done adequate research into the management strength 
and commercial viability of each of its underlying ven-
tures; 
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d) has drawn up a business plan for the next three years 
in respect of each underlying venture, and of the com-
bined portfolio, with forecast balance sheets, profit 
and loss accounts and cash flows. 
ii) A single venture company must have drawn up an analysis 
of its prospects based on market segment growth, com-
petitive analysis and market share. From this it should 
present a three year business plan with forecast 
balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and cash 
flows. 
iii) A venture capital conglomerate or a single venture com-
pany: 
a) should in its analysis of future earnings indicate 
credible returns on capital which, on a time weighted 
basis, are above average; 
b) need have no profit history but must have issued capi-
tal and reserves (excluding intangibles and reserves 
arising from asset revaluations) of more than Rl.6 mil-
lion at the time of listing; 
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c) will enjoy the concessions as to the number of 
shareholders and advertising awarded to companies in 
the DeM. A further concession will also be made in that 
only 5 per cent of the number of shares in issue need 
to be held by the public; 
d) will give an undertaking to ' the JSE that any disposi-
tion of assets to any party associated with the control 
of the company will require the consent of the company 
in general meeting with the controlling shareholders 
not voting at the meeting; 
e) should have directors and management, the majority of 
which have successful records of achievement in their 
respective roles; 
f) will have in bold block letters at the beginning of its 
prospectus or pre-listing statement a warning of the 
speculative nature of investment in such a company. 
iv) Because of the nature of the venture capital market it 
is not possible to give final finite requirements for a 
listing 1n this sector and the JSE reserves the right 
in its -sole discretion to add to, to alter, or to ex-
empt any of its requirements if it is of the opinion 
that this would be in the interest of investors or 
potential investors in the company (Johannesburg stock 
Exchange News Release, 31st January 1989:1-5). 
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Although the listing requirements for the 'Venture Capital 
Market' might yet prove to be the least stringent of all 
listing requirements its lack of certainty at this stage 
necessitates the adoption of the requirements of the DCM as 
the operational limit of a 'small' business. 
12.3 DURBAN-PINETOWN-PIETERMARITZBURG AREA <DPP AREA) 
The DPP area has been chosen for study because it houses a 
large number of small industrial enterprises across a broad 
spectrum. The study was restricted to manufacturing firms in 
this area since capital budgeting is an issue of central im-
portance in these firms whereas other issues are more impor-
tant in the case of retailers. 
12.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
It is acknowledged that by confining attention to small 
manufacturing firms in the DPP area, the research findings 
will not necessarily be of general validity among all 
businesses. However, depending on the results obtained, the 
limitations can be lifted in further studies aimed at 
generalizing the findings at least for small manufacturing 
businesses elsewhere in South Africa. 
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12.5 SAMPLE SIZE 
At the time of the study the DPP area housed 660 manufactur-
ing firms which qualified as 'small' in terms of the opera-
tional definition (these firms were obtained from the 1988-
89 yearbook and directory of . the Natal Chamber of 
Industries>. Since it was envisaged that statistical tests 
would be utilized in relation to some hypotheses it was 
deemed necessary to have a sample of at least 30 firms in-
cluded in the study. Such a number would be adequate to per-
mit the effective application of certain non parametric 
techniques. 
On the other hand the research programme would require 
analysis of many 'open ended' responses, to be obtained by 
means of personal interviews with respondents. 
A sample greater than 30 would thus become unwieldy. It was 
accordingly decided that the sample size should be 30. 
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12.6 RANDOM SELECTION 
According to Kidder (1981:428) a random sample is selected 
by a process that not only gives each element in the popula-
tion an equal chance of being included in the sample, but 
also makes selection, of every possible combination of the 
desired number of cases equally possible. 
Manheim (1977:277-280) indicates that the fundamental type 
of probability sample is the simple random sample (SRS) 
typified by the familiar procedure of putting each in-
dividuals' name on a seperate slip of paper, mixing them all 
in a bowl, and then selecting the desired number by blindly 
drawing slips from the bowl. Clearly, the total population 
is represented by all the slips from the bowl and each ele-
ment is represented by a single slip. However, Manheim 
stresses that in actual practice, because of the physical 
labour of transcribing all elements onto seperate slips of 
paper and then mixing them thoroughly, this type of random 
sample is rarely used. 
In this study it was decided to use a SRS variant of 
'systematic sampling' which is described by Manheim as the 
simplest, most foolproof and most widely known modification 
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of SRS. In this procedure the population, size N is divided 
by the sample size, n, in order to yield the sampling inter-
val k. 
Then, one selects a random number r, from 1 to k. The nth 
element on the list or frame then becomes the first element 
selected for the sample, and thereafter, going down the 
list, every kth element from r is included in the sample. 
In the DPP area there are 660 unlisted small businesses each 
of which was numbered for the study, N is therefore 660. The 
sample size is 30, 
therefore n = 30 
therefore k = 660 
30 
= 22 
A random number between 1 and 22 was selected, which hap-
pened to be 10. The sample accordingly included firms num-
b~red 10 and every 22nd element thereafter: 10, 32, 54, 76, 
98, 120, 142, 164, 186, 208, 230, 252, 274, 296, 318, 340, 
362, 384, 406, 428, 450, 472, 494, 516, 538, 560, 582, 604, 
626 and 648. 
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In the event of a selected firm refusing to cooperate, the 
firm with the following number would be approached for in-
terview. 
Having selected the firms to be included in the sample, it 
now remains to discuss the interview technique to be 
employed as well as the structure of the questionnaire to be 
completed by the interviewer. 
12.7 ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
The most common form of data collecting used by researchers 
in the social sciences is asking questions from people, the 
data being the oral or written responses. 
This situation, irrespective of the way in which adminis-
tered (viz. by telephone or face to face), is known as an 
interview (Manheim 1977:210). Manheim further observes that 
interviews may vary on a continuum from structured to rela-
tively unstructured. 
At tne one extreme is the completely structured interview. 
In this type of interview the exact same stimuli lS 
presented to every respondent. This means that the precise 
wording and sequence of the questions will be specified in 
advance, with no deviation permitted. It also implies that 
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the respondent's replies will be in terms of fixed alterna-
tives, a limited number of predetermined responses of which 
the respondent selects one. Furthermore, in a structured in-
terview the interviewer strives to avoid giving any addi-
tional information or explanation to the respondent. 
The converse is true of the unstructured interview. In this 
type of interview, the interviewer is encouraged to vary the 
manner and wording of the questions in order to suit the 
peculiarities of the situation and he may follow up on ap-
portunities suggested by the respondent's replies (Manheim 
1977:212). Most often the form of interview adopted is some-
where on the continuum between these two extremes. 
Since interviewing implies the asking of questions from 
people the structuring of these questions need now be 
scrutinized. 
12.7.1 CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS 
Closed-ended questions are synonomous with the structured 
interview in that a respondent has to select an 
from a fixed number of predetermined responses. 
dent is furthermore not given the opportunity 





Closed-ended questions can be administered in several ways. 
12.7.1.2 CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED BY MAIL 
Closed-ended questions administered by mail is a form of 
data collection which is known as the mail questionnaire. 
Warwick and Linninger (1975:31) observes that the mail ques-
tionnaire has the advantage of being subject to a low cost. 
Manheim (1977:215) indicates that the mail questionnaire 
furthermore has the advantage of being practical where a 
population is scattered over a wide area. 
A disadvantage of the method is however its poor response 
rate. 
Closed-ended questions can 
telephone. 
also be administered 
12.7.1.3 CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED BY TELEPHONE 
by 
Telephone interviews must be quite brief since respondents 
may become impatient or suspicious and/or give inaccurate 
responses in prolonged interviews. It is therefore suitable 
only for structured or relatively . superficial questions. 
Probably its most common use has been in audience surveys 
for television and radio. 
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As indicated, interviews tend to be relatively structured 
since there is very limited opportunity for the interviewer 
to probe into any subconcious or personal factors, and al-
most no opportunity to establish rapport with the respon-
dent. 
An advantage is that telephone interviews are very inexpen-
sive since no travel costs are involved, and because one in-
terviewer can complete many interviews in a relatively short 
period. However, sampling problems are involved since not 
all households or businesses have telephones < Manheim 
1977:214). 
Another method to administer closed-ended questions is by 
means of a face to face interview. 
12.7.1.4 CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED BY FACE TO 
FACE INTERVIEW 
Closed-ended questions administered by the face to face in-
terview is highly structured and rigid. These questions do 
not permit the respondent to give his own replies and there 
is no assurance that the predetermined responses will in-
clude the one he believes is correct (Manheim 1977:212). 
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It has been noted in section 8.2.6.2 that closed-ended ques-
tions administered by face to face interview in empirical 
studies on capital budgeting elicited unsatisfactory 
answers. Respondents were for example asked to select a 
capital budgeting method used by them. They did just that 
but when asked to describe it they failed. 
Kidder (1981:149) observes the following disadvantages re-
lated to face to face interviews: 
relatively high cost involved; 
a slow procedure and 
interviewer bias not easily avoided. 
The opposite of closed-ended questions are open-ended ones. 
12.7.2 OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS 
Where closed-ended questions implied selection from fixed 
alternatives, open-ended one's enables the respondent to 
reply in exactly his own words. 
Instead of asking a closed-ended question like: "Which of 
the following do you think is -the most serious health 
problem facing our nation today?" and supplying fixed alter-
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natives from which the respondent must choose, the question 
can be open ended: "what do you think is the most serious 
health problem facing the nation today (Manheim 1977:212)?" 
Warrick and Linnininger (1975:134) however point out that 
open-ended questions, with all their merits, have the draw-
back that they can generate an enormous variety of 
responses. Respondents furthermore vary greatly on the 
length of their responses to open-questions, and inter-
viewers differ with regard to the extent to which they probe 
for more information. 
Open-ended questions can be administered by telephone. 
12.7.2.1 OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED BY TELEPHONE 
It was noted in section 12.7.1 that since telephone inter-
views must be brief it is suited for structured interviews. 
The opportunity for the interviewer to probe into any sub-
concious or personal factors is therefore limited and there 
is almost no opportunity to establish rapport with the 
respondent. It is consequently relatively inappropriate to 
administer open-ended questions by telephone. 
Open-ended questions administered in a face to face inter-
view have some appealing merits. 
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12.7.2.2 OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED IN A FACE TO 
FACE INTERVIEW 
Kidder (1981:149) mentions that this method of interviewing 
has the following advantages: 
the likelihood exists of establishing good rapport with 
the respondent; 
* the interviewer can ask complex questions at length and 
in depth and 
* the interviewer can obtain full detailed answers 
through clarification and probing questions. 
Having reviewed the literature on the administration and 
structure of the questionnaire it is now necessary to decide 
on an approach to be followed with the study at hand. 
12.7.3 APPROACH SELECTED 
Some of the questions to be administered in the DPP area, 
especially those of a confidential financial nature will be 
administered on a closed-ended basis. This was decided upon 
after respondents, when initially contacted, expressed 
reluctance to participate if they had to disclose financial 
information, especially financial statements. Other ques-
tions however, contain terminology that will have to be ex-
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plained. Full benefit will furthermore be derived from the 
merits of as many open-ended questions as possible as well 
as the advantages of the unstructured interview. 
The type of questionnaire selected for the study at hand 
will consequently be partially open-ended to be administered 
by personal interview. 
12.8 CONSTRUCTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
A total of 48 questions were posed and each of them will now 
be considered in turn. Where statistical testing of 
hypotheses was envisaged the hypotheses as well as the test 
concerned will be specified. 
12.8.1 OBJECTIVES 
Q1 What are the objectives of your firm? State shortly. 
main objective 
secondary objective 
The objectives of a firm determine decision criteria. Ac-
cordingly it was of prime importance to determine as a point 
of departure the degree to which a respondent was profit 
orientated. The question was furthermore intended to be 
open-ended so that a variety of expression could be accom-
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modated. The responses would accordingly require some inter-
pretation on an individual basis to enable each to be 
labelled either predominantly profit orientated or not. 
12.8.2 INVESTMENT DECISION PROCEDURES 
Question 2 addresses the hypothesis that profit orientated 
firms will tend to have formal investment evaluation proce-
dures. 





Describe how investment decisions are made. 
This question should establish on the degree of sophistica-
tion of investment decision making employed and again the 
question was open ended to permit individual assessment. 
In order to test the hypotheses the chi square test was to 
be adopted [see Sprent (1981:155-167)1. This test was to be 
applied to verify whether there are any significant dif-
ferences between profit orientat ed groups on the one hand 
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and non profit orientated groups on the other hand regarding 
their investment evaluation procedures. The groups in this 
instance were those derived from question 1. 
12.B.3 RISK OF INSOLVENCY 
The following question concerns the hypothesis that invest-
ments which are perceived to have the slightest possibility 
of failing should be avoided, if failure would force the 
firm into insolvency. 
Q3 Assuming all other decision criteria are satisfied will 
you accept an investment with the following probabil-
ities? 
PROFITS LOSSES PROBABILITY OF OCCURING 
a R50 000 40 per cent 
b R75 000 20 per cent 
c RBO 000 15 per cent 
d RB5 000 10 per cent 
e R90 000 5 per cent 
f) A LOSS THAT 10 per cent 





The answers to this question should reflect on the extent to 
which respondents exercise caution when making an invest-
ment. It has been noted that literature suggests that small 
firms generally do not have the resources to weather losses 
as large as their listed counterparts. 
In the event that any respondent should choose to accept the 
tisky investment a statistical test will be applied to as-
certain whether these respondents are less risk averse than 
their counterparts who refused the risky investment. Since 
risk aversity is also indicated by debt ratios and certainty 
equivalents it seems appropriate to use a statistical test 
to determine whether a positive correlation does exist be-
tween: 
i) the debt ratios of investors who accepted the risky in-
vestment on the one hand and the debt ratios of inves-
tors who rejected the risky investment on the other 
hand and 
ii) the certainty equivalents of investors who accepted the 
risky investment on the one hand and the certainty 
equivalents of investors who rejected the risky invest-
ment on the other hand. There is however a genuine 
dichotomy with one of the variables in that the vari-
able 'investors having to decide on the choice of a 
risky investment' must be reduced to 2 categories viz. 
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investors who accepted the risky investment and those 
who refused it. Where a situation like the above one 
exists Guilford (1973:297) suggests the use of the 
'point bi serial correlation coefficient test.' 
In order to test the hypothesis viz. investments which are 
perceived to have the slightest possibility of failing 
should be avoided the large sample sign test (see Freund and 
Williams (1977:30) was adopted. This type of test typically 
suits the type of question where the outcome on accepting or 
rejecting the risky investment hinges on 'yes' and 'no' 
answers. It is expected that 'no' answers will predominate. 
12.8.4 USE OF SHORT TERM FINANCE 
Questions 4 to 7 are meant to probe the hypothesis that un-
listed business firms which do not have access to capital 
markets make liberal use of short term debt in their funding 
of capital expenditures. Questions 8, 9 and 10 provide an 
elaboration of attitudes toward financing. 
Q4 Which form of financing do you use when you invest 




FORM OF FINANCE IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE REASON 
This question should provide an accurate picture of the form 
of finance respondents actually prefer when they invest. It 
should furthermore reflect on their usage of short term 
debt. 
Q5 Do you try to link long term sources of financing (3 





The answer to this question should verify whether 
decision-makers do in fact follow the approach recom-
mended by financial theory, namely to use long term 
financial resources (long term debt, equity) for the 
financing of capital expenditures. 
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Q6 If you do try to raise long term sources of finance for 
a proposed investment and you still experience a 
shortage of funds would you abandon the project or 
would you push ahead and use short term sources? 
Examples of short term sources: 
(bank overdrafts, trade credit, factoring, short term 
loan) 
Continue: What kind of short term monies would you 
prefer and why? 
Discontinue: 
Question 6 will reflect whether the decision maker, 
when he experiences a shortage of permanent financing 
will expose himself to the risk of supplementing these 
long term sources with short term sources. 
Q7 Do you prefer to use short term sources (1 year 




This question calls for a motivation by the decision 
maker for his preference of using or not using short 
term sources to finance investments. 
If the responses in question 4 are interpreted as 'yes' 
and 'no' with respect to short term funding there will 
be consistency in the responses of questions, 4 ~ 7 
<all questions will permit 'yes' and 'no' 
categorization). 
The responses in question 4 were converted to 'yes' and 
'no' on the following basis : if the answer for example 
was 'long term debt' it was interpreted as 'no' because 
it indicated non usage of short term funds whereas 
answers like 'bank overdraft' and 'trade credit' indi-
cated usage of short term funds and were consequently 
interpreted as 'yes'. 
It should further be noted that the 'no' answers in 
question 5, in terms of the statistical test, should 
actually be treated as 'yes' since 'no' would 1n fact 
indicate usage of short term funds and vice versa. 
It is therefore possible to implement the chi square 
test to ~erify whether 'yes' answers will predominate. 
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12.8.5 MEDIUM TERM FINANCE 




This question calls for a rationale for the preference 
to use or not use medium term sources to finance in-
vestments. 
12.8.6 RISK ATTITUDE TOWARDS USAGE OF SHORT TERM FUNDS 
Q9 If you do use short term sources to finance invest-
ments, are you not afraid that these debts will have to 





In this instance the object is to ascertain whether 
decision makers are actually aware of the dangers in-
volved (overdrafts can be called up and/or extension of 
short term loans can be refused.) in the utilization of 
short term funds for investment decision making. 
12.8.7 PREFERENCE OF FINANCING SOURCE 
Q10 Which of the following sources of financing would you 
prefer to utilize to finance an investment? Tick the 3 
favoured most ~n order of preference by inserting 1, 2 
and 3 alongside the respective source of finance: 




Long term loans (longer than 3 year duration) 
Medium term loans (1 to 3 years) 
Short term loans (1 year) 
Hire purchase agreements 
Mortgage bonds 
Personal bank loan (longer than 3 years) 
Personal bank loan (1 to 3 years) 
Personal bank loan (1 year) 
Small Business Development Corporation Financing: 
i) Mini Loan (R5 000 and less) 
iD Comprehensive assistance program (R30 000 and 
less) 
~iil General finance Program (R500 000 and less) 
Guarantees from private individuals 
Lease backs 
Loans by private individuals 
Any other means of financing (specify) 
REASONS FOR CHOICES: 
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Question 10 is supposed to show wh i ch funds a firm will ac-
tually prefer use if it had command over a wide spectrum of 
alternative financial resources. 
The forms of finance preferred will be rated on a points 
scale from 3 (most preferred) to .1 (least preferred). 
12.8.8 ATTITUDE TOWARD FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
Questions 11 to 14 relate to respondents' attitudes toward 
leverage. Question 11 probes the hypothesis that unlisted 
firms, because of a shortage of equity capital tend to have 
high debt ratios. 
Q11 Do you think you are making use of a disproportionate 
amount of debt in your total capitalization? (Total 
financing) 
Yes 
No Why do you say that? 
The answer to question eleven should indicate whether 
decision makers, according to their own perception, 
make use of excessive debt in their total capitalisa-
tion. 
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since the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis in 
this question hinges on 'yes' and 'no' responses the 
large sample sign test will be implemented to determine 
whether 'yes' answers will predominate. 
Q12 What is your debt (including shareholders loans)/equity 
(owner supplied funds) ratio? 





• 3 :. 7 
Answers to question 12 should reflect the actual situa-
tion regarding debt ratios in the study area. The posi-
tion of shareholder's loans in some circumstances can 
for purposes of establishing leverage be considered as 
part of equity. This is particularly so where such 
loans have been waived in favour of creditors. However 
for the purposes of the study and to ensure consistency 
in responses shareholders' loans were regarded as debt. 
In this question the range of the debt ratios will be 
determined as well as their mean value and standard 
deviation. 
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Q13 What do you think this ratio could go to without caus-
ing financial embarrassment? 
This question was asked to ascertain whether firms in 
the DPP area are not already on the verge of financial 
embarrassment as result of large debt ratios. 
In this respect the range and mean value of the es-
timated debt ratios will be calculated. 
Q14 If you need additional capital and both debt and equity 
is available which would you choose? 
Debt Explain 
Equity Explain 
Answers to question 14 should reflect on the relative 
extent of caution exercised by decision makers when 
raising finance for capital expenditures. It should in-
ter alia also reflect on the advantages/disadvantages 
of leverage contrary to more conservative capital 
structures. 
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12.8.9 OPPORTUNITY COST 
Questions 15 and 16 relate to opportunity costs. 
Question 15 probes the conjecture that decision makers of 
unlisted firms are not generally aware of opportunity yields 
on investments in a risk class similar to investment in 
their own firms. 
Q15 Are you aware of an opportunity or opportunities where 
you/your shareholders can earn a higher return on in-
vestment than in the firm? 
Yes 
No 
Question 15 was asked in order to ascertain whether 
decision makers are actually aware of opportunities 
outside the firm where they can get a higher return on 
their investment than in the firm. 
394 
Since the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis in 
this instance will be determined by the outcome of 
'yes' and 'no' answers the large sample sign test will 
be adopted to test whether 'no' answers will 
predominate. 
Q16 If the answer to question 15 was 'no' don't answer 
question 16. If the answer to question 15 was 'yes' 
explain why the shareholders don't liquidate the in-
vestment and reinvest in the better opportunity. 
The answers to question 16 should reveal why decision 
makers, if they are aware of better opportunities, do 
not liquidate their investment in the firm and invest 
in the better opportunity. This should highlight pos-
sible non economic returns. 
12.8.10 VALUATION OF SHARES 
Question 17 probes the valuation problem of the shares of 
the unlisted company. 
Q17 If you were to liquidate your investment in the firm by 
selling shares how would you calculate the minimum ac-
ceptable price for the shares? 
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Answers to this question should shed some light on the 
methods implemented by decision makers to value the 
shares of unlisted companies. 
12.8.11 COST OF CAPITAL 
Question's 18 to 22 probed respondents' views regarding the 
cost of capital. 
Q18 When considering the cost of borrowed funds, how is the 
cost assessed? 
The question is asked in order to establish whether 
respondents perceive the cost of debt in Rands or in 
percentage terms. It will also serve as a control for 
question 2 in that firms which use DCF methods cor-
rectly, should also perceive the cost of debt as a per-
centage. If they do not they have a problem in cal-
culating a discount rate. 
Question 19 concerns the hypothesis that the cost of debt is 
\ 
not generally measured on an after tax basis when making a 
decision on the funding of an investment. 
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Question 19 should elicit direct answers as to whether 
decision makers calculate the cost of debt on a before 
tax or after tax basis. 
In order to test the hypothesis the large sample sign 
test will be used. 'Before tax' responses will be al-
lotted + signs and 'after tax' responses - signs. The 
test will be conducted to determine whether + signs 
predominate. 
Question 20 will probe the hypothesis that decision makers 
of unlisted firms do not consider the cost of equity when 
making investments. 
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Q20 Do equity funds (owner supplied funds - money, goods or 
retained earnings) have a cost? 
Yes 
No Explain 
Question 20 should indicate whether the decision maker 
really perceives equity to have a cost. 
Since responses in this case, which should determine 
whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected 
again hinges on 'yes' and 'no' responses, the large 
sample sign test will be adopted to determine whether 
'no' answers will predominate. 
Q21 If 'yes' which of the following best describe your con-
cept of this cost? 
a) net prbfit after taxes asa percentage of book value 
of equity (owner supplied capital + 
reserves + retained earnings) 
b) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
book value of tqtal investment; 
c) net profit after taxes as a percentage of 
market value of equity; 
d) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
market value of equity; 
e) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
market value of total investment; 
f) opportunity cost (what owners could earn elsewhere); 
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g} none of these (please describe). 
Answers to question 21 will reveal how respondents who 
actually perceive equity to have a cost, conceptualize 
this cost. 
Q22 What rate would you say approximates the cost of equity 
in this firm? 
Question 22 requests the respondent to directly come up 
with the cost of equity according to his perception of 
it in question 21. 
A mean value for equity cost will be calculated in this 
instance. 
12.8.12 TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Question 23 verifies the hypothesis that firms do not raise 
finance for new investments according to a target capital 
structure. 
Q23 If debt and equity are used in the funding of a 
proposed capital expenditure, are these two forms of 





Question 23 requires a direct answer from the respon-
dent as to whether investments are funded according to 
the proportions of a target capital structure. The 
'large sample' sign test will be applied, to establish 
whether 'no' answers will predominate. 
12.8.13 WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST OF CAPITAL 
Question 24 tests the hypothesis that decision makers of un-
listed firms do not calculate a weighted average marginal 
cost of capital when they make investment decisions. 
Q24 If debt and equity were used in the funding of a capi-
tal expenditure, how is the overall cost determined? 
Describe shortly. 
Answers to question 24 should reveal whether respon-
dents use a weighted average marginal cost of capital 
when making investment decisions. 
400 
If the costs of finance in this instance is weighted 
properly and a weighted average marginal cost is calcu-
lated it would constitute a 'yes' answer, if not a 'no' 
answer. The large sample sign test will be used to 
determine whether 'no' answers will predominate. 
12.8.14 INFLATION 
Questions 25 and 26 regard inflation in the investment 
decision-making process. 
Questions 25 concerns the hypothesis that inflation is not 
taken into account by decision makers of unlisted firms when 
making investment decisions. 
Q25 Do you consider inflation ln investment decisions? 
Yes How is this done? 
No 
Question 25 endeavours to elicit direct answers as to 
whether decision makers actually consider inflation in 
their investment decisions and · if they do how they go 
about it. 
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The large sample sign test will be implemented to 
determine whether 'no' answers will predominate. 
Q26 Depending on the answer to the previous question being 
'yes' what rate do you use? 
Question 26 tries to establish whether a rate, if used 
by a decision maker to account for inflation, is ap-
plied formally or informally. 
12.8.15 LIQUIDITY 
Due to the confidential nature of liquidity aspects direct 
questions which required reference to financial statistics 
were not posed. 
Questions 27 to 38 regard liquidity. Questions 27 to 34 
regard the actual liquidity position of respondents whereas 
questions 35 to 38 regard their attitudes toward liquidity. , 
Questions 27 to 34 test the hypothesis that there exists a 
relative liquidity shortage in most unlisted firms in the 
area. 




A positive answer to this question will reveal relative 
illiquidity. 
Q28 Do you stretch payments to creditors on principle? Why? 
stretching payment to creditors on principle whilst 
risking supplies being cut off as result of Ithis action 
indicate liquidity problems. 
Q29 If you have one or two major customers do you find that 
they put pressure on you when money generally is tight? 
Yes No 
An affirmative answer to question 29 will reveal that 
the respondent is relatively unable to weather large 
amounts of outstanding debt and consequently indicates 
a state of illiquidity. 
Q30 Has the frequency of the response 'the cheque is in the 
post' increased lately? 
Yes No 
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The objective of question 30 is just to prepare the 
respondents mind for question 31. An affirmative or non 
affirmative answer will consequently have no sig-
nificance on the question of liquidity. 
Q31 Have you tried that answer? 
Yes No 
An affirmative answer to question 31 indicates that the 
respondent has stalled payment to creditors and conse-
quently indicates relative illiquidity. 
Q32 Has your bank manager ever made mention of a current 
asset ratio of 2:1? 
Yes No 
If the respondent's bank manager has made mention of a 
current asset ratio of 2:1 (the liquidity ratio re-
quired by banks from business firm's) it more than 
likely indicates that his firms illiquid position has 
been discussed. 
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Q33 Has your bank manager ever made mention of an 'acid 
test' ratio of 1:1? 
Yes No 
If the 'acid test' ratio (current assets 
stock/current labilities) has been mentioned by the 
bank to the respondent it indicates strongly that his 
firm's 'acid test' ratio did not conform to the norm of 
1:1. 
Q34 Which of the following investments would your firm 
prefer? Investment A and B both have a cost of R1 000. 
Each investment has the following after tax cash flows 












A Give detailed reasons for your selection. 
B 
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A firm choosing investment A with its regular cash flow 
pattern obviously has liquidity problems since invest-
ment B has a much higher profitability. 
Each of the 7 questions concern1ng liquidity will carry 
a weight of 14,29 per cent. The weighting of each ques-
tion will indicate whether a firm displays liquidity or 
illiquidity in a certain respect. For each question a 
'yes' answer will indicate illiquidity, and score 14,29 
per cent whereas a 'no' answer will indicate liquidity 
and score nil. In question 34 firm A, with it's regular 
cash flow, will be associated with a 'yes' answer and 
firm B with a less regular cash flow but higher 
profitability with a 'no' answer. The higher the score 
a respondent achieves therefore, the more illiquid his 
firm will be. The distribution of percentages scored by 
various groups of respondents will be presented in the 
form of a bar chart. The skewdness in the distribution, 
if any, should reveal whether a state of illiquidity 
exists or not. A chi -sguared test will furthermore be 
applied to test whether the operational hypothesis 
should be accepted or rejected in that it will deter-
mine whether 'yes' answers will predominate. 
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A rank correlation test will furthermore be applied be-
tween debt ratios and liquidity scores in order to es-
tablish whether any positive correlation exists between 
high debt ratios and illiquidity. 
12.8.16 ATTITUDES TOWARD LIQUIDITY 
Questions 35 to 38 test the decision maker's attitude 
towards liquidity. 
Question 35 tests the hypothesis that if a liquidity 
shortage does exist independant investments with relatively 
high returns and slow paybacks could be rejected. 
Q35 You are considering an investment of R100 000 with an 
expected after tax return of 35 per cent. Your invested 
capital (R100 000) will however only be paid back (time 
when investment will be recovered as calculated from 
cash inflows) after 6 years. (Assume a cost of funds of 




This question will test whether the illiquid firms' 
respondents will in fact reject investments with rela-
tively high returns and slow paybacks. 
In order to test the hypothesis the large sample sign 
test will · again be implemented to determine whether 
answers 'no' will predominate. 
Question 36 tests the hypothesis that investments with fast 
paybacks and minimal returns could be accepted. 
Q36 You are considering an investment of R100 000 with an 
expected after tax return of 25 per cent. Your invested 
capital (R100 000) will be paid back after 2 years. 
(Assume a cost of funds of 20 per cent). Will you ac-
cept this investment? 
Yes Explain 
No Explain 
This question was posed to ascertain whether respon-
dents will actually give preference to investments with 
fast paybacks and minimal returns. 
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The large sample sign test will be implemented to test 
whether 'yes' answers will predominate. 
Question 37 relates to the hypothesis that when mutually ex-
clusive investments are considered there will be a bias 
towards an investment with a fast payback and lower returns 
relative to one with a slower payback and better returns. 
Q37 You have the choice between two investments A and B, 
each of R100 000. Investment A has an expected after 
tax return of 25 per cent and a payback period (time 
when investment will be recovered as calculated from 
cash inflows) of 2 years. Investment B has an expected 
after tax return of 40 per cent and a payback period of 
6 years. (Assume a cost of funds of 20 per cent) Which 
investment will you choose? Explain. 
Question 37, although similar in nature to questions 35 
and 36 will also serve to check out the consistency of 
answering in the latter two questions. 
The large sample sign test will be utilized to verify 
whether any significant differences exist between 'yes' 
and 'no' answers. A will be associated with a 'yes' and 
B with a 'no' answer. It is expected that 'yes' answers 
will predominate. 
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Question 38 relates to the hypothesis that returns will 
be sacrificed for liquidity up to a certain point. 
After this 'cut off' point returns will have precedence 
over liquidity. 
- Q38 Consider the following mutually exclusive (acceptance 
of one eliminates the other from further consideration) 
investments A and B. Each investment amounts to R100 
000 and has a life of 10 years. (Assume the cost of 
your funds to finance this project is 20 per cent). In-


























Question 38 was asked to check whether respondents will 
in fact sacrifice liquidity for returns up to a certain 
level, after which level returns will have precedence 
over liquidity. Investment A will be associated with a 
'yes' answer and investment B with a 'no' answer. 
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The large sample sign test will be implemented to 
determine: 
a) whether 'yes' answers will predominate in the 
choice between investments A and B in the 1st al-
ternative and 
b) whether 'no' answers will predominate in the 
choice between investments A and B ln the 2nd al-
ternative. 
12.8.17 SALARIES 
Question 39 tests the hypothesis that owner/managers are not 
aware of the nature of salaries drawn by other 
owner/managers in the similar industry as their own. 
Q39 Are you aware of the nature of salaries drawn by other 
owner/managers in the same industry as you? 
Yes No 
Question 39 was asked to verify whether owner/managers 
are in fact ignorant as to the premium that the market 
places, in monetary terms, on the amount of work that 
is done in a specific industry by an owner/manager. 
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The large sample sign test will be used to determine 
whether 'no' answers will predominate. 
12.8.18 NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS 
Questions 40 to 47 test the conjecture that there exist cer-
tain non economic satisfactions in the firm which could in-
duce owner/managers of unlisted firms to accept sub standard 
returns relative to other investments of similar risk out-
side the firm. If this situation does exist it will lower 
the cost of equity of the unlisted firm. 
Q40 What increase in your current earnings would induce you 
to sell whatever shares you might have in this business 
and accept a position elsewhere in a large organiza-
tion? Your earnings will consist of salary plus income 
from invested capital. You are free to invest your 
capital wherever you like. 
a) an increase of R5 000 p.a; 
b) an increase of R5 001-R10 000 p.a. ; 
c) an increase of R10 001-R20 000 p.a; 
d) any other lncrease (specify) ; 
e) no increase at all. Explain. 
412 
This question tests whether owner/managers of unlisted 
firms put a premium on elements of job satisfaction 
which are non economic in nature. 
Q41 What premium do you put on the fact that you are your 
own boss? In other words, what do you think being your 
own boss is worth in monetary terms elsewhere? 
Question 41 requires from the respondents to put a 
monetary value on one element of non economic satisfac-
tions namely, 'being your own boss' • 
Q42 The owner(s) of a business has a unique relationship to 
that business. Each of the following has been suggested 
as a reason why some owners prefer to invest in own 
c~mpanies. 
How important is each of the following factors in your 
decision to invest in this company? Most important is 











+3 +2 +1 
UNIMPORTANT 
I can play a part in planning -3 -2 -1 
and controlling decisions 
I hold a leadership position 
I can be my own boss 
I know my job is secure 
I control my income by my 
own actions 
I take pride in running my 
own business 
Members of my community re-
cognize my position in the 
firm and hold me in esteem 
because of it 
I feel that I am contributing -
to the growth of the community 
Question 42 has the objective of isolating some 
specific non economic satisfactions in order to ascer-
tain on a points scale in which order of importance 
they can be categorized. 
Q43 Would you be willing to sacrifice some return on your 
investment in order to retain any of the factors men-
tioned in question 42? 
Please select your answer from the following responses 
and tick the grid provided in the appropriate place. 
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a) would sacrifice a large percentage of return to 
maintain this characteristic; 
b) would sacrifice a moderate percentage of return to 
maintain this characteristic; 
c) ,would sacrifice a sma l l percentage of return to 











would not sacrifice return to maintain 
characteristic. 
a b c d 
, 
this 
Question 43 will test whether respondents are in fact 
prepared to sacrifice returns in order to maintain any 
or all of the non economic satisfactions listed in 
question 42. The question will furthermore test whether 
the returns that respondents are prepared to sacrifice 
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are indeed in conformance with the points scored by the 
individual's above mentioned non economic ~atisfac­
tions. 
Q44 Are there other factors which were important in your 
decision to invest in your own company and for which 
you would sacrifice return? 
Yes Specify 
No 
Question 44 probes whether any other non economic 
satisfactions which could have been overlooked in ques-
tion 42 does exist and for which respondents are 
prepared to sacrifice return. 
Q45 Do you feel you are currently sacrificing return in or-
der to maintain any of the characteristics mentioned in 




Question 45 tries to establish whether respondents are 
aware of the fact that they are forfeiting return in 
order to maintain certain non economic satisfactions. 
Answers to questions 46 and . 47 will indicate the value 
of non economic returns. 
Q46 Viewing the factors in questions 43 and 44 collec-
tively, what maximum return on your investment would 
you sacrifice to maintain them? 
Question 46 requires from respondents to put a monetary 
value on non economic satisfactions in a collective 
sense. 
In this instance a mean value of returns to be 
sacrificed will be calculated. 
Q47 For what approximate return on your funds would you 
consider removing them from the firm? 
a) less than 4 per cent; 
b) 4 8 per cent; 
c) 9 - 13 per cent; 
d) 14 - 16 per cent; 
e) 17 - 20 per cent; 
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f) over 20 per cent; 
g) no return at all. 
Respondents are required to state what percentage 
return on an alternative investment (where non economic 
satisfactions will not be prevalent) would entice them 
to sell their firm and invest in the said alternative. 
No statistical test will be employed to test the 
hypothesis concerning non economic satisfactions in 
that these satisfactions will either be prevalent or 
not. 
Question 48 relates to the hypothesis businessmen in 
the study area are relatively risk averse. 
12.8.19 RISK AVERSITY 
Q48 You are bidding on a contract to supply 1 000 units of 
a component that you are manufacturing. You have to 
decide on a bid price. One uncertain factor is the pos-
sibility of a strike by your workers. If this were to 
happen it would mean delays and penalties associated 
with meeting the deadline on the contract. 
How much are you willing to pay for insurance against 
losses due to a possible strike. 
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The objective of question 48 is to elicit certainty 
equivalents from respondents in order to gauge their 
degree of risk aversity. 
The distribution of certainty equivalents (percentages) 
will be depicted in the form of a bar chart. The nature 
of its skewdness should give an indication of the de-
gree of risk aversity of the respective respondents in 
the study area. 
12.9 SUMMARY 
Chapter twelve dealt with the research methodology of the 
study at hand. 
Unlisted firms are small by any standards and do not qualify 
for a listing on a stock exchange. These firms cannot there-
fore, according to theoretical standards, calculate a cost 
of capital. By operationally defining as 'small' those firms 
which do not conform to the most accommodating listing re-
quirements, it will be possible to avoid any confusion. Ac-
cordingly it will be 'small' firms ln the DPP area that will 
be included in the research sample. In order to classify a 
firm as 'small' it would be necessary to apply the listing 
requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
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The listing requirements of the JSE were outlined, as well 
as the more lenient listing requirements of Development 
Capital Market (DCM). A study was furthermore conducted on 
the even more lenient listing requirements of the JSE's most 
recently launched Venture Capital Market. However, the re-
quirements are in many respects not as clearly defined as 
those of the DCM and although the listing requirements for 
the Venture Capital Market might yet prove to be the least 
stringent of all listing requirements its lack of certainty 
at this stage necessitates the adoption of the requirements 
of the DCM as the operational limit of a 'small business'. 
The DPP area has been chosen for study because it houses a 
large number of small industrial enterprises across a broad 
spectrum. The study was restricted to manufacturing firms 
since capital budgeting is an issue of central importance to 
these firms. These firms were all selected from the 1988-89 
yearbook and directory of the Natal Chamber of Commerce. 
Because attention has been confined to small manufacturing 
firms in the DPP area, the research findings will not neces-
sarily be of general validity to all small firms in South 
Africa. However, depending on the results obtained, the 
limitations can be lifted in further studies aimed at 
generalizing the findings. 
420 
Since it was envisaged that statistical tests would be util-
ized in relation to some hypotheses a sample size of 30 was 
deemed necessary. Such a number would be adequate to permit 
the effective application of certain non parametric tech-
niques. 
It was decided because of its merits, to use a 'random 
sample'. The best form of random sampling namely the Simple 
Random Sample variant of 'systematic sampling', because of 
its widely acclaimed merits in literature, was eventually 
decided on. 
The concept of the structured and unstructured interview is 
explored as well as the merits of closed ended versus open 
ended questions. 
Closed ended questions are furthermore discussed in context 
of its administration by mail, by telephone and in face to 
face context, whereas open ended questions are discussed in 
terms of its administration by telephone and in face to face 
context. 
The approach selected in the view of the foregoing reseach 
lS a questionnaire that will be partially open ended to be 
administered by personal interview. 
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In the second half of chapter twelve the questions in the 
questionnaire were discussed in respect of: 
* how each question reflects on the central hypotheses. 
* the reason for asking each question and 
* the statistical tests, if any, to be applied in dif-
ferent questions. 
In chapter thirteen, a report will be made on the findings 
in the study. Data collected in the field study in the DPP 
area will be analyzed and interpreted and statistical tests 
performed, where necessary, in order to test the validity of 





During the implementation phase of the research programme 
each firm selected in terms of the sampling procedure was 
approached with the request that an interview of ap-
proximately one hour be granted. Most of those approached 
were willing to co-operate. In those few instances where the 
request was denied the next firm (according to the sampling 
system adopted in section 12.6) of the population was ap-
proached. The interviewee in each case was the chief execu-
tive officer, who in almost all cases was also sole or con-
trolling shareholder. 
A total of 30 respondents were interviewed all of whom were 
fully co-operative. Indeed, many expressed a keen interest 
in the questionnaire and wished to be advised of final 
results. The sample size was adequate for all the envisaged 
statistical tests to be employed. The responses obtained on 
each questionnaire were recorded on .a large spreadsheet to 
facilitate analysis. The results of that analysis are 
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reported in this chapter together with an interpretation 
thereof. The headings correspond with those utilized in the 
construction of the questionnaire. 
13.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
.13.2.1 OBJECTIVES 
Question 1 
Respondents to this question permitted a differentiation be-
tween firms that are primarily profit orientated and those 
that are not primarily orientated toward some other objec-
tive. However, it was expected that there would be some 
respondents who would in a 'knee jerk' reaction respond in 
the affirmative and yet in reality utilize decision criteria 
which were not consistent with a profit orientation. Secon-
dary objectives were accordingly probed in order to deter-
mine whether the stated primary objectives would be substan-
tiated. 
The respondents who identified their main objective as 
profit maximization totalled 23 (77,3 per cent). Addition-
ally one specified wealth maximization as the primary objec-
tive. The latter firm was immediately placed in the profit 
orientation category. 
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Of the . 23 respondents who had as main objective profit maxi-
mization 8 had contradictory secondary objectives. Typical 
answers were: to create opportunities for employees, to 
provide employment, to be socially responsible and to serve 
the industry. On these grounds they were categorized as non 
profit orientated firms. The remaining 6 firms were placed 
in the non profit category as they stated as the main objec-
tive the following: to grow and provide employment (3 
firms), to manufacture rubber products (1 firm), to improve 
sales volume (1 firm) and earning a living (1 firm). 
Secondary objectives which supported the main objective of 
profit maximization were inter alia to provide quality serv-
ice, to grow, to be market leaders, to create job satisfac-
tion, to build a successful business, to run the business 
efficiently, to update plant and equipment and to secure 
retirement. These responses taken in conjunction with a 
primary stated objective of profit maximization, were ac-
cepted as an endorsement thereof. 
At the end of this analysis, 16 firms were categorized as 
being primarily profit orientated and 14 as being primarily 
orientated towards a non profit objective. 
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13.2.2 INVESTMENT DECISION PROCEDURES 
Question 2 
In relation to this question it was hypothesized that profit 
orientated firms will tend to have formal procedures of in-
vestment decision making and non profit orientated firms 
will have informal or subjective procedures. Responses will 
accordingly be ' cast in a dichotomy: formal procedures and 
non formal procedures. Formal procedures included payback 
period, DCF and accounting rate of return. 
The respondents who used formal investment decision making 
methods numbered 11 (37 per cent). Only one of those respon-
dents indicated that his firm used a discounted cash flow 
method, more specifically the NPV method. Respondents who 
made use of a form of accounting rate of return numbered 2 
whereas 8 respondents indicated that they used a form of 
payback method. 





equipment and machinery bought as and when required; 
plant and machinery bought on an ad hoc basis; 
investments made on gut feel; 
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* replace old machinery when we can afford it; 
* buy machinery through contacts in Europe when bargains 
are available; 
* decisions at board meetings in relation to future earn-
ings and 
* even if no return is made on the machine at least the 
machine itself appreciates. 
A few respondents seemed to have difficulty in comprehending 
the long term nature of investment. Some respondents also 
seemed unable to differentiate between capital expenditure 
and operating expenditure. One respondent said he 'invests' 
in raw materials whenever price increases were expected. 
Some respondents indicated specifically why they do not use 
DCF methods in their investment decision making. One of 
those, a plastic bag manufacturer, inter alia for the fer-
tilizer industry, said he had tried to use DCF methods but 
was frustrated. According to him forecasting is extremely 





volatility of the South African economy; 
the unpredictability of interest rates; 
droughts and floods which especially affect the fer-
tilizer industry; 
changing tax rates and 
427 
trade unionism - especially strikes and their conse-
quences. 
All these factors he asserted dissuaded him from using DCF 
methods. They had also forced him to limit his 'long range' 
forecasting to 1 year. 
Another respondent asserted that his firm had used DCF 
methods in the past but experience showed that projected in-
come was invariably better than actual income. 
Another respondent in the tea blending industry, said that 
DCF methods yield 'alarming results' if applied in a 5 to 10 
year period, due to forecasting difficulties. He could not 
elaborate on what he meant by 'alarming results'. 
In testing the hypothesis that profit orientated firms will 
tend to have formal procedures and non profit orientated 
firms informal procedures the results were cast in a two by 
two cross break and the chi squared test 1x2 ) was applied. 
The relative cross break is reflected in table 13.1. 
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TABLE 13.1 
INVESTMENT PROCEDURES ACCORDING TO PRIMARY OBJECTIVE 
FORMAL INFORMAL ROW 
TOTAL 
Primary Profit 4 5.9 12 10.1 16 
Objective Non Profit 7 5.1 7 8.9 14 
Column Total 11 19 30 
Chi square was calculated to be 2,09 which was not sig-
nificant at the ,05 level for a one tailed test. Accordingly 
the hypothesis could not be substantiated. 
13.2.3 RISK OF INSOLVENCY 
Question 3 
The question probes the hypothesis that investments which 
have the slightest possibility of failing and in the event 
forcing the firm into insolvency will be avoided by a sig-
nificant number of firms. 
There were 7 respondents who indicated that they would ac-
t.. 
cept an investment that had a 90 per cent probability of 
profits but a 10 per cent probability of a loss that could 
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had to insolvency. Their reasons for accepting this invest-
ment were that the probability of making profits (90 per 
cent) outweighted in their view the probability of making a 
loss (10 per cent) that could lead to insolvency. The 23 
(67,7 per cent) respondents who refused to accept the in-
vestment all said they could not risk a 10 per cent chance 
of going insolvent. This result unquestionably supported the 
hypothesis evidenced by the large sample sign test. 
Freund and Williams (1977:30) observe that when the sample 
size is large (n > 20) the decision rule is based on the 
fact that the test statistic namely Z = Y - n/2 
~ n/4 
follows a normal standard distribution where: 
y = number of positive responses 
n = sample size 
If the 'yes' and 'no' responses are substituted into the 




At the ,05 level of significance the critical value is 
-1,645. Since the observed value of the test statistic is 
less than -1,645 there is a 95 per cent chance that the 
operational hypothesis can be accepted. 
In order to provide some rationale for the reason why 7 
respondents would accept the risky investment, an effort was 
made to isolate some points which seemed common to these 
respondents. 
As point of departure it was posited that these 7 respon-
dents were relatively less risk averse than their 23 coun-
terparts and that they would accordingly also expose them-
selves to higher risk and financial leverage than the 
cautious group. It was accordingly decided to apply a test 
of correlation between the nominally measured results under 
this heading and those interval measured results obtained in 
response to questions 12 (debt ratios) and 48 (certainty 
equivalents). To test for correlation the point - biserial 
correlation coefficient test was adopted. 
The correlation coefficient between high debt ratios and ac-
ceptors of the risky investment proved to be 0,406. The cor-
relation coefficient with certainty equivalents was 0,239. 
Neither coefficient provides adequate support for the 
hypothesis which must accordingly be rejected. 
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13.2.4 USE OF SHORT TERM FINANCE 
Questions 4 to 7 examine the extent to which respondents 
make use of short term debt in the financing of capital ex-
penditure. 
Question 4 
Respondents were asked to indicate which forms of financing 
they actually use when they invest. Table 13.2 records the 
answers to this question. The total is more than 30 as 
respondents indicated more than 1 form. 
TABLE 13.2 
FORMS OF FINANCE USED BY RESPONDENTS WHEN INVESTING 
FORMS OF FINANCE NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER CENT 
Equity 17 37 
Leasing (3-5 years) 11 24 
Hire purchase (3-5 years) 7 15 
Bank overdrafts 4 8 
Long term Loan 3 6 
short term Loan 2 4 
Medium term Loan 1 2 
Bond finance 1 2 
Trade credit 1 2 
432 
Long term sources of finance namely long term loans, leas-
ing, hire purchase and equity represents 82 per cent of the 
forms of financing utilized. Only 28 per cent of the 
responses indicated use of funds of a short term nature. 
Typical reasons for using different forms of finance were 
the following: 
1. Long term loan 
questionable). 
fixed interest (this perception is 
2. Medium term loan no specific reason. 
3. Short term loan one year's profit will repay loan 
(this is clearly a question of confusing long term with 
short term). 
4. Leasing: 




capital expenditure is spread over the life of the 
asset and 
tax benefits (not specified). 




general sales tax is paid only once (reasoning not 
clear); 
ownership gives stronger balance sheet 
statement is questionable) and 




* no interest charges; 
* no cost; 
* low cost (the reasoning in all 3 cases above is 
surely unqualified and . faulty); 
* do not like borrowing; 
* have a big supply available; 
* no outside pressure to repay and 
* depreciation tax benefits (not specified). 
7. Bank overdraft: 
* flexible (the fact that they are repayable on 
demand overlooked) and 
* interest is charged on daily balance. 
8. Bond financing: 
* no specific reason. 
9. Trade credit : 
* cost free (only cost free if discounts are taken). 
One respondent who used 5 years leasing as a source for in-
vestment financing iridicated that he uses retained earnings 
for working capital purposes. 
These responses clearly reveal that there are some miscon-
ceptions about several of the issues. Nonetheless a note of 
conservatism emerges as there seems to be a slight 
preference towards the usage of equity. 
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Question 5 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they try to link 
long term sources of financing (3 years and longer) to 
proposed investments. The respondents who replied in the af-
firmative numbered 24 (80 per cent). Respondents who indi-
cated that they do not make the attempt numbered 6 (20 per 
cent) • 
A total of 21 respondents (70 per cent) declined to give 
concrete reasons for their answers. Reasons given by respon-
dents who did try to link long term sources of financing to 






try to match DCF forecasts with term of finance; 
resulting cash flow will payoff loan; 
due to inflation ability to payoff instalments 1S im-
proved with time; 
profit will help to repay loan and 
try to reduce monthly cash outflows. 
Few of these respondents seemed to comprehend the sig-
nificance of matching cash flows over the life of the 1n-
vestment with finance of the same term. 
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Most respondents in the total sample who preferred to link 
short term sources of finance to investments were in the 
construction industry. According to them long term planning 
in this industry, because of the volatility of the economy 
is impossible. When there is an economic downturn, according 
to them, the construction industry is affected first. 
Question 6 
This question tries to establish whether respondents would 
supplement long term sources of finance with short term 
sources if they experience a short fall. 
Respondents who indicated that they would indeed supplement 
long term sources of finance with short term sources in or-
der to finance an investment if the need arises, totalled 22 
(73,3 per cent). Of these, 20 indicated that they would use 
overdraft facilities for the purpose. Those who supplied 
reasons for this choice said inter alia that overdraft 
facilities were convenient, flexible, easily obtainable and 
are not normally called up. One respondent however, said he 
would only use short term sources if an immediate return is 
expected from the investment. 
Two of the 22 respondents chose trade credit as their form 
of short term funds. They declined to give reasons. 
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Of the 8 respondents who indicated that they would not go 
ahead with the investment, 7 declined to give reasons and 1 
said he did not use short term funds for long term invest-
ments under any circumstances. 
The responses to this question reinforced the observation 
made previously that the majority of respondents do not 
really comprehend the danger of using any short term funds 
for long term projects. 
Question 7 
This question directly probed the preference of decision 
makers for the utilization of short term funds to finance 
investments. 
Respondents indicating that they would prefer to use short 
term sources totalled 8 (27 per cent). Of these 7 supplied 





prefer short term financing since long term planning in 
the construction industry is difficult; 
overdraft facilities are flexible (3 respondents); 
overdrafts are cheap (2 respondents) and 
it is company policy to use short term sources to 
finance investments. 
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Of the 22 (73 per cent) respondents who indicated that they 
do not prefer to use short term sources to finance invest-
ments, 17 supplied reasons as follows: 
* prefer to match cash flows with the life of the invest-
ment (2 respondents); 
* a sudden downturn in the economy could have a 
'magnified effect' on the usage of short term funds; 
* prefer to use cash; 
* too costly (3 respondents); 
* investment will be too large; 
* 'normally' prefer not to use short term sources; 






prefer to use short term funds for working capital; 
banks object to advancing short term sources for 1n-
vestment purposes (no reason given as to why banks 
should so object); 
have ample equity available; 
only use short term sources in emergencies and 
not enough cash flow to service short term interest 
charges (3 respondents). 
The responses to this question reinforce conclusions in the 
previous 2 questions that most respondents are not aware of 
the real implications of the usage of short term debt for 
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the funding of investments. Of the responses to this ques-
tion only those underlined truly reflect some understanding. 
The rest appear to be either erroneous or intuitive. 
A chi squared test (x 2 ) was adopted to test the hypothesis 
I 
underlying questions 4 to 7 namely that most decision makers 
are prepared to make use of short term debt in their invest-
ment decision making. Questions 5, 6 and 7 allowed for 
definite 'yes' and 'no' responses. It should be noted 
however that the 'no' answers in question 5, in terms of the 
statistical test, should actually be treated as 'yes' since 
'yes' would indicate usage of short term funds and vice 
versa. 
Question 4 required from respondents to state which forms of 
financing they use when they invest and more than one 
response was permissable. In order to obtain uniform 'yes' 
and 'no responses, the responses in question 4 was also con-
verted to 'yes' and 'no'. If the respondents first answer 
for example was 'long term debt' it was interpreted as 'no' 
because it indicated non usage of short term funds whereas 
answers like 'bank overdraft' and 'trade credit' indicated 
usage of short term funds and were consequently interpreted 
as 'yes'. This system was consequently implemented and 
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revealed that 7 (23,3 per cent) respondents indicated that 
they used short term debt (therefore allocated 'yes' 
answers) whereas 23 (76,7 per cent) said 'no'. 
In this way it was possible to implement an appropriate 
statistical test. Table 13.3 depicts the chi squared (x 2 ) 
test applied. 
TABLE 13.3 
USAGE OF SHORT TERM DEBT TO FINANCE INVESTMENT 
RES- Q U EST I o N S ROW 
PONSES Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 TOTAL 
Yes 7 (10.8) 6 (10.8) 22 (10.8) 8 (10.8) 43 
No 23 (19.3) 24 (19.3) 8 (19.3) 22 (19.3) 77 
Column 
Total 30 30 30 , 30 120 
x 2 - 24.60 
440 
The one tailed critical value at a ,05 level of significance 
is 7.82. However the significant difference is in the op-
posite direction to that hypothesized. This ' in effect means 
that the operational hypothesis that unlisted business firms 
make liberal use of short term funds when investing should 
be rejected. Indeed it is far more likely that they do ex-
actly the opposite. The pattern was only disrupted by ques-
tion 6 and that question could be interpreted as relating 
more to an emergency situation than a normal investment 
situation. 
Perhaps the reasoning and understanding of past experience 
may sometimes be faulty; perhaps they do the right thing for 
the wrong reasons. They nonetheless do the right thing and 
that is important. 
Contrary to expectations, small unlisted firms in the DPP 
area generally finance capital investment with long term 
funds. 
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13.2.5 MEDUIM TERM FINANCE 
Question 8 
In response to the question as to the use made of medium 
term sources in the funding of investments, 10 (33,3 per 
cent) of the respondents answered that they do use medium 
term sources and 20 (66,7 per cent) said that they did not. 
Of the respondents answering 'yes', 7 supplied reasons for 
the usage of these funds: 
* 
* 




In that way cost of asset is 
than a 5 year lease (2 
prefer medium term funds when the investment 'requires' 
it (3 respondents); 
* able to redeem debt commitment sooner than in the case 
of a 5 year lease (2 respondents) and 
* profits can be used to redeem lease commitment. 
Of the respondents who answered 'no' 18 gave reasons why 
they didn't use meduim term funds: 
prefer to match cash flows with life of the investment 
(generally the same as those who preferred long term 
funding); 
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* prefer to have the cost of the investment eliminated 
quickly (short term preference); 
* prefer to fund investment with cash 
* interest rates are too high; 
* repayments are too big (long term preference) and 
* not 'company policy'. 
Medium term sources of financing are less vulnerable than 
short term sources and these responses, taken together with 
earlier answers endorse the view that most respondents were 
conservative in financing. 
13.2.6 RISK ATTITUDES TOWARD USAGE OF SHORT TERM DEBT 
Question 9 
Question 9 endeavours to assess the attitudes of respondents 
specifically in respect of the risk embodied in short term 
debt, when used for investment purposes. 
Respondents were required to indicate whether they were not 
afraid that if short term debt is used for investment deci-
sion making, these debts will have to be paid before there 
is sufficient cash flow from the investment. Respondents who 
did not answer this question numbered 10 (33,3 per cent) 
since they did not make use of short term funds in the fund-
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ing of their capital expenditures. Of the 20 (67,7 per cent) 
who did answer the question 6 (30 per cent) respondents 
answered 'yes' i.e. they were afraid and 14 (70 per cent) 
answered 'no' i.e. they were not afraid. Those who were not 
afraid gave the following reasons: 
* the plant generates enough cash flow to meet any emer-
gencies in respect of the servicing of any short term 
debt (8 respondents); 




in an emergency situation, my firm would have no other 
choice but to make use of overdraft facilities and 
overdrafts are not normally called up. 
The majority of 'fearless' responses to this question indi-
cated that the respondents concerned are liquid enough to 
handle situations where cash flows from an investment cannot 
be utilized to service the financing source that was applied 
t~ that investment. 
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13.2.7 PREFERENCE OF FINANCING SOURCE 
Question 10 
This question probes the conceptual preference of respon-
dents as to different forms of financing in the investment 
process. Unlike question 4 where respondents had to indicate 
the forms of finance they actually use when they invest, 
this question required them to indicate the 3 kinds of fund-
ing favoured most, in order of preference. The results are 
reflected in table 13.4. 
TABLE 13.4 
MOST FAVOURED FORM OF FINANCING FOR INVESTMENT 
SOURCE OF FUNDS (IN SEQUENCE OF PREFERENCE) 
Owner supplied funds 
Retained earnings 
Bank overdrafts 
Long term loans 
Leasing 




Short term debt 
Bankers acceptances 















The forms of finance preferred were rated on a points scale 
from 3 (most preferred) to 1 (least preferred). 
The reasons given for the choice of owner supplied funds and 
retained earnings were mostly that these forms of finance 
were less costly, less risky and carried no interest 
charges. One respondent said he would give it priority be-
cause he wanted to stay independant. All the respondents who 
preferred bank overdrafts did so because they were flexible 
and fairly easily obtainable. Leasing's relative popularity 
stemmed from the fact that lease payments were tax deduc-
table and would be spread over 5 years. 
The fact that such a high number of respondents selected 
equity as their number one preference for funding investment 
indicates an attitude of conservatism. 
13.2.8 ATTITUDES TOWARD FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
Question 11 
Question's 11-14 relate to respondents' attitudes toward 
leverage. 
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Question 11 was very direct and probes the hypothesis that 
unlisted firms, because of a shortage of equity capital, 
have large debt ratios. 
The respondents who thought their 
proportionately high totalled 6 





per cent) whilst 23 
ratios were within 
limits. One respondent would not answer the question. 
In order to test the operational hypothesis, the large 
sample sign test was again implemented. In this instance the 
test statistic yielded an answer of -3,2. This was sig-
nificant at the ,05 level for a one tailed test. However 
this significant result was precisely opposite to the direc-
tion predicted. Respondents did not consider themselves to 
be under capitalized and were quite comfortable with the 
debt utilized. 
Question 12 
This question called for an exact specification of the 
respondent's debt ratio, including shareholder's loans as 
debt. One respondent declined to answer the question. The 
debt ratio of the other 29 respondents ranged from 5 - 90 
per cent with a mean of 36 per cent and a standard deviation 
of 21. The standard deviation, which is quite large, indi-
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cates that there were very low debt ratios and some very 
high ones. These debt ratios in actual fact reveal that debt 
ratios in the sample are indeed conservative in comparison 
with many listed companies. It can therefore be concluded 
that respondent's perceptions of their debt ratios cor-
responded with reality. 
Question 13 
Respondents were required to state what they thought was the 
maximum debt ratios their firms could sustain without being 
financially embarrassed. 
A total of 7 respondents were unable to answer the question. 
The debt ratios mentioned by the other 23 respondents ranged 
from 25 per cent to 90 per cent with a mean value of 50 per 
cent. This was substantially above the mean calculated in 
question 12. It however indicates a relatively low maximum, 
a fact that reinforces previous conclusions of a conserva-
tive attitude towards debt. 
Question 14 
This question attempted to establish attitudes towards the 
composition of a financial mix. 
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Respondents were asked which form of finance they would 
prefer if they needed additional capital and had to choose 
between debt and equity. 
A number of 22 <73,3 per cent) respondents indicated that 
they preferred equity and 7 (23,3 per cent) preferred debt. 
The remaining respondent replied that his choice would 
depend upon the state of the economy namely that if interest 
rates drop he would consider borrowing, if not he would 
choose equity. This respondent seemed to be aware of the 
profits to be reaped as result of the favourable employment 
of lever~ge. 
A signif1cant factor that emerged from the interpretation of 
the responses from this question was that 6 respondents who 
chose equity gave as their reason that it was a form of 
finance with no interest charges and no financial costs. 
These 6 confirmed this belief in responses to a later ques-
tion which asked specifically whether equity has a cost. 
Comment which reinforced a clearly emerging attitude of cau-
tion included, 'am afraid of large debt ratios, 'don't like 
to pay interest' 'don't like working for the bank' and 'am 
conservative'. Many observed that a firm which borrows 
heavily in the RSA could soon find itself in dire straits 
due to the volatility of the interest rates. 
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One respondent who chose debt, had a relatively low debt 
ratio of 25 per cent. The reason for his choice was that he 
felt he had room for leverage in his financial mix. Another 
respondent chose debt because he favoured the tax deduc-
tability of interest charges. Other respondents who chose 
debt felt it was their choice because it was flexible or was 
the cheapest form of finance. These answers indicated that 
many respondents often had rational reasons for choosing 
debt for funding investment. However not one respondent jus-
tified his answer by reference to establishing an optimal 
cost of capital. 
13.2.9 OPPORTUNITY COST 
Question 15 
Questions 15 and 16 relate to opportunity costs. More 
specifically question 15 probed the hypothesis that 
owner/managers are not generally conscious of outside oppor-
tunity yields on investments in a risk class similar to in-
vestment in their own firms. 
Respondents were asked whether they were aware of oppor-
tunities where they could earn a higher return on investment 
in a risk class similar to investment in their own firms. 
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Anyone who answered 'no' were further asked whether any at-
tempts had been made to establish returns on alternative i ,n-
vestments. A uniformally negative response was obtained. 
There were 20 (66,7 per cent) of the respondents who 
answered 'no' and 10 (33,3 per cent ) who answered 'yes'. In 
order to test the hypothesis as to whether owner/managers of 
small unlisted firms are generally aware of opportunity 
yields on investments in a risk class similar to investment 
in their own firms a large sample sign test was again ap-
plied. 
In this instance the statistical test yielded a value of 
-1,83. Since -1,83 is less than the critical value of -1,645 
at the 0,5 significance level of a one tailed test it can be 
concluded that there were significantly more 'no' than 'yes' 
answers. This in effect means that there is a 95 per cent 
chance that the operational hypothesis is valid. 
Question 16 
This question required reasons from those 10 respondents who 
were aware of better opportunities, why they did not invest 
in such opportunities instead of the firm. They were asked 
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, 
more specifically to explain why they don't liquidate their 
present investment in the firm and invest the proceeds in 
the better opportunity. 
The following reasons were given by the 10 respondents. 
* my firm has better future prospects (2 respondents); 
* outside opportunities are short term and fluctuating (4 
respondents); 
* job satisfaction and responsibility toward employees (3 
respondents) and 
* starting up costs at a later stage would be too expen-
sive (1 respondent). By this the respondent meant that 
if the alternative opportunity in which he invested 
proved to be a failure, starting from scratch the form 
of business he presently owns would be too expensive. 
The responses indicated that respondents did not really 
evaluate outside opportunities in terms of those having the 
same risk as that of the firm. They rather vizualized com-
parative opportunities in terms of risk free short term in-
vestments in financial institutions. They definitely seemed 
to have a problem in comprehending ~he concept of risk quan-
tification or alternatively of actually quantifying the risk 
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in an alternative opportunity. If the latter alternative is 
true it is a situation which is indeed problematic and 
recognized as such in financial literature (section 10.4.2). 
13.2.10 VALUATION OF SHARES 
Question 17 
This question was aimed at establishing how respondents 
would go about valuing their shares in the business. 
Respondents were required to state how they would go about 
calculating a minimum acceptable price for their shares if 
they were to liquidate their interest in the firm ~ 
There were six of the respondents who said they had no idea. 
Table 13.5 categorizes the responses of the other 24. The 
columns headed net assets and earnings reflect responses 
















SHARE VALUATION METHODS 
NO. OF 
RESPONDENTS 
based on net assets; 
net assets at book value + 3 years 
after tax earnings; 
net assets at market value + goodwill; 
net assets value + super profits 
method; 
net assets at market value; 
net assets at book value 
3 years after tax earnings + equity 
divided by number of shares; 
3 years after tax earnings plus 
asset value; 
4 to 5 times annual after tax 
profits; 
annual after tax profits X 10 + 
3 times after tax annual earnings 
40 per cent asset value + 60 per 
cent goodwill and patent holding; 
valued in relation to plant on hand; 

















Due to a variety of meanings probably associated with some 
of the key words involved there is clearly some overlapping 
1n the responses and the categorization is tentative at 
best. Verbatim responses only were recorded and clarifying 
questions were posed only in relation to certain issues. 
Where 'goodwill' was mentioned, the respondents were unable 
to say how goodwill should be valued. Similarly the 'super 
profits' method could not be explained. In all cases 'after 
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tax profits' were said to refer to historic audited figures 
but when asked if this referred only to the last audited 
years results, an average of the last 2 years or to the an-
ticipated current year's results confusion was evident. 
The only general conclusion that could be reached was that 
none of the respondents considered opportunity cost or any 
discount of future profits. There was merely a vague idea 
that price should relate somehow to net asset values and to 
proven profitability. 
13.2.11 COST OF CAPITAL 
Question 18 
Questions 18-22 relate to the cost of capital. Question 18 
sought to establish the way in which respondents understood 
the cost of debt. 
Respondents were asked how they regarded the cost of bor-
rowed funds. 
There were 10 (33,3 per cent) respondents who viewed the 
cost of debt in terms of Rands, 13 (43,3 per cent) who 
viewed the cost as a percentage and 7 (23,4 per cent) who 
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viewed the cost in terms of Rand and percentage. These 
responses indicated once again that the role of the cost of 
debt in investment decision making was poorly understood. 
Apart from the fact that this question was supposed to 
reflect respondent's conception of the cost of borrowed 
funds it also served as a control for question 2. The ra-
tionale for this was explained in section 12.8.11. As a con-
trol this question served its purpose in that the respondent 
who had indicated that his firm used the net present value 
method for investment decision making expressed the cost of 
debt in terms of Rands. When asked how his firm was able to 
calculate a discount rate if they do not assess the cost of 
debt percentage wise, he could not respond. It was then ad-
mitted that although he believed that the NPV approach was 
correct, his firm did not in fact use it. 
Since the real cost of debt is the after tax cost, the next 
question probed respondent's comprehension of this aspect. 
Question 19 
The hypothesis was made that the cost of debt is not 
generally measured on an after tax basis when a decision on 
the financing of an investment is made. 
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Respondents were simply asked whether they calculate the 
cost of debt on a before tax or aft er tax basis. 
There were 23 (77 per cent) respondents who assessed the 
cost of debt on a before tax basis whereas 7 (23 per cent) 
assessed the cost on an after tax basis. It was indicated by 
1 respondent that he assessed the cost on a before tax basis 
because the tax benefit only · comes 1 year later. Some 
respondents gave the impression that they were not even 
aware of the tax benefit that involves the deductability of 
interest before tax is paid. 
In order to test the hypothesis formally the large sample 
sign test was again implemented. The respondents who viewed 
the cost of debt on a before tax basis were allotted plus(+) 
signs and the ones who viewed the cost on an after tax basis 
minus(-) signs. 
In this case the observed value of the test statistic proved 
to be 2,9 for a one tailed test which was significant at the 
,05 level. The hypothesis was accordingly sustained. 
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Question 20 
This question was designed to test the hypothesis that 
owner/managers do not consider the cost of equity when 
making investments. 
The question was posed as to whether equity funds (owner 
supplied funds - money, goods or retained earnings) have a 
cost. It was hypothesized that a significant number of 
respondents would claim that equity funds have no cost. 
Respondents who regarded equity as having a cost totalled 22 
(73,3 per cent) whereas 8 (26,7 per cent) said that it had 
no cost. Of the latter group, 7 said that equity was 'cost 
free'. On further questioning they indicated that it had no 
cost because no interest was payable on it, unlike debt. The 
other respondent in this group answered that only directors' 
loans have a cost but equity had none. 
If the large sample s1gn test in this instance is applied to 
test the hypothesis it reveals an observed test statistic of 
2,56. Although the critical value at the ,05 level of sig-
nificance is 1,645 for a one tailed test the result is in 
the opposite direction to the hypothesis, which must accord-
ingly be rejected. 
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In the following question relevant respondents were re-
quested to elaborat~ on their concept of the cost of equity. 
Question 21 
The 22 respondents who indicated in the previous question 
that they perceived equity to have a cost were requested to 
indicate from a choice of 7 categories which best described 
their concept of this cost. 
The various categories from which respondents had to choose 
as well as the number of respondents who chose a specific 
category were as follows: 
a) net profit after taxes as a percentage of the book 
value of equity - 5 respondents 
b) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
book value of total investment - 1 respondent 
c) net profit after taxes as a percentage of market value 
of equity - 1 respondent 
d) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
market value of equity - 1 respondent 
e) net profit after taxes plus interest as a percentage of 
market value of total investment - 1 respondent 
f) opportunity cost <what owners could earn elsewhere) 
10 respondents 
459 
g) none of these (please describe): (overdraft rate) - 1 
respondent (The prevailing prime overdraft rate was 21 
per cent). 
There were 2 respondents who indicated that they were not 
sure. 
It is obvious from the above responses that confusion ex-
isted among respondents about the cost of equity capital. 
However, a substantial number did select 'opportunity cost'. 
Indeed, the number is significant at the ,05 level for a two 
tailed test. 
Question 22 
Respondents who said that equity had a cost were asked which 
rate they thought approximated the cost of this form of 
finance in their respective firms. Of the 22 respondents, 16 
responded to this question. (The other 6 indicated that they 
did not know the co si of equity in their firms.> The cost of 
equity estimated, ranged from 15 to 35 per cent with a mean 
value of 20 per cent. It is interesting that this mean value 
was lower than the prevailing prime overdraft rate (21 per 
cent). This finding is not consistent with the suggestion 
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made by Weston and Brigham (1978:796) that the cost of debt 
should generally be lower than the cost of equity. Boyer 
(1974 :9) explains this view as follows: 
"There is firstly a tax ~dvantage on debt which reduces 
the cost and secondly the cost of equity is generally 
supposed to be higher than that of debt because of the 
risk factor it reflects." 
It should however, also be borne 1n mind that if non-
economic satisfactions are relevant, the relative cost of 
equity might be further depressed. This thought will be ex-
plored further when the responses to questions 42-47 are 
considered. 
13.2.12 TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The next question was intended to establish whether respon-
dents considered target capital structures in their finan-
cial decision making. 
Question 23 
The hypothesis to be tested through this question was that 
finance for new investments would not be raised according to 
a target capital structure. 
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Subjects were asked to indicate whether debt and equity (if 
used in the funding of proposed capital expenditure) are 
raised according to a specific ratio. 
Of the respondents 28 (93,3 per cent) said that they did not 
raise funds in a specific ratio whereas 2 (6,7 per cent) 
respondents indicated that they did. 
In this case there is overwhelming evidence in favour of ac-
ceptance of the hypothesis. 
13.2.13 WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARGINAL COST OF CAPITAL 
Question 24 
This question tests the hypothesis that owner/managers of 
unlisted small firms do not attempt to calculate a weighted 
average marginal cost of capital when they make investment 
decisions. 
They were asked : "if debt and equity were used in the fund-
ing o£ capital expenditures how woul~ you go about determin-
ing the overall cost?" 
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* There were 6 (20 per cent) subjects who said they did 
not know; 
* another said that he disregards the cost of funds when 
he invests and rather makes sure that the cash flow is 
sufficient; 
* 3 respondents said they visualized an average cost; 
* another respondent indicated that since he never uses 
debt he only takes cognizance of the cost of equity; 
* the respondents who considered only the cost of bor-
rowed funds numbered 18 (60 per cent). Amongst these 
respondents were 11 who did recognize a cost of equity; 
* the respondent who had indicated that his firm used 
DCF, calculated the overall cost of capital as follows 
: debt in Rands and equity on an ROI basis. He however 
answered previously that he regarded the cost of equity 
as being an opportunity cost. There was clearly some 
inconsistency in the responses of this subject. It is 
suspected that although he knew something about DCF 
techniques and knew that they were considered 'right', 
he did not use them, but did not wish to acknowledge 
the fact. 
A weighted average marginal cost of capital is clearly a 
concept which plays no part in the investment decision 
making of the firms in this study. 
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13.2.14 INFLATION 
Questions 25 and 26 explored the way in which inflation is 
dealt with in the investment decision making process. 
Question 25 
This question concerns the hypothesis that inflation is ig-
nored by owner/managers when they make investment decisions. 
Respondents were asked bluntly whether they consider infla-
tion when they make investment decisions. 
The respondents who answered that they do consider inflation 
in their investment decision making numbered 22 <73,3 per 
cent) whereas 8 (26,7 per cent) indicated that they did not. 
The 22 respondents who did consider inflation described 




respondents who said they account for inflation 
'according to their perception of future values'num-
bered 4; 
there were 2 respondents who s~id they take cognizance 
of rising costs of labour and raw materials; 
the respondents who said they considered replacement 
values of equipment at a later stage numbered 4; 
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* some respondents, 4 in total, said the only way they 
* 
adjust for inflation is to buy machinery as soon as 
possible because the sooner it is bought, the sooner it 
appreciates; 
there were 5 respondents who said they applied a 
projected inflation rate to estimate the future prices 
of machinery. They were very 'vague' about this 'rate'; 
* another respondent said he adjusts for inflation ac-
cording to the consumer price index. He could not say 
what it was he adjusted. 
* another respondent adjusted for inflation according to 
'gut feel' and 
* another one said he adjusted for inflation by building 
a rate of escalation into future prices (he was unable 
to elaborate on this rate). 
If the large sample sign test is employed to test the 
hypothesis that owner/managers of small unlisted firms do 
not take inflation into account in their investment decision 
making it reveals an observed test statistic of 2,56. Al-
though the critical value at the ,05 per cent level of sig-
nificance is 1,645 for a one tailed test the result is in ' 
the opposite direction to the hypothesis, which must accord-
ingly be rejected. However, although the above hypothesis is 
rejected on a basis of a closed ended question, the methods 
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described by respondents are so subjective and vague that an 
in depth test on these methods could very well prove the 
hypothesis to be effectively true. 
In the following question more information was required con-
cerning the inflation rate used by respondents. 
QUESTION 26 
Respondents who answered in the previous question that they 
do consider inflation in their investment decision making 
were required to state the rate used. 
/ 
Only 1 respondent used a rate according to the cost price 
index which he stated as between 15 and 17 per cent. The 
price index to all knowledge does not exist. When the 
respondent was asked how he applied this index he could not 
respond. 
There were 2 respondents who used an arbitrary rate of 20 
per cent and 2 respondents who used a rate of 15 per cent. 
Other responses were inter alia the following: built into 
forecast, informally, perception, gut feel, prime rate plus, 
per cent, rate advised by financial institutions and no 
fixed rate. 
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The diversity of subjective methods and their vagueness puts 
a question mark on the validity of these rates and the way 
in which they are said to be applied. 
13.2.15 LIQUIDITY 
S~bjects were most unlikely to admit to a liquidity problem 
to a researcher and accordingly, indirect questioning was 
needed. Questions 27-38 test liquidity aspects of firms in 
the study. Questions 27 to 34 relate to the probable actual 
liquidity position of respondents whereas questions 35 to 38 
probe attitudes toward liquidity. 
Questions 27 to 34 concern the hypothesis that there exists 
a liquidity shortage amongst unlisted firms in the study. 
Each of seven questions viz. 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33 and 34 
carry an equal weight of 14,29 per cent in order to estab-
lish an overall probable liquidity rating. Question 30 does 
not form part of the weighted series of questions relevant 
to the hypothesis. It serves merely as a prompt towards 
question 31. 
For each question a 'yes' answer will indicate illiquidity 
and will score 14,29 per cent, whereas a 'no' answer will 
indicate liquidity and the score will be nil. The higher the 
score a respondent achieves therefore, the more illiquid his 
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firm will be. Each respondent thus had 7 scoreable ques-
tions, with a maximum possible score of 100,0 per cent. The 
terms of each of the questions are briefly restated for ease 
of reference: 
Question 27 endeavours to asdertain whether a respondent ex-
periences any difficulty with collection from debtors. 
Question 28 requires respondents to indicate whether they 
stretch payments to creditors on principle. 
Question 29 seeks to ascertain whether major customers who 
are slow payers put pressure on the firm when money 
generally is tight. 
Question 30 asks whether the frequency of the cynical debt-
ors control excuse: 'the cheque is in the post,' has in-
creased lately. This question does not form part of the 
hypothesis but serve to prepare the respondent's mind for 
the next question. 
Question 31 seeks to ascertain whether the respondent has 
himself tried 'the cheque is in the post' answer to queries 
from the debtors control of suppliers. 
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Question 32 tries to establish whether the bank manager has 
ever made mention of a current ratio of 2 to 1. This is 
something he is likely to have said if he felt the firm had 
a liquidity problem. 
Question 33 tries to establish whether the bank manager has 
made mention of an acid test ratio of 1:1. This is likely if 
stock seemed to be slow moving. 
Question 34 provides the respondent with a choice between 
two investments A and B, each having a cost of R1 000. In-
vestment A has an after tax cash flow of RSOO, R800 and R1 
000 in years 1, 2 and 3 respectively whereas investment B 
only has a R3 200 after tax cash flow in the third year. A 
respondent choosing alternative A is regarded as illiquid 
and will be associated with a 'yes' answer whilst one choos-
ing alternative B is regarded as liquid and will be as-
sociated with a 'no' answer. Figure 14.1 1S a bar chart 
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The distribution has a mean value of 50 per cent and a stan-
dard deviation of 20.68. The distribution furthermore 
reveals that there is a bias towards the middle ranges of 
liquidity in the study. 
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The correlation coefficient between liquidity scores and 
debt ratios is -.018. This statistic reveals that there is 
no significant relationship between illiquid firms and firms 
with high debt ratios amongst the sample firms. 
Table 13.6 depicts the results, arranged in a format to per-
mit a chi square test. 
TABLE 13.6 
LIQUIDITY OF UNLISTED BUSINESS FIRMS 
QUESTIONS 
RES- Q27 Q28 Q29 Q31 Q32 Q33 Q34 ~ 
PONSES tror 
Yes P.4 <11.8) 12( 11.8) 14 <11.8) 8 <11.8) 8 <11.8) 9 <11.8) 18 <11.8) 83 
No 116 <18.14) 18 <18.14) 16 <18.14) 22 <18.14) 22 <18.14) 21 <18.14) 12 <18.4) 1127 
Col-
umn 
total 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 210 
x 2 = 15,29 
The one tailed critical value at a ,05 level of significance 
is 12.59. However, the significant difference recorded is in 
the opposite direction to that hypothesized. This in effect 
means that the operational hypothesis that there exists a 
relative liquidity shortage in most unlisted firms in the 
study should be rejected. Indeed, the firms involved in the 
study generally appeared to have adequate liquidity. 
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The evidence supplied by the above test reinforces the ob-
servations relating to leverage whi ch suggested conservatism 
in financial management among subject firms. 
13.2.16 ATTITUDES TOWARD LIQUIDITY 
Questions 35 to 38 probe the attitude of respondents towards 
liquidity. 
Question 35 
This question tests the hypothesis that if a liquidity 
shortage does exist, independant investments with high 
returns but slow paybacks would be rejected. 
The respondents 
ment of R100 000 
return of 35 
after 6 years. 
cent) • 
were asked if they would accept an invest-
with an expected after tax discounted 
per cent that will however only be received 
(The cost of capital is assumed to be 20 per 
There were 25 respondents (83,3 per cent) who would refuse 
to accept the investment and 5 (6,7 per cent) who would ac-
cept it. 
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The respondents who refused the investment on grounds of a 
low return totalled 4. The remainder (21) of the respondents 
rejected it on grounds of relative illiguidity. 
Respondents who accepted the investment indicated that 
'return takes precedence over liquidity.' 
If the large sample sign test is applied in this instance 
'yes' answers would total only 21 because these were the 
number of respondents who rejected the investment on grounds 
of the negative impact that acceptance would have on li-
quidity •. 
The test statistic yielded an answer of -3,66. Since -3,66 
is less than the critical value at the ,05 per cent level of 
significance of 1,645 for a one tailed test it can be con-
cluded that there were significantly more 'no' answers than 
'yes' answers. This means that the operational hypothesis 
that investments with high returns and slow paybacks are 
rejected has a ninety five per cent chance of being correct. 
Question 36 
The next question concerns investments with fast payback 
periods and minimal returns. 
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The question endeavours to verify the hypothesis that in-
vestments with fast payback periods and marginal returns are 
favoured. 
Respondents were asked whether they would accept an invest-
ment of R100 000 with an expected after tax return of 25 per 
cent and a payback period of 2 years. (The cost of capital is 
assumed to be 20 per cent) 
The respondents who said 'yes' to the investment totalled 15 
(50 per cent) whereas 15 (50 per cent) said 'no'. The 15 who 
indicated that they would accept the investment indicated 
that they would do this on grounds of its liquidity. These 
were the same respondents who rejected the investment in the 
previous question on grounds of illiquidity. Those who 
rejected the investment indicated that the return was too 
low. 
Since it is quite clear that no difference exists between 
'yes' and 'no' answers the operational hypothesis can be 
rejected. However, the results certainly endorsed the find-
ings under the previous question by virtue of the identity 
and reasoning of respondents. 
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Question 37 
This question probes liquidity preferences in circumstances 
of mutually exclusive investment opportunities. 
It relates to the hypothesis that when mutually exclusive 
investments are considered there will be a bias towards an 
investment with a fast payback and lower returns relative to 
one with a slower payback and better returns. 
Respondents were given a choice between two investments A 
and B. A has an expected after tax return of 25 per-cent and 
a payback period of 2 years. Investment B has an expected 
after tax return of 40 ~er cent and a payback period of six 
years (the cost of capital is 20 per cent). A, the liquid 
investment is associated with a 'yes' answer and B the illi-
quid investment with a 'no' answer. 
The respondents who accepted investment A on grounds of li-
quidity numbered 22 <73,33 per cent) whereas 6 (20 per cent) 
respondents rejected the investment on grounds of a low 
return. These 6 respondents also rejected the investment in 
question 36 on grounds of a low return and proved to be the 
same six who were return. orientated in question 35. Their 
responses in the following question will be closely 
scrutinized in order to see whether they remain return 
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orientated. Another respondent did not know how to choose 
and another indicated that he first had to do a NPV calcula-
tion before he could decide. 
The large sample sign test in this instance reveals a criti-
cal value of 1,645 for a one tailed test at the ,05 per cent 
level of significance. Since the observed test statistic of 
2,56 is bigger than the critical value it indicates that 
'yes' answers predominated significantly. The operational 
hypothesis is therefore sustained. 
Question 38 
This next question tries to establish whether respondents 
would prefer liquid investments irrespective of higher in-
cremental returns. 
More specifically it probes the hypothesis that returns will 
only be sacrificed for liquidity, up to a certain point. 
After this 'cut off' point returns will have precedence over 
liquidity. 
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Respondents were firstly required to choose between 2 in-
vestments A and B. A has an expected after tax return of 23 
per cent and a payback period of 2 years and B had an ex-
pected after tax return of 26 per cent and ,a payback period 
of 4 years. 
Investment A will be associated with a 'yes' answer and in-
vestment B with a 'no' answer. 
There was 1 respondent who did not know how to choose. 
Another respondent indicated that he would decide after he 
made a NPV analysis. The other 28 (93,3 per cent) respon-
dents all chose investment A being the more liquid one. 
The second part of the question however introduces an in-
cremental return. Respondents were requested to indicate 
whether they would prefer investment A with an expected 
after tax return of 25 per cent and a payback period of 2 
years or an investment B with an expected after tax return 
of 40 per cent and a payback period of 4 years. There were 
20 (66,7 per cent) respondents who chose the more liquid, 
lower return investment. 
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The respondents who chose investment B on grounds of its 
high return numbered 10 (33,3 per cent). Of these, 6 proved 
to be the same respondents who gave precedence to return 
over liquidity in the previous 3 questions. 
A closer look at these 6 respondents' liquidity scores 
reveals that they were all relatively liquid and indeed in a 
position to give return priority over liquidity. 
Their liquidity scores were as follows: 
o - 20 per cent - 2 respondents 
20 40 per cent 2 respondents 
40 - 50 per cent - 2 respondents. 
The last two respondent's liquidity score (42,86) were well 
below the mean liquidity score (50) calculated previously 
from questions 27-34. 
The fact that 20 respondents preferred a liquid investment 
with a minimal r .eturn over a less liquid investment with a 
much higher return indicates a very high preference for li-
quidity. It certainly indicates great caution in investment 
decisions. The large sample sign test rendered an observed 
statistic of 1.831. Since 1,831 is more than the critical 
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value of 1,645 for a one tailed test at a ,05 per cent level 
of significance there is evidence that 'yes' answers 
predominate that is, a preference for liquidity. 
13.2.17 SALARIES 
Question 39 
The following question endeavours to determine the awareness 
of owner/managers regarding opportunity salaries. 
Question 39 in particular, tests the hypothesis that 
owner/managers are not aware of the nature or extent of 
salaries and/or drawings from other firms in the industry. 
Owner/Managers were asked directly whether they were aware 
of the nature or extent of salaries and/or drawings from 
other firms in the industry. 
There were 11 (36;6 per cent) of the respondents who 
answered 'yes', they were aware of salaries drawn by other 
owner/managers in the same industry, and 19 responderits 
answered that they did not know. 
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In order to test the hypothesis the large sample sign test 
was chosen. This test rendered an observed statistic of 
-1,46. Since the critical value of the ,05 per cent level of 
significance is -1,645 for a one tailed test the hypothesis 
must be rejected. 
13.2.18 NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS 
Questions 40 to 47 test the hypothesis that there exists 
certain non economic satisfactions which can induce 
owner/managers of unlisted business firms to accept sub-
standard returns relative to other investments of similar 
risk outside the firm. If this situation does exist it would 
effectively lower the cost of equity for the unlisted firm. 
Question 40 
Question 40 requested respondents to indicate what increase 
in their current earnings would induce them to sell whatever 
shares they might have in their particular business and ac-
cept a position elsewhere in a large organization. Their 
'earnings' consist of salary plus income from invested capi-
tal. They would be free to invest the capital released 
whereever they liked. 
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Table 13.7 depicts the categories from which subjects had to 
choose as well as their respective choices. 
TABLE 13.7 
INCREMENTAL EARNINGS REQUIRED TO SURRENDER BUSINESS OWNER-
SHIP 
CATEGORIES OF INCREMENTAL RETURNS NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 
RO R 5 000 p.a. 0 
R 5 001 R10 000 p.a. 2 
R10 001 R20 000 p.a. 5 
Any other increase (specify) 8 
No increase at all, explain 15 
Respondents who indicated 'any other increase' specified the 
following:-
R 40 000 1 respondent 
R 50 000 1 respondent 
R 80 000 1 respondent 
R 100 000 1 respondent 
R 500 000 1 respondent 
R1 000 000 1 respondent 
R2 000 000 1 respondent 
4 day work week- 1 respondent 
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Respondents who indicated 'no increase at all' had the fol-
lowing reasons: 
* job satisfaction cannot be bought - 12 respondents 
* want to stay in business - 2 respondents 
* too used to being owner/manager - 1 respondent 
It appears from the above analysis that owner/managers, 
place a very high premium on 'non economic satisfactions.' 
Question 41 
This question probes what monetary premium owner/managers 
put on the fact that they are their own 'bosses'. 
Respondents were asked what they thought being their own 
boss is worth in monetary terms elsewhere (they were re-
quired to state one single payment). Table 14.8 depicts the 
responses on this question. 
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TABLE 13.8 
VALUE PLACED BY OWNER/MANAGERS ON "BEING THEIR OWN BOSS" 
CATEGORIES OF VALUES RESPONDENTS 
R 0 R 10 000 2 
R 10 001 R 20 000 1 
R 20 001 R 50 000 4 
R 50 001 R 100 000 3 
R 100 001 R 500 000 4 
R 500 001 R1 000 000 6 
R1 000 001 R2 000 000 1 
R2 000 001 R3 000 000 1 
OTHER: 
Interest on invested capital plus 
R3 000 per month 1 
No value whatsover 1 
Undecided 6 
The high values placed by respondents on being their own 




Question 42 probes the relative importance of different fac-
tors as being motivators for owner/managers to invest in an 
own business. 
Respondents were asked how important certain factors were in 
their decision making to invest in their own company. ' These 
factors will now be evaluated on a points basis ranging from 
+3 (most important) to -3 (most unimportant), in order to 
establish the ranking of importance: 
Table 13.9 depicts the results of this ranking. 
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TABLE 13.9 
FACTORS IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE INDUCING OWNER/MANAGERS TO 
INVEST IN OWN COMPANIES 
NO. FACTORS RESPONDENTS RATING 
(POINTS) IN TERMS 
OF +3 TO -3 
1 I can play a part in planning and 
controlling decisions 86 
6 I take pride in running my own 
business 75 
3 I can be my own boss 69 
5 I control my income by my own 
actions 65 
8 I feel that I am contributing to 
the growth of the community 59 
2 I hold a leadership position 52 
4 I know my job is secure 27 
7 Members of my community recognize 
my position in the firm and hold me 
in esteem ·because of it 19 
Independence and the ability to control one's destiny emerge 
clearly as the most important considerations. 
Question 43 
Question 43 seeks to establish whether respondents would be will-
ing to make sacrifices in order to · retain any or all of the fac-
tors mentioned in question 42. 
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Respondents were requested to indicate whether they would be 
prepared to sacrifice a large percentage of return, a moderate 
percentage of return, . a low percentage of return or no return in 
order to retain any of the factors mentioned in question 42. 
Table 13.10 depicts a grid where respondents had to indicate the 
nature of the return they were willing to sacrifice in order to 
retain any of the factors mentioned in question 42. 
In order to obtain a significant comparison factors (a) (b) (c) 
and (d) depicting large returns, moderate returns, small returns 
and no returns respectively and were weighted 4, 3, 2 and 1. 
TABLE 13.10 
SACRIFICES IN TERMS OF RATE OF RETURN 
00 ooN ~C SATISFACTIONS a b c d TCYrAL 
1 I can play a part in planning and con- 10 10 7 3 87 
trolling decisions 
2 I hold a leadership position 4 ·7 9 10 65 
3 I can be my own boss 9 9 7 5 82 
4 I know my job is secure 8 6 9 7 75 
5 I control my incOIre by my own actions 7 10 9 4 80 
6 I take pride in running my own business 3 8 13 6 68 
7 Members of my coomunity recognize my 3 4 4 19 51 
position in the firm and hold me in 
esteem because of it 
8 I feel that I am contributing to the 
growth of the cormumity 2 4 9 15 53 
In both questions 42 and 43 factor number 1 scored the 
highest points which reveals that the factor 'I can play a 
part in planning and controlling decisions' is the most 
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coveted non economic satisfaction for which the greatest 
return will be sacrificed in order to retain it. It can fur-
thermore be established that factors 1, 3 and 5 featured in 
the first four most popular non economic factors for which 
return will be sacrificed, both _in questions 42 and 43, al-
though not in the same sequence. A further observation to be 
made is that factors 2 and 7 featured 6th and 8th in both 
questions. This points to consistency in the responses. 
Question 44 
This question was intended to establish whether respondents 
were willing to sacrifice return for any other non economic 
satisfactions not mentioned in question 42. 
Respondents were asked whether there were any other non 
economic satisfactions which they enjoyed in their firms, 
for which they would be willing to sacrifice return. 
There were 27 (90 per cent) respondents who said that there 
were no other factors for which they would sacrifice return 
in order to stay in the firm. 
There were 2 respondents who indicated that they were, will-
ing to sacrifice for 'job enjoyment.' 
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One respondent indicated that he was prepared to sacrifice 
return for 'social responsibility.' 
Question 45 
Question 45 tested whether respondents were aware of making 
sacrifices for staying in business. 
Respondents were asked whether they felt that they were cur-
rently sacrificing return in order to maintain any of the 
characteristics mentioned in questions 43 and 44. 
There were 24 (80 per cent) of the respondents who said 
'no', they were not currently sacrificing return in order to 
retain any of the factors mentioned in questions 42 and 43 
and 6 (20 per cent) who answered 'yes'. 
Of the 6 who answered 'yes' 1 respondent said he felt he was 
sacrificing in order to maintain factor number 1 (I can play 
a part in planning ~nd controlling decisions) whereas 3 
respondents felt they sacrificed return in order to retain 
all the factors collectively. Another respondent said he 
sacrificed return in order to retain factor number eight and 
another one said he sacrificed return in order to maintain 
factors 1 to 5. Those who said 'no' were clearly satisfied 
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that they were making more money by being in business for 
their own account than they would earn by working for 
someone else and investing their assets elsewhere. 
Question 46 
The objective 6f this question is to try and put a monetary 
value on non economic satisfactions. 
Respondents were requested to indicate what maximum return 
on their investment they would be willing to sacrifice in 
order to maintain the factors mentioned in question 42. 
There were 28 of the respondents who indicated that they 
were willing to sacrifice some return. Only 1 respondent was 
undecided and another one indicated that he was not prepared 
to sacrifice anything. of the 28 respondents who were will-
ing to ' sacrifice, one was prepared to sacrifice his total 
return, the nature of which he did not disclose. The range 
of percentages of net after tax earnings the other 27 
respondents who were prepared to sacrifice ranged from 3 per 
cent to 25 per cent with a mean value of 6,72 per cent. 
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Question 47 
The objective of this question was to determine what per-
centage return on an alternative investment (where non 
economic satisfactions will not be available) would induce 
respondents to sell the~r firms and invest in the said al-
ternative. 
Respondents were required to indicate the approximate 
returns they would consider for removing non economic satis-
factions from the firm. 
Table 13.11 depicts the return categories and preferences of 
respondents for a specific return category: 
TABLE 13.11 
APPROXIMATE RETURNS FOR WHICH RESPONDENTS WOULD CONSIDER 
REMOVING NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS FROM THE FIRM 
RETURN CATEGORIES RESPONDENTS 
Less than 4 per cent 0 
5 8 per cent 0 
9 - 12 per cent 0 
13 - 16 per cent 0 
17 - 20 per cent 2 
Over 20 per cent 18 
No return at all 10 
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The respondents to questions 42 to 47 indicate quite clearly 
that the operational hypothesis concerning these questions 
can be accepted: non-economic satisfactions are important. 
13.2.19 RISK AVERSITY 
The final question in the questionnaire probed the risk 
aversity of respondents. 
This question relates to the hypothesis that the businessmen 
in the study are not risk seekers. The question was put to 
respondents that if they were bidding on an uncertain con-
tract, the outcome of which could be jeopardized by strikes 
and delays, what insurance premium were they willing to pay 
against possible losses. 
They were required to state the value of the insurance 
premium percentage-wise in terms of the total value of the 
contract. 
Figure 14.2 1S a horizontal bar chart that indicates the 
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Only 1 respondent declined insurance against the risky con-
tract and 1 was undecided. 
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It is evident from figure 14.2 that 28 respondents preferred 
to relinquish different percentages of the contract price 
for insurance against losses. It can therefore be concluded 
that all of them are relatively risk averse. 
The operational hypothesis, namely that businessmen in the 
study area are relatively risk averse, can therefore be ac-
cepted. 
13.2.20 SUMMARY 
With regard to the objective of the firm it is clear that 
there are many firms which are not primarily profit orien-
tated. It is furthermore evident that few firms use formal 
methods of investment decision making. However, the 
hypothesis that profit orientated firms will use formal pro-
cedures and non profit orientated firms will use informal 
procedures could not be substantiated. 
It is furthermore apparent that forecasting problems; due to 
the volatility of the South African economy, particularly 
fluctuating interest· rates, changing tax rates and trade 
unionism could play a role in deterring many decision makers 
from using formal DCF methods even if they were fully 
familiar with such methods. 
493 
There were a surprising number of decision makers who are 
prepared to risk insolvency through accepting risky invest-
ments. Nonetheless, the operational hypothesis in this 
respect namely that decision makers will not accept invest-
ments that could fail and in the event force the firm into 
insolvency, was however upheld since a significantly greater 
number of respondents rejected this type of investment. 
In contrast to allegations in the literature regarding the 
excessive use of short term debt by small firms in the fund-
ing of capital expenditures, there seemed to be a preference 
for equity financing amongst decision makers in the study. 
This is an indication of an apparently conservative approach 
towards investment decision making. There are, however, 
severe misconceptions especially with regards to the cost of 
equity and trade credit. There is furthermore no comprehen-
sion of the fact that overdrafts can at any time be called 
up. 
Although a large number of respondents indicated that they 
do link long term sources of financing to proposed invest-
ments there seems to be confusion as to the implication of 
matching long term sources of finance with long term invest-
ments. The confusion in this respect warrants further 
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research. An examination of financial statements of the 
firms concerned would, of course, have provided insight into 
the problem but they were unavailable to the researcher. 
Although the majority of respondents preferred not to use 
short term debt for investment purposes only a few supplied 
reasons that truly reflected some understanding. In spite of 
the operational hypothesis that unlisted small firms make 
liberal use of short term sources of finance in the funding 
of their investments they seem to be doing exactly the op~ 
posite. 
The usage of medium term finance (which is less vulnerable 
than short term sources) endorses the view that decision 
makers in the unlisted small firms of the study are conser-
vative in their investment decision making. 
The majority of those respondents who did make use of short 
term funds in the funding of their investments seemed to be 
unperturbed by the possibility that these debts might fall 
due before enough cash flow has been generated from the in-
vestment. They all appeared to have a sound liquidity back-
ing and were thus perhaps justified . in their complacency .• 
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Owner supplied funds and retained earnings seemed to be by 
far the most preferred forms of finance for the funding of 
investments. This fact further underlines a conservative ap-
proach towards investment decision making. 
Despite the supposition that high debt ratios would prevail 
in the study, the research revealed generally moderate to 
low debt ratios. Respondents' perceptions of their debt 
ratios furthermore seemed to correspond with reality, which 
effectively reflects a conservative attitude towards the use 
of debt. 
Respondents agaln revealed a conservative attitude when they 
expressed preferences as to the composition of a financial 
mix. The majority preferred equity. However not one respon-
dent justified his answer by reference to establishing an 
optimal cost of capital. 
The hypothesis that owner/managers of unlisted small firms 
were not conscious of outside opportunities in a risk class 
similar to that of investment in their own firms was 
validated. Respondents who indicated that they were aware of 
better opportunities seemed unable to quantify the risk of 
these opportunities since they regarded comparative outside 
opportunities in terms of short term risk free investments 
in financial institutions. 
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The variety of responses relating to the valuation of shares 
in the unlisted small firm were evidence of confusion. Not 
one respondent considered any discouting of future profits 
neither did anyone consider any form of opportunity cost. 
There is no uniform way in which the cost of debt is viewed. 
Some respondents conceptualize this cost in form of Rands 
and other in the form of percentages whereas others regarded 
it in both forms. Furthermore, supposition that the cost of 
debt is measured on a before tax basis seemed accurate. 
A notable fact that emerged during the study was that 
several respondents regarded equity to be cost free. And 
among those respondents who did regard equity as having a 
cost, there seemed to be confusion and only a very few 
regarded it as being an opportunity cost. It is furthermore 
evident that some respondents underestimate their cost of 
equity since as a group the mean value of the estimate of 
this cost was below the prime overdraft rate which is con-
trary to principles enunciated in literature. Underestima-
tion of cost of capital would possibly lead to acceptance of 
investments which would decrease shareholder wealth while 
overestimation of cost of equity would result in rejection 
of appropriate investments. 
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The concepts of target capital structures and weighted 
average marginal cost of capital were clearly concepts which 
play no part in the investment decision making of firms in 
the study. 
The hypothesis that owner/managers of unlisted small firms 
do not take inflation into account was rejected on ~he basis 
of a closed ended question. However the methods described by 
respondents were so subjective and vague that an in depth 
questioning on this matter might well prove that although 
these respondents thought that they had taken inflation into 
account in their investment decision making they in fact had 
not. 
Responses regarding liquidity in the study confounded ear-
lier reported findings viz. that small firms are usually il-
liquid. Indeed, the firms appeared to be particularly li-
quid. Furthermore, investments wit h relatively high returns 
and slow payback periods were rejected in favour of invest-
ments with fast paybacks and lower returns. What also ap-
pears to be evident is that respondents who do prefer in-
vestments with high returns and slow payback periods above 
investments with lower returns and faster payback periods 
can afford to do so since they are indeed very liquid. It 
may well be that small firms in South Africa today, have 
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learned their lessons from past severe liquidity squeezes 
and know only too well the threat to survival that illi-
quidity poses. 
Non-economic satisfactions were . much in evidence. The most 





planning and controlling decisions; 
pride in running own business; 
being own boss and 
control of income by own actions. 
Respondents were furthermore, willing to deliberately 
sacrifice financial returns for non economic satisfactions. 
This means that they can be content with substandard finan-
cial returns which in turn means that their cost of equity 
can be lowered. 
It is finally observed that the respondents tendered to be 
r~latively risk av~rse since they would be prepared to in-
sure against losses resulting from a risky venture. This 
further endorsed the conservative profile of the firms con-
cerned. 
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In the final chapter conclusions will be drawn from the 
study ~nd recommendations made. These conclusions and recom-
mendations will be focus sed toward the normative investment 
decision making model. 
500 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature that served as a background to this study 
painted a gloomy picture of small firms in general. They 






being illiquid to such an extent that their total sur-
vival depended on meticulous cash management; 
making use of an inordinate amount of debt in their 
capital structures; 
making e~tensive use of short term debt in their in-
vestment decision making and 
using extremely unsophisticated investment decision 
making techniques. 
Furthermore, because they are unlisted, they are in practi-
cal terms also unable to use 'approved' methods for capital 
bUdgeting. 
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The above mentioned points suggest an extremely high risk 
profile for small firms. A normative model for investment 
decision making was consequently developed in recognition of 
the need to exercise the utmost caution and in doing so to 
minimize the risk of insolvency. 
Since the investment decision making profile of the small 
firm in the study area has now been established it becomes 
necessary to compare these results against the normative 
model and to draw conclusions and make recommendations. 
14.2 THE NORMATIVE MODEL VERSUS THE INVESTMENT DECISION 
MAKING PRACTICES OF UNLISTED SMALL FIRMS IN THE 
DURBAN-PINETOWN-PIETERMARITZBURG METROPOLITAN 
AREAS 
14.2.1 PROHIBITIVE CONDITIONS 
14.2.1.1 RISK OF INSOLVENCY 
The risk of insolvency principle stipulates that 
having the slightest possibility of failing 
projects 
should be 
avoided. The mere possibility of an indigestable loss being 
incurred should render a particular . investment unacceptable. 
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Although a number of respondents in the study area would 
risk insolvency by accepting such an investment a sig-
nificant majority of ,respondents appeared to be very respon-
sible in their attitudes towards risk. These respondents in-
dicated most emphatically that they would under no cir-
cumstances accept an investment that has the slightest pos-
sibility of failing and in the event lead to insolvency. On 
further questioning they explained that their firms were not 
able to weather losses brought about by 'gambling' with un-
certainty. This leaning towards risk aversity was confirmed 
when it was found that 28 out of 30 respondents were 
prepared to take out insurance against possible losses in-
curred in a risky contract. 
It could thus be concluded that the research sample to a 
great extent conformed to this aspect of the normative 
model. 
14.2.1.2. UTILIZATION OF SHORT TERM DEBT 
The normative model states that under no circumstances 
should the unlisted firm make use - of short term debt funds 
in order to finance investments. Non adherence to this rule 
could, in the event of non extension of short term debt 
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facilities, lead to financial embarrasment or even insol-
vency. The unlisted small firm should instead of yielding to 
the temptation simply avoid "the investment. 
Research in the study area suggested that by and large the 
firms do adhere to this stipulation laid down by the norma-
tive model. Relatively few respondents made use of short 
term sources in the funding of their investments. 
Those who did make use of short term funds supplied ration-
ale for their actions which were to say the least, suspect. 
Builders for example claimed that the construction industry 
is so business cycle sensitive, that planning (and funding) 
extend only one year into the future. 
Although most decision makers seemed to have a preference 
for equity in the funding of investments, several misconcep-
tionsregarding the usage of different forms of finance 
emerged. There was for example, a lack of awareness that 
bank overdrafts can at any time be called up. In addition 
trade credit was generally regarded automatically as cost 
free without consideration of the discount position. 
Finally, most respondents regarded equity as a form of 
finance without cost. Collectively these misconceptions 
point to an information 'gap' which can potentially lead to 
investment decision making below the optimal level. 
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On the other hand, the bias t·owards the use of equi ty as 
well as medium term finance for investment funding points to 
an attitude of conservatism on the part of owner/managers of 
unlisted small firms in the study area. It indeed represents 
some exciting good news that refutes the allegations of Con-
radie that small firms make excessive use of short term 
sources of funds in the funding of investments. 
14.2.1.3 DEBT RATIOS 
The normative model stipulates that a 'moderate' debt ratio 
should be maintained at all times. Since such a ratio is in-
dustry specific an exact general ratio could not be 
prescribed. It was recommended that advice be obtained from 
people who are conversant with the industry, such as the 
firm's auditors. 
Notwithstanding the lack of clearly defined ratio criteria 
it was clear that firms in the sample were generally conser-
vatively funded: the mean debt ratio was a low 36 per cent. 
This is particularly low when compared against the results 
of the study by Conradie in which 66,7 per cent of bank 
manager respondents deemed a 49 per cent debt ratio as the 
upper limit and 33,3 per cent a 60 per cent ratio. 
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The 36 per cent debt ratio furthermore compares extremely 
favourably against a British study by Wilson (1979 :57) a 
study by the Bureau of Financial Analysis of the University 
of Pretoria and that of Conradie (1982 :212), whose research 
results on debt ratios for small firms all revealed debt 
ratios of around 60 per cent. The firms in this study 
clearly do not fit the mould proposed by Weston and Brigham 
{1978 :953) that small businessmen borrow beyond their 
means. 
Respondent's perceptions of their debt ratio positions cor-
responded in most cases with the actual ratios. 
of respondents as to how high this ratio could 
The opinion 
be without 
causing financial embarrasment centered around 50 per cent. 
This indeed reflects a 'moderate' ratio if judged by the 
standards of the Conradie study. In comparison with many JSE 
listed companles the mean debt ratio in the study can also 
be regarded as conservative. 
Respondents generally did not consider themselves under 
capitalized and were quite comfortable with the debt util-
ized. Many consciously adopted a conservative stance in or-
der to accommodate the volatility of the South African 
economy and the resultant unpredictable interest and tax 
rates. 
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14.2.2 THE REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
The normative model is prescriptive concerning the required 
rate of return. 
14.2.2.1 COMPONENT COSTS OF CAPITAL 
i) Cost of Equity 
In estimating the cost of equity the controlling owners 
would need to monitor the returns on realistic, equal risk, 
investment alternatives outside the firm. Opportunity cost 
is thus the basic determinant of the cost of equity. 
It is disturbing that several respondents viewed equity to 
be cost free. Most of them felt it was free because there 
were no interest charges payable on it. Only a third of the 
respondents regarded the cost of equity to be an opportunity 
cost. Amongst the rest a great deal of confusion was evident 
as to what determined the cost of equity. 
These research results coincide with those of the studies by 
Soldofsky and Boyer, both of whom established that a sig-
nificant number of firms regarded equity as not having a 
cost. 
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Respondents who acknowledged the cost of equity. estimated 
such cost at ratios varying from 16 to 35 per cent with a 
mean value of 20 per cent. As this was below the prevailing 
prime overdraft rate and probably well below the overdraft 
rate which would be applicable to subject firms, it is 
likely that most respondents underestimated the cost. In 
this regard both Weston and Brigham (1978 :796) and Boyer 
(1974:9) argue that the ciost of equity should generally be 
higher than the cost of debt. 
On the other hand the cost of equity might genuinly be lower 
than opportunity cost as a result of the presence of non 
economic satisfactions nearly all respondents were 
prepared to sacrifice returns ln order to retain non 
economic satisfactions. 
The majority of respondents furthermore seemed unaware of 
better opportunity yields in a risk class similar to that of 
investment in their own firm. These respondents seemed un-
able to quantify risk or alternatively they were not able to 
comprehend the concept of risk quantification since they 
regarded comparative outside opportunities only in terms of 
risk free short term deposits with financial institutions. 
Risk quantification in alternative investment opportunities 
is in any event problematic (Meij and Willems 1966 : 156). 
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ii) COST OF DEBT 
The normative model required that the cost of debt should be 
measured on an after tax basis. 
Most respondents in the study asessed the cost of debt on a 
before tax basis. This was a distinct deviation from the 
model. Many respondents gave the impression that they were 
not even aware of the deductability of interest on debt from 
taxable income. As a result, many respondents were inade-
quately informed on ,the concept of financial leverage and 
its beneficial effect on returns when applied ap-
propriately. 
14.2.2.2 OVERALL COST OF FINANCING 
The normative model requires that when both debt and equity 
are used in the financing of an investment, the decision 
maker needs to be conscious of the fact that there is an 
overall cost of financing to be considered which includes a 
cost of equity. The equity and debt elements would need to 
be weighted by the amounts involved in order to arrive at an 
overall cost of capital. The estimation of this cost is im-
perative since it will, as the required rate, be compared 
against projected returns of the investment. 
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In this respect research findings revealed that the sample 
firms deviated completely from the principle laid down by 
the normative model. The weighting of capital costs in order 
to obtain a weighted average cost of capital clearly played 
no part in the investment decision making of respondents in 
the study. In this respect Soldofsky, in a survey on capital 
budgeting practices of small firms, came to the conclusion 
that the weighting of capital costs was beyond the com-
prehension of most of the respondents interviewed by him. 
A significant observation during the survey was that a sub-
stantial number of respondents only considered the cost of 
debt when determining an overall cost against which expected 
returns of an investment were to be measured. This observa-
tion was consistent with the findings of Gray, et al. 
(1972: 29-38) that the most popular method of evaluating an 
investment proposal was to compare the expected rate of 
return on an investment against the cost of a single source 
of funds. 
The 'information gap' seems to be very pertinent in respect 
of an overall cost of financing. 
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14.2.3 FINANCING MIX 
A comprehensive understanding of the component costs of 
capital and the overall cost of capital is a prerequisite 
for the understanding of the concept of a 'target capital 
structure.' 
According to the principle laid down by the normative model 
the decision maker should be aware of the fact that there 
exists a level of financing which represents an optimal mix 
between debt and equity. This optimal level, the normative 
model specifies, will be that proportion between debt and 
equity where the overall cost of capital is minimized. 
Decision makers in the study did not raise finance for the 
funding of investments according to a target capital struc-
ture. The impression was gained during the survey, that the 
concept of a target capital structure and its significance 
lay beyond the general realm of comprehension of respon-
dents. 
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14.2.4 EVALUATION METHOD 
In prescribing an evaluation method for investments to be 
explored by the unlisted small firm the normative model 
takes due cognizance of DCF. The normative model however, 
provides the following rationale for not prescribing dis-
counted cash flow: -
* investment decision makers in listed firms in South 
Africa who do use DCF methods generally do not link 
their utilization to the normative objective of th~ 
firm which is wealth maximization; 
* 
listed firms with skilled financial executives have 
difficulty in mastering DCF techniques. It is conse-
quently unreasonable to expect unlisted firms to do so 
and 
since the unlisted small firm has no formal market 
where its shares are traded the calculation of an ap-
propriate discount rate is not facilitated. These firms 
are acordingly unable to utilize DCF techniques in a 
theoretical correct manner;. 
although opportunity cost provides a possible alterna-
tive for the calculation of an appropriate discount 
rate, theoretical and practical obstacles prevent its 
utilization. 
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Consequently the only alternative left for the decision 
maker of the unlisted small firm, is to utilize non time re-
lated methods in the decision making process. 
The normative model accordingly stipulates that the decision 
maker should giye balanced attention to both liquidity and 
profitability without losing sight of the fact that an ac-
ceptable project should return more than its cost of financ-
lng. Clearly, decision makers will need to be made aware of 
the issues involved and encouraged to apply the model ap-
propriately. 
14.2.4.1 PROFITABILITY 
Since the small unlisted firm has limited access to the kind 
of information relevant to decision making these firms' 
decision makers should rely heavily on accounting data. 
Against this background it is considered mos~ appropriate 
that the unlisted small firm makes use of the accounting. 
rate of return. 
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14.2.4.2 LIQUIDITY 
The normative model observes that the unlisted small firm 
usually operates from a fragile liquidity base and will need 
to specify a 'cut off' payback period beyond which a 
proposed investment cannot be accepted. In the light of this 
high priority objective the normative model suggests that 
the firm should be willing to sacrifice some investment 
returns, if necessary, in order to stay liquid. The exact 
percentage which might need to be sacrificed will differ 
from firm to firm depending on the investment liquidity con-
ditions of the firm. 
The normative model however recognizes that it will be un-
reasonable to expect the decision maker of the unlisted firm 
to sacrifice unlimited returns for liquidity. This trade off 
will depend on the liquidity position of the specific firm 
as well as the utility values of the decision makers. 
It 1S dissapointing that 1n general decision makers in the 
study area do not make use of formal accounting related in-
vestment decision making 
return or payback period. 
methods like accounting rate of 
Thirty three and one third per 
cent (10 respondents) indicated a method based on accounting 
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rate of return and payback. When asked to describe it 
however they were so vague that not one of these so called 
'hybrids' could be defined. 
Informal methods described were extremely unsophisticated. 
When questioned on the use of these so called 'methods' 
respondents replied that they were utilized on grounds of 
~ractical experience and have proved themselves through the 
years. Decision makers in general put a high premium on 
'practical experience' in their approach to investment deci-
sion making and gave the impression that it was something of 
supreme value which cannot be replaced. 
It was observed that very few respondents have the remotest 
knowledge of the rather unsophisticated but theoretically 
accepted investment evaluation methods like 'accounting rate 
of return' or 'payback period.' 
Similar research results were disclosed by Soldofsky when he 
conducted a survey on the capital budgeting practices 
amongst small manufacturing enterprises in the USA. Many 
respondents, Soldofsky found, described their investment 
evaluation methods as both vague and flexible, indicating a 
lack of a formalized decision making criterion. The conclu-
sions of Soldofsky were confirmed in a later study by Gray, 
et al. (1972 :29-38).Although the Boyer study (1974 :12) 
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suggests that there may be confusion with regards to the in-
vestment evaluation methods used in the USA, the general 
pattern that emerged from all studies seems to be that the 
smaller the business the more unsophisticated the investment 
evaluation method. 
A further disturbing observation that became evident in the 
survey is that some respondents seem to confuse capital ex-
penditures with operating expenses. 
These observations collectively endorse previous conclusions 
that a severe information 'gap' exists between theory and 
practice in the investment decision making of unlisted small 
firms in general. 
Respondents who comprehend DCF provided rationale for the 
non usage of these methods. According to them the volatility 
of the South African economy, ever changing tax rates and 
interest rates make forecasting and the establishing of in-
terest rates virtually impossible. It is consequently quite 
understandable that some respondents, especially those in 
the business cycle sensitive industries limit their 
forecasting to 1 year. 
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The above practice coincides with observations from Weston 
and Brigham (1987 :501) who state that small business 
managers feel uncomfortable when called upon to make 
forecasts beyond a year or two. Since DCF techniques require 
explicit estimates of cash flows small business managers 
feel they cannot risk insolvency on what they call 
'guesstimates' • 
Pike (1982 :36) also defends book value methods, more 
I 
specifically payback period, against DCF. He observes that 
managers don't understand DCF, that DCF is not necessary 
when payback periods are rapid and ' finally that, it is no 
easy task to estimate the 'correct' discount rate. 
Carsberg and Hope (1985 :45-46) note that the uncertainty 
associated with business undertakings makes it extremely 
risky to rely on single valued forecasts. They do state 
however that DCF forecasts can improve the chances of op-
timal decisions. 
The above evidence on the application of DCF in investment 
decision making endorses the stance of the normative model 
in this respect. 
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Respondents in general seem to prefer investments with mini-
mal returns and fast payback periods to investments with 
relatively higher returns and slower paybacks. It could 
however not be established whether liquidity would have 
precedence over further incremental returns beyond the ones 
presented in the questionnaire. Further research in this 
respect seems necessary. The few respondents who did prefer 
profitability over liquidity seemed to be so liquid that 
they could indeed afford to sacrifice liquidity for 
profitability. The liquidity preferences of respondents in 
the study area were endorsed by their actual liquidity POS1-
tion : firms generally seem to be relatively liquid. 
A further observation that reinforced the conclusion of a 
sound liquidity position that exists amongst respondents was 
their cool reaction to the possibility of overdrafts being 
called up at any time, or extent ion of short term loans 
being refused. A number of respondents indicated that they 
were liquid enough to weather any such event. 
The high preference for liquidity in the area refutes al-
legations in literature (section 9.1.4.5) that small firms 
are illiquid and that their basic objective is one of sur-
vival which hinges on meticulous cash management. 
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The high preference for liquidity reinforces previous con-
clusions that there exists a trend of conservatism regarding 
investment decision making in the study area. 
14.2.5 INFLATION 
The normative model requires from decision makers to take 
inflation into account when they make their investment deci-
sions. This should be done by writing off depreciation ac-
cording to replacement value and not according to historical 
book values. 
Although it is recognized that decision makers do take note 
of inflation in their investment decision making their 
methods are so subjective and unsophisticated that further 
research into these 'methods' could very well 'show up' 
their inefficiency. 
14.2.6 SALARIES TO OWNERS 
In respect of salaries that are paid to owner/managers the 
normative model suggests that these withdrawals be limited 
to an amount approximately equal to the salaries paid in the 
industry for equivalent work performed. Excessive drawings 
could distort return on investment calculations and could 
even impair liquidity. 
519 
The above norm could not be probed properly due to the con-
fidential nature of the question. 
14.2.7 VALUATION OF SHARES 
The valuation process of the unlisted small 'firm is complex. 
This complexity is further compounded by the impact of non 
economic satisfactions on the cost of equity. A norm was 
consequently not constructed for the purpose of valuation. 
The variety of responses which this question elicited is 
evidence that confusion exist between respondents in this 
respect. 
There is little likelihood that any normative model of 
general validity can be constructed to accommodate this 
problem. 
14.2.8 NON ECONOMIC SATISFACTIONS 
The point of departure of the normative model concerning 
'non economic' satisfactions is that owners should be aware 
that 'non economic satisfactions can lower their cost of 
equity i.e. allow them to accept a . sub standard financial 
return (one that is lower than alternative investments of 
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similar risk). The cost of their non economic satisfactions 
is thus directly mea~urable and some limiting cost should be 
specified by the rational owner. 
Responses to these questions indicated that respondents 
value 'non economic' satisfactions very dearly. They put a 
premium on autonomy and they are prepared to sacrifice 
financial return in order to retain certain non economic 
satisfactions. These non economic satisfactions were also 
measurable in 29 cases, meaning that owners are aware of the 
financial return they are sacrificing. 
The existence of 'non economic satisfactions' and the resul-
tant monetary value placed on it by respondents in the study 
area confirms the study by Boyer (1974 :112). 
A quite interesting conclusion is that the four most coveted 
non economic satisfactions in the study area namely "I can 
play a part in planning and controlling decisions," "I take 
pride · in running my own business", "I can be my own boss" 
and "I control my income by my own actions" also featured in 
the first four in the Boyer study, however ln exactly the 
opposite sequence. The rating furthermore corresponds to the 
theory of Maslow namely that the need for self actualiza-
tion. (I can play a part in planni~g and controlling deci-
sions) is the most important, followed secondly by status 
needs (I take pride in running my own business and I can be 
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my own boss} and thirdly by economic needs (I control my in-
come by my own actions. A number of features which emerged 
from the study namely the non economic satisfactions, desire 
for independance, 
of moderate risk 
control of one's destiny and a preference 
levels conform closely with the need for 
achievement profile researched inter alia by McClelland and 
Burnham (1976 :100-110). These factors also prove to be con-
sistent with entrepreneurial activities. 
The comparison of monetary returns between this study and 
that of Boyer poses problems in that there is a discrepancy 
of fifteen years between the two studies. 
What _was furthermore evident, however, was that 50 per cent 
of the respondents of the DPP area indicated that they would 
not leave their businesses under any circumstances 
(irrespective of how lucrative the outside offer might be) 
whereas in Boyer's study the percentage proved to be 65,3 
per cent}. 
The existance of non economic satisfactions in the study 
area in effect means that the co~t of equity as well as the 
overall cost of capital will be lowered by the monetary 
value respondents put on the non economic satisfactions. The 
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lower discount rates of equity and the overall cost of capi-
tal will therefore impact on the value of owner's equity and 
the total value of these firms respectively. 
14.3 CONCLUSION 
Although investment evaluation methods of respondents in the 
study area's are far removed from those accepted as valid in 
financial literature the methods they employ seem to have 
the desired results. 
Respondents' behaviour towards investment decision making is 
furthermore enhanced by their cautious approach towards the 
form of financing they employ (which is generally long term) 
and their management of working capital. Although they 
generally do not have rationale for doing the right thing 
(utilizing long term funds) they are in fact doing it, and 
that is the only important thing. 
The general impression of the survey was that these respon-
dents placed a very high premium on their 'practical 
experience', something that has been moulded in a hard 
school, that of a volatile South African economy, with tax 
rates and interest rates changing dramatically from one 
period to another. There is, however, an information 'gap' 
between theory and practice. 
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Respondents seem to be unaware of some basic theoretical 
principles, concepts and practices. 
14.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
14.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recommendations regarding investment decision making in the 
unlisted small firm should hinge on the objective of the 
firm, namely wealth maximization. These recommendations 
should therefore be aimed at those aspects of the normative 
model where the small unlisted firm falls short. These 
recommendations should furthermore be instrumental in bridg-
ing the information 'gap' that exists between theory and 
practice. If this can be done successfully it can serve to 
enhance the vision of decision makers of unlisted small 
firms, which will, when coupled with their practical ex-
perience, lead to increased profitability. 
14.4.2 INVESTMENT EVALUATION 
It is imperative that decision makers comprehend that an ac-
ceptable project should return more than it costs to 
finance. He must furthermore have an idea as to how the ac-
ceptance of a project will affect the firm's profitability, 
liquidity and solvency. 
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14.4.2.1 PROFITABILITY 
Profitability of an investment should be gauged according to 
the average rate of return method. There are virtually no 
respondents who utilize this method and since it is so 
simplistic and applicable with readily available accounting 
data it should be mastered and applied accordingly. There is 
thus a need for appropriate training and education. The at-
tention of tertiary educational institutions should be drawn 
to the need and suitable programmes developed. 
14.4.2.2 LIQUIDITY 
The unlisted small firm which operates from a fragile li-
quidity base will need to specify a 'cut off' payback period 
beyond which a proposed investment ca not be accepted. 
Respondents are generally ignorant of the above principle. 
It is imperative that they master the concept of 'payback 
period' and apply it. In addition to establishing this 'cut 
off' point, however, the decision maker needs to project in-
cremental cash flows on a monthly rather than annual basis. 
Attention should furthermore be given to cash flows needed 
over and above those concerning the initial costs namely 
cash flows needed to increase working capital. In this 
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respect the ratio . developed by Hamblin (1976:63) could as-
sist in determining how much working capital a firm needs 
given the credit terms given and taken in the industry and 
the rate of stock turnover. Actual working capital less the 
required working capital as calculated will indicate whether 
or not a surplus exists. If there is a surplus, it needs to 
be large enough to carry the working capital needs of the 
new investment. If there is a deficit or the surplus is not 
large enough, it would be necessary to negotiate a loan or 
overdraft facilities until the eventual positive cash flow 
from the investment is sufficient to offset the early out-
flows. If such facilities cannot be arranged the investment 
should be avoided. 
14.4.3 COST OF CAPITAL 
14.4.3.1 AWARENESS OF OPPORTUNITY YIELDS 
Owner/managers should be aware of opportunity yields on in-
vestments in a similar risk class as that in their own 
flrms. In order however, to be able to make a comparison be-
tween the return they are receiving and that of outside op-
portunities it is imperative that owner/managers be able to 
quantify the cost of capital on an opportunity cost basis. 
Too many respondents employ the wrong method to calculate 
this cost, others don't even know about its existence. 
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14.4.3.2 COST OF DEBT 
The cost of debt should be measured on an after tax basis. 
Too many respondents are not aware of the tax benefits of 
debt and its resultant impact on financial leverage. 
14.4.3.3 OVERALL COST OF FINANCING 
Decision makers should realize that an overall cost of 
financing is imperative in the decision making process. They 
should further be able to realize that if debt and equity is 
used in the funding of an investment that these two costs 
should be incorporated in an overall cost according to their 
weights. If the 'average rate of return' method is used this 
'weighted cost' should act as an acceptance criterion 
against which the 'average rate of return' should be 
measured. 
14.4.4 FINANCING MIX 
The decision maker should realize that there exists an op-
timal financing mix which represents a level of financing 
consisting of part debt and part equity. This optimum level 
he should comprehend represents the point where the overall 
cost of capital is minimized. 
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14.4.5 INFLATION 
Adjustments to account for inflation should be made via in-
flation accounting. Depreciation should for example be cal-
culated and accounted for on the basis of replacement cost 
and not historical book values • . 
14.4.6 CONCLUSION 
It is recognized that the unlisted small firm is a cor-
nerstone of the freemarket economy in that it serves to in-
crease competitiveness amongst undertakings in the industry 
in which it serves. If it were not for these firms 
oligopolies and its concomitant dangers such as informal 
price fixing and cartel forming could very well undermine 
the South African free market economy. 
It is therefore imperative, in order to ensure the 
managerial efficiency of these firms, that they be noticed 
by academicians and their decision makers 'educated', in or-
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